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Abstract 
In boardrooms around the world, climate change has recently emerged as a major issue, 
matching the level of public concern. This thesis is motivated by the growing interest in 
assessing the financial consequences of corporate involvement in climate change beyond 
regulatory compliance, as evidenced by firms’ voluntary participation in the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP). This thesis contributes to the ongoing literature by extending 
insights into three financial consequences of voluntary carbon disclosure, namely, financial 
performance, firm risk, and market reaction.  
We empirically investigate these financial consequences by conducting three essays using a 
unique dataset containing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange’s FTSE350 index for 
the period 2007 to 2015. In the first essay, we empirically conceptualise and investigate the 
impact of adopting proactive carbon strategies on financial performance, building on the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm as a theoretical framework. For this, we employ a 
panel data approach. The finding provides strong evidence that voluntary carbon disclosure 
and firm financial performance are positively associated. In the second essay, we build on the 
RBV theory and consider the potentially positive association between information asymmetry 
and firm risk, and subsequently the relationship between corporate carbon disclosure and firm 
risk, by appointing the panel data approach. We find that the adoption of carbon strategies 
significantly reduces the firm’s total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. In the third essay, we 
examine the market reaction to carbon disclosure announcements by adopting an event study 
method. This is done by considering investors’ perspective on the costs and benefits of carbon 
disclosure. The results show that the market reacts significantly negatively to carbon 
disclosure announcements via the CDP. Furthermore, additional tests are applied, including 
investigating the influence of the global financial crisis and industry status on the examined 
relationships. Our research findings offer fresh insights and updated policy implications for 
investors, management, regulators, and sustainability institutions. 
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Chapter 1.Introduction 
 
Global warming and related climate change are the most serious problems confronting the 
world today (World Economic Forum, 2016).1 While it is not a new phenomenon, increased 
awareness and understanding of the scale of the threats in the 21st century have shed light on 
the need for greater corporate responsibility toward the environment (Laufer, 2003). This 
increased attention has prompted calls for businesses to prioritise the disclosure of reliable 
information, so that a firm’s risk and opportunity related to climate change can be properly 
assessed, something now elevated to a strategic issue (Lewandowski, 2017). On their part, 
firms have realised that they face real consequences from climate change and are increasingly 
giving strategic consideration to reducing their carbon footprint (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011). 
 
1.1 Research Motivation and Significance 
The main cause of climate change is greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Luo et al., 2018), and 
the leading source of such emissions is corporations (CDP, 2017).2 Therefore, the need to 
recognise how corporate initiatives aimed at tackling climate change impact a firm’s financial 
situation is a pressing one. At the most fundamental level this research is motivated by the 
alarming potential consequences of climate change. This is combined by an understanding of 
the degree to which GHGs are emitted by large corporations suggesting that any global 
success in tackling this issue would require corporate as well as government action. 
Furthermore, it is also understood that such concerns extend beyond the research domain and 
are expressed by investors, regulators and other stakeholders with increasing intensity which 
adds to the significance of the research. The motivation to examine the relationship between 
voluntary carbon disclosure and firm financial situation is derived from the uncertainty 
surrounding it. With a clearer understanding of this relationship, firms may be supported in 
their decision-making and strategy. Finally, undertaking the research at this time is supported 
by the growing pressure from investors, stakeholders and regulators for firms to go beyond 
                                                 
1 The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines ‘climate change’ as 
‘a change of climate, which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods 
(UNFCCC, Article 1.2, 1992).  
2 GHG resulting from human activities have reached a historical peak (Okereke et al., 2012). They contribute to 
the warming of the atmosphere and constitute a serious risk to the health and safety of our society, as well as 
having an impact on all life (CGU, 2009). The components of GHG are carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons (NASA, 2019). The term ‘carbon emissions’ is occasionally used instead 
of GHG emissions, because carbon dioxide is predominant among other GHGs, representing 81% of total GHG 
emissions in the UK (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2018). 
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statutory requirements to make enhanced voluntary carbon disclosures. This pressure is 
evidenced by the rising prominence of organisations such as the UK-based Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) which provide a framework and platform for such disclosure. While climate 
change is a global phenomenon, to examine the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
firm financial consequences it is appropriate to take as a research case an advanced high 
emissions economy with a recognised voluntary disclosure framework. Therefore, the United 
Kingdom has been selected as the research case. 
 
1.2  The UK Context 
This study takes the United Kingdom (UK) as a research sample in this examination on the 
consequences of carbon disclosure, in a business context. The UK represents an interesting 
case because it is a high-emitting country and at the forefront of tackling climate change and 
promoting mitigation measures and carbon reporting by the business sector. The UK is a part 
of the European Union (EU) that is one of the world’s top three GHG-emitting economies 
(following China and the United States). Among EU member countries, the UK is one of the 
largest GHG emitters (Haque, 2017). According to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
(2018), the country is among the top 20 emitters of GHGs. In 2013, emissions from the 
consumption of energy by the UK reached 568.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, 
ranking it 11th in the world (CIA Factbook, 2018). 
 
1.3 The UK’s Changing Climate Risk and Political Response  
The UK’s climate is changing; specifically, it is getting warmer. Nine of the ten warmest 
years, on record, have occurred since 2002 (Kendon et al., 2018). The decade 2008–2017 
witnessed temperature that was 0.8 degrees Celsius warmer than 1961–1990. Summers are 
becoming wetter, and a long-term trend of rising sea levels has been observed (Kendon et al., 
2018). A range of present and future risks have been identified for the UK. These risks 
include floods and coastal change affecting communities, businesses, and infrastructure; 
health and productivity risks from higher temperatures; increased pressures on water supply; 
and risks to ecosystems, soils, and biodiversity (UK Government, 2017). 
Since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the UK government has adopted and engaged 
a proactive stance towards climate change not least in efforts to encourage multilateral 
cooperation and to work with the business community through either voluntary guidelines or 
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statutory regulation. In June 2012, the then deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, told the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro:  
 “Counting your business costs while hiding your greenhouse gas 
emissions is a false economy…British companies need to reduce 
their harmful emissions for the benefit of the planet, but many 
back our plans because being energy efficient makes good 
business sense too. It saves companies money on energy bills, 
improves their reputation with customers and helps them manage 
their long-term costs too.” (DEFRA, 2012).3 
From 2013, the UK became the first country in the world to make the reporting of GHG 
emissions a legal requirement for the quoted companies (DEFRA, 2012).  In recent years, the 
UK prime minister restated the UK’s commitment to tackling climate change at the G20 
Summit in July 2017.  
 “…The UK’s own commitment to the Paris Agreement and 
tackling global climate change is as strong as ever. Not only will 
this protect the environment for future generations, it will keep 
energy affordable and maintain a secure and reliable supply in 
order to protect the interests of businesses and consumers. We 
play a leading role internationally and we are delivering on our 
commitments to create a safer, more prosperous future for us all”. 
(Prime Minister’s Office, 2017). 
Successive UK governments have also put their statements into action in the form of both 
regulations and guidelines.  
 
1.4 Regulatory Frameworks and Policy Guidelines   
The regulatory environment currently in place in the UK is regulated by combination of 
national and international provisions and agreements. These will be described in the following 
sections of this chapter and are summarised in Table 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 DEFRA is an abbreviation of Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. More details are explained 
in Section 1.4.2.1. 
 
 
 
4 
 
Panel A: National Regulatory Frameworks and Policy Guidelines 
Companies Act 2006 and 2013 Revisions 
Climate Change Act 2008 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural affairs: Reporting Guidelines 
Carbon Disclosure Project 
The UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
Panel B: International Provisions and Agreements 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Kyoto Protocol 
The European Union Emissions Trading System 
The Paris Agreement 
       Table 1.1 National and International Regulatory Frameworks and Agreements 
1.4.1 Regulatory Frameworks in the UK 
1.4.1.1 Companies Act 2006 and 2013 Revisions  
The Companies Act 2006 is the main source of the UK’s company law. Its comprehensive 
nature is reflected in it being, at the time of passing, the longest piece of legislation in the 
UK’s history, with 1,300 sections. Its contribution to the legal framework on climate change 
is found in Section 417 (5) and (6), which states that the environment is one of the areas a 
listed company must report information about by using financial and/or non-financial key 
performance indicators. The Act suggests that companies should follow a “comply or explain” 
approach towards the reporting of non-financial indicators in their Business Review. The 
2006 Act was amended by the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013. These regulations removed the business review provision and replaced it 
with a legal requirement for quoted companies to disclose their annual GHG emissions and 
the methodologies used to calculate them in their annual directors’ report. This came into 
force on 1 October 2013.  
 
1.4.1.2 Climate Change Act 2008 
The Climate Change Act 2008 put a legally binding framework in place to reduce the UK’s 
GHG emissions and a framework for developing the UK’s ability to adapt to climate change. 
Section 1 of the Act provides for a legally binding requirement for the government to reduce 
the UK’s GHG emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. It also obliges the government 
to set five-yearly carbon budgets starting with the period 2008–2012 (first period). Table 1.2 
presents the budgets that are already set. 
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Carbon budget Period Carbon budget level Reduction below 1990 levels 
2008 to 2012 3,018 MtCO2e 25% 
2013 to 2017 2,782 MtCO2e 31% 
2018 to 2022 2,544 MtCO2e 37% by 2020 
2023 to 2027 1,950 MtCO2e 51% by 2025 
2028 to 2032 1,725 MtCO2e 57% by 2030 
Table 1.2 The UK’s Carbon Budgets 2008–2032 
Source: The UKCCC (2018) 
 
The UK’s performance against these budgets has been positive. For example, in 2017 
emissions were 43% lower than 1990 levels, ahead of target. In addition to target-setting, 
another important aspect of the Act was its provision for setting up the UK Climate Change 
Committee (UKCCC) as presented in Act's Section 32. The UKCCC is an independent 
statutory body, which was given the legal duty to advise the UK government on carbon 
budgets and report to Parliament on progress (UKCCC, 2017). Recently, the UKCCC has 
warned that still more policy intervention will be needed if the country is to obtain budgets for 
the fourth and fifth periods (UKCCC, 2018). 
Overall, the Companies Act 2006 and the Climate Change Act 2008 determine the basic 
reporting requirements for the environmental dimension of a firm’s corporate social 
responsibility. In the lack of mandatory standards about environmental responsibility 
measures/ indicators, this legislation sets out the legal minimum obligations. The minimum, 
however, increasingly falls short of the expectations of stakeholders. To fill this gap, 
voluntary guidelines and reporting frameworks that offer appropriate environmental indicators 
have become more widely used in the UK. These will be presented in the following section.    
 
1.4.2 Other Frameworks and Policy Guidelines in the UK 
1.4.2.1 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: Reporting Guidelines 
Within the UK government it is the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), established in 2001, that has the responsibility for protecting the environment 
alongside rural communities, fishing and agriculture. In June 2013, DEFRA issued updated 
guidelines for reporting on the environment, including the mandatory reporting of GHG 
emissions. With the exception of the legal requirement to report GHG emissions for quoted 
companies, the guidelines issued by DEFRA are advisory. Furthermore, there is no 
universally agreed upon methodology for measuring these emissions, and they are not 
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required to be audited. The department does refer companies to the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) regarding methodologies, standards, and protocols (DEFRA, 2013).  
 
1.4.2.2 Carbon Disclosure Project 
One of the most significant non-statutory developments in the UK is the establishment of the 
CDP in 2000. The CDP is a non-profit charitable organisation, which has grown into a 
leading carbon disclosure initiative operating globally. It has developed several programmes 
covering GHG emissions, water, supply chain, forests, cities, and the Carbon Action Initiative 
(CDP, 2018a). Knox-Hayes and Levy (2011) attribute the success of the CDP to its “strategic 
skill in presenting the project in ways that appeal to multiple stakeholders and building broad 
legitimacy for reporting standards” (p. 1). In promoting disclosure and the sharing of 
information between companies, the CDP acts to reduce the perceived risks associated with 
this disclosure (Wilhelm, 2013). 
The CDP issues an annual questionnaire containing items on how climate change is managed, 
including strategy, initiatives and targets, risks and opportunities related to climate change, 
data on emissions performance, and the methods used to gather data. The collated information 
is then published in an annual report that includes a firm-specific carbon disclosure score on a 
scale from 0 to 100. The report is publicly available via the CDP website (CDP, 2018a). Table 
1.3 shows the numbers and percentages of FTSE350 firms participating in the CDP report 
over the sample period from 2007-2015. 
 
FTSE350  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Number 245 234 236 243 236 240 260 248 250 243.56 
Per cent 70.00% 66.86% 67.43% 69.43% 67.43% 68.57% 74.29% 70.86% 71.43% 69.59% 
Table 1.3 The Response Rate for FTSE350 Firms (2007-2015) 
Source: CDP (2007-2015) 
 
1.4.2.3 The UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
The UK pioneered emissions trading with its UK Emissions Trading Scheme introduced in 
2002, three years before the Kyoto Protocol had been ratified.4 This multi-industry scheme 
encouraged major companies and organisations to reduce their emissions in return for 
payments from a fund exceeding £200 million (DEFRA, 2006). Subsequent reviews of the 
scheme concluded that its targets had been insufficiently ambitious. Therefore, the 
                                                 
4 More details are explained about the Kyoto Protocol in Section 1.4.3.2. 
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administration of the scheme was transferred to the DEFRA in 2008. Nevertheless, this and 
other schemes established the concept of carbon pricing; it advocated that the price of goods 
and services should fully reflect the costs and benefits in social, economic, and environmental 
terms (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2015).  
 
1.4.3 International Frameworks  
National regulatory frameworks and policy objectives in the UK are either determined or at 
least influenced by multinational agreements. The lead organisation on climate change is the 
United Nations; regionally, the EU also contributes towards the regulatory environment.  
 
1.4.3.1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came into force 
on 21 March 1994 and currently has 165 signatories (United Nations, n.d.). The treaty had 
been prepared at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Although the main aim of 
the treaty was to promote international action to tackle man-made climate change by 
encouraging signatories to reduce GHG emissions, it did not introduce legally binding limits 
on emissions or enforcement mechanisms. However, it mandated annual conferences of the 
parties (COPs), and the consequential Kyoto Protocol was proposed at the 1997 conference.5  
 
1.4.3.2 Kyoto Protocol 
The third COP held under the UNFCCC took place in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997. The 
conference adopted The Kyoto Protocol; however, it was not ratified until 2005.  
The Kyoto Protocol is notable for establishing the principle of differentiated responsibilities, 
which implies countries at different levels of economic development have different 
capabilities and responsibilities to tackle climate change.  
The geopolitical challenges to the operation of the Kyoto Protocol are exemplified by the 
sharp differences in country targets (Grubb et al., 1999). 
Relatedly, the Protocol gave rise to the concept and practice of emissions trading under which 
countries with excess allowances, likely to be developing countries given headroom to 
develop, can sell their allowances to other (more developed) countries. 
 
                                                 
5 These conferences are known as the Conferences of the Parties. The first conference was held in 1996 at Berlin. 
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1.4.3.3 The European Union Emissions Trading System 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS) was introduced in 2005 and 
governed the capping, pricing, and trading of carbon emissions in participating countries. Its 
coverage extended to major emitters including power stations, large factories, and industrial 
plants that exceed a certain level of emissions. In the early years of the scheme, carbon 
allowances were allocated without cost in order to stimulate the creation of the market; from 
2013, these allowances were auctioned. The tactic of giving free allowances was highly 
significant. Firms could choose to sell these allowances or use them to emit carbon through 
production. Thus, an opportunity cost was attached to carbon emissions and the principle that 
goods and services are priced to include their environmental cost was reinforced (Oestreich 
and Tsiakas, 2015). Its success is reflected in its current coverage levels, which encompasses 
11,000 installations across 31 countries, accounting for 45% of the total EU GHG emissions 
(European Commission, 2016). Installation operators, whether in the public or private sector, 
must purchase carbon credits in the open market should they intend to exceed their 
allocations.  
 
1.4.3.4 The Paris Agreement  
The Paris Agreement of 2015 came into force on 4th November 2016. The EU had ratified the 
agreement one month prior (United Nations, 2018). With its mitigation actions coming into 
effect from 2020, the overall aim of the agreement was to secure action by its signatories that 
would limit the surge in global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels 
and attempt to go further in limiting the increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius (UNFCCC, 2018). 
Concerning the Kyoto Protocol, the central issue was uniting countries at different stages of 
development in the common cause of tackling global warming. Despite the non-prescriptive 
nature of the agreement, the period since November 2016 has seen the announcement of many 
ambitious carbon policy initiatives. One common area of these initiatives concerns vehicle 
emissions, with plans announced to ban petrol-powered cars at certain points in the future. For 
example, the UK government announced that by 2040 all cars sold in the UK would be zero-
emission vehicles (Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2018). It also confirmed its 
commitment to be a zero net emissions country by 2050. This target is a step further than the 
80% reduction already mandated by the Climate Change Act 2008 (Carbon Brief, 2018). The 
Paris Agreement emphasised the environmental integrity, transparency, and robust accounting 
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by recognising the possibility of voluntary cooperation among parties to allow for achieving a 
higher ambition and setting out principles (e.g. Jayaraman and Kanitkar, 2016). 
 
1.4.4 UK Policy Summary 
Climate change is a global issue that not only requires nation states to take national initiatives, 
but also to engage in international cooperation and agreements. These sections have given an 
overview of the climate status and recent history of regulation and policy initiatives that form 
the framework of the UK’s response to climate change challenges. Since the early 1990s, the 
UK has been a proactive participant in international cooperation, and it has simultaneously 
introduced its own national initiatives. As stated above, current policy discussions are centred 
on achieving a net zero emissions economy by 2050; this would make the UK one of the most 
ambitious countries among large emitters. In addition to legally binding national targets as 
mandated in the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK has also encouraged and legislated to 
promote carbon disclosure by large UK firms. 
 
1.5 Research Overview, Aim, Objectives and Key Findings 
The aim of this research is to examine the financial consequences of voluntary carbon 
disclosure on leading UK companies, specifically, those listed on the London Stock Exchange 
FTSE350 between 2007 and 2015. By contributing to a greater understanding of these 
consequences, the research may enhance the public perception of a firm’s carbon disclosures 
and assist the firm in meeting continuing pressures from various stakeholders on carbon-
related issues. 
This research is delimited to the financial consequences of carbon disclosure and the non-
financial consequences are not considered. Following this, three main objectives are set. The 
first is to investigate the relationship between voluntary carbon disclosure and firm financial 
performance (FP). The resource-based view (RBV) associated with carbon disclosure is 
applied as a theoretical framework. A thorough financial performance index, covering both 
market and accounting perspectives, is employed; a range of firm characteristics adjudged to 
potentially drive the examined relationship are controlled for; and sensitivity tests are applied. 
The findings offer clear evidence that a firm’s voluntary carbon disclosure is a source of 
competitive advantage addressing firm risk and opportunity. Moreover, such disclosure 
enhances organisational legitimacy and reliability and ultimately improves firm FP. 
Furthermore, we capture the potential impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the 
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carbon disclosure and firm FP relationship. The results show that the carbon disclosure has no 
effect on FP during the crisis years. However, during the recovery period, reporting on 
carbon-related issues promotes higher firm FP. Additionally, the findings indicate that carbon 
disclosure has less association with market-based measures than do alternative indicators. 
Finally, we find that firms operating in carbon-intensive industries are not benefiting from 
disclosures on their carbon profile as much as firms in non-carbon-intensive sectors. 
The second objective is the investigation of the impact of voluntary carbon disclosure on firm 
risk (FR), particularly, the potential for a positive relationship between information 
asymmetry and FR. The proposed RBV framework is applied to develop an understanding of 
the impacts of climate change mitigation activities on the FR. The study finds that adopting a 
carbon management strategy that includes enhanced carbon disclosure leads to a reduction in 
a firm’s total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Significantly, the relationship between 
carbon disclosure and FR only became noticeable after the GFC. Furthermore, the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and FR is more marked in carbon-intensive industries.  
The third objective is to examine the market reaction to announcements of voluntary carbon 
disclosures, to reach a clear understanding about investors’ interpretation of carbon disclosure 
initiatives based on the cost-benefit approach. Using an event study method, the results 
demonstrate that investors in the London Stock Exchange market elicit a significantly 
negative response to carbon disclosure announcements via the non-profit Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP). This negative reaction is more obvious for firms operating in carbon-intensive 
industries when compared to that of the main sample. This contrasts with the significantly 
positive investor reaction to carbon disclosure announcements during the GFC period.  
While each objective is pursued in a separate empirical chapter, all three are important and 
equal components in pursuing the overall unified aim of the research. When combined, FP, 
FR and market reaction form a comprehensive picture of the financial consequences of 
voluntary carbon disclosure in a way that only examining one of these may not achieve. To 
achieve these objectives, data from well-established sources— Bloomberg, Datastream, and 
the CDP databases—are used in this research. 
 
1.6 Potential Contributions 
This thesis seeks to add novel contributions towards the knowledge of the way voluntary 
carbon disclosure, as part of a proactive carbon strategy, interacts with both the FP of the firm 
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and FR, and how investors and the market react to announcements of voluntary carbon 
disclosures. 
The findings of this research make an important contribution to the literature examining the 
financial consequences of voluntary carbon disclosure. It will also offer significant 
implications for management, investors, regulators, and sustainability institutions. Moreover, 
our findings would be of significance to stakeholders who have considerable interests in 
evaluating the survival and sustainability of a firm and understanding the investors’ reaction 
to carbon disclosures initiatives. In particular, investors can consider the findings when 
making investment decisions. The findings will enable regulators to enhance their evaluation 
of the willingness of firms to disclose their carbon emissions voluntarily and use this 
understanding when further developing the regulatory framework.  
There are shared contributions across the three empirical chapters and unique contributions 
for each chapter. As there is relatively little known about the examined relationships within 
the UK context, the first of the shared contributions was to fill a considerable gap in the 
literature by providing evidence from the UK on the financial consequences of carbon 
disclosures. The second and third shared contributions provided evidence concerning industry 
type, specifically carbon-intensive vs non-carbon-intensive industries and the effect of the 
GFC on the relationships of interest. Turning to unique contributions, the first essay presented 
in Chapter 2 contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, we build on RBV theory to 
understand how the proactive carbon strategy through the voluntary carbon disclosure could 
affect the firm’s FP. Secondly, it provided what is believed to be the first use of a financial 
index to quantify the financial impacts of carbon disclosure. Therefore, we add to the broad 
set of environmental accounting literature by identifying the impact of carbon disclosure on 
separate indicators, e.g. accounting vs market-based measures of firm FP. In the second essay 
presented in Chapter 3, we first devise a conceptual model based on RBV theory which 
considers the positive association between the information asymmetry and FR and which 
builds understanding how the voluntary carbon disclosure could affect FR. Secondly, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first study investigating the impact of carbon disclosure on 
FR. Alongside the contributions it shares with other chapters, the third study presented in 
Chapter 4 contributes a theoretical framework based on the cost-benefit approach to facilitate 
understanding of how investors and the market react to announcements of voluntary carbon 
disclosure. 
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is organised into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 are the empirical chapters presented as three separate papers, each chapter contains its 
own introduction, literature review, hypothesis development, research design, results and 
analysis and conclusion sections. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.  
 
1.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has introduced the research to be presented in this thesis. It has explained the 
motivation for the research and given a brief contextual summary of the UK in regard to 
climate change and its regulatory framework, including internnational agreemnts and 
provisions, designed to achieve reduced GHG emissions. Furthermore, the chapter described 
the overall aim of the research and the three objectives set to achieve this aim. These three 
objectives, each realised through empirical studies examining the relationship between 
voluntary carbon disclosure and three types of potential financial consequence, FP, FR and 
market reaction are presented in forthcoming chapters. They are linked by the aim of 
providing the fullest possible understanding of the financial consequences of voluntary carbon 
disclosure. As explained, non-financial consequences are not considered. Consideration was 
given to the potential contributions of the research and finally the structure of the thesis was 
briefly summarised. 
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Chapter 2.Does Corporate Carbon Disclosure Influence Financial 
Performance of UK Firms? 
2.1 Introduction 
A growing number of firms have made their global-warming strategy part of their core 
strategy as they recognise that going green could save money through improved energy 
efficiency and waste management, amongst other factors. Managers have private information 
about firms’ carbon profile, including carbon strategy, carbon emissions, and carbon 
reduction activities, that is not directly accessible by outside stakeholders (Luo and Tang, 
2014). In addressing the information asymmetry problem, managers strategically disclose 
relevant information to maximise the value of the firm as perceived by capital providers 
(Beyer et al., 2010). Carbon disclosure can be among the various aspects of corporate 
reporting toward greater transparency in environmental reporting (Hahn et al., 2015; Hummel 
and Schlick, 2016). Under the current regulatory reforms to meet growing environmental 
concerns from diverse stakeholders, climate change and energy transitions have become 
pressing financial and social issues. Green finance has recently emerged as a regular part of 
many investment decisions (Ward, 2017). Also, serious doubts have been raised about the 
business models of firms that operate in polluting industries. Many investors and other 
stakeholders have raised concerns about their firms’ investments and strategic decisions on 
voluntarily disseminating carbon information. As such, investigating the impact of carbon 
disclosure on firm financial and operational performance is nowadays imperative.  
The current emergence of investors’ interests in climate-related financial risks calls for a 
specific type of global data about such risks to support rational investment decisions (The 
Economist, 2017). One attempt to respond to these needs was the initiation of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), an environmental impact charity, which investigates the 
participating companies’ practices and risks related to global warming.6 The purpose is to 
promote more transparency that could guide investors away from shareholdings at risk of 
climate change impacts. CDP could also help drive investment toward a low-carbon and more 
sustainable economy. The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between 
voluntary carbon disclosure and firm financial performance (FP). Achieving this objective 
                                                 
6 The scheme started out in the UK in 2000 but has grown to become the world’s biggest register of corporate 
emissions. Each year, it administers a questionnaire on climate change-related issues to public companies on 
behalf of its signatories (e.g. banks, investors, wealth advisors, pension funds). It then makes public the results in 
an annual report. 
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could demonstrate how the impacts of climate change on business operations and responding 
to them, can simultaneously and positively affect both the environment and business.  
Our study is motivated by an interest in understanding corporate engagement in climate 
change practices, beyond stringent requirements related to regulatory compliance, as 
evidenced by firms’ voluntary participation in carbon disclosure through CDP. We contribute 
to the ongoing debate on the economic consequences of carbon disclosure by conceptualising 
and testing the impact of adopting proactive carbon management strategies on a firm’s 
financial health. The resource-based view (RBV) theory is deemed appropriate to this study 
setting. The RBV emphasises that internally made decisions, based on a firm’s ability to 
exploit the available productive resources, generate competitive advantage and, thereby, 
procure financial benefits. That is, there are possibly valuable and hard-to-duplicate resources 
that might provide strategic gains over competitors (Hasseldine et al., 2005).  
Our sample comprises 977 firm-year observations listed in the FTSE350 index from 2007 to 
2015, a time characterised by high public awareness and extensive policy debate on climate 
change and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. FTSE350 companies are the largest companies 
by market capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange. Therefore, these companies 
represent a central projection for the UK’s carbon profile and economic performance. We 
utilise carbon disclosure score (CDS), reported by the CDP – and construct a comprehensive 
financial index that captures different types of a firm’s performance. This financial index 
comprises both accounting and market indicators. Findings in this study suggest that 
voluntary carbon disclosure tends to significantly improve a firm’s FP. This finding is 
consistent with a “win-win” perspective of being 'green and competitive' (Porter and Van der 
Linde, 1995). Furthermore, we capture the potential impact of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) on the carbon disclosure and firm performance relationship. The results show that the 
carbon disclosure has no effect on performance during the crisis years. However, during the 
recovery period, high reporting on carbon-related issues promotes higher firm performance. 
We additionally re-assess the associations between carbon disclosure and each of the 
individual proxies for our financial index. Our findings show that market-based measures of 
firm performance are less related to carbon disclosure than other measures. Furthermore, we 
extend our analyses and cluster the full sample into two sub-samples, firms reporting high FP 
and low FP. The results show that firms which achieved high FP reported highly positive 
carbon disclosure compared to a modest disclosure for firms with low FP. Finally, conditional 
on the industry type (i.e. carbon-intensive vs non-carbon-intensive industries), we find that 
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firms operating in carbon-intensive industries are not benefiting from disclosing on their 
carbon profile as other firms that work in non-carbon-intensive sectors.  
This study contributes to the emerging research area of climate-related activism and the 
broader corporate transparency debate in three ways. First, the limited debate within the prior 
literature on the financial consequences of carbon disclosure indicates a lack of consensus on 
the direction of this relationship. Moreover, relatively little is known about this association 
within the European context in general and in the UK context in particular. The UK represents 
an interesting setting for this type of research. While the European Union (EU) is marked as 
one of the world's top three GHG-emitting economies (after China and the United States), the 
UK, a member of the G7 (Group of Seven), represents one of the largest GHG emitters in the 
world (Haque, 2017).7 The UK is also listed in the top twenty countries that emitted the most 
carbon dioxide (UCS, 2018).8 It is also observed that climate change has fundamentally and 
adversely affected the UK weather.9 Several government initiatives are launched 
accordingly.10 The UK is currently leading and developing proactive mechanisms to mitigate 
the dangers of climate change. In December 2008, the Committee on Climate Change 
recommended that the UK government set a long-term target to reduce GHG emissions to at 
least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. In September 2009, the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) issued voluntary guidance on measurement and reporting of 
GHG emissions to support UK organisations in reducing their contribution to climate 
change.11 Moreover, the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1970) (Strategic Report Regulations, 2013) introduce 
                                                 
7 The Group of Seven (G7) was a group of advanced industrialized countries – the United States, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Canada. This group holds an annual summit aimed at building a consensual 
approach to global issues including economic development, crisis management, energy, terrorism, and global 
security.     
8 According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook, in 2013 the UK emitted approximately 568.3 
million metric tons (MMT) of carbon dioxide, released by burning fossil fuels in the process of producing and 
consuming energy (CIA Factbook, 2018). Within the same year, France emitted 385.6 MMT of carbon dioxide; 
Italy emitted 362 MMT; Poland emitted 257.6 MMT; Belgium emitted 93.62 MMT (CIA Factbook, 2018). 
9 For example, on 10 August 2003, the UK recorded its highest ever temperature at 38.5°C (101.3°F)–which 
triggered thunderstorms and flash floods in northern England and Scotland and contributed to health problems 
among local communities led to the death of thousands. To make matters worse, December 2015 was the wettest 
and warmest month ever recorded in the Met Office’s records dating back to 1910. 
10 In his recent speech in 2012 at the Accounting for Sustainability Annual Forums, The Prince of Wales was 
quoted as saying “…We are rapidly running out of time to adopt an approach that reduces our impact on the 
Earth’s capacity to sustain us all. I am afraid the damage we are doing is now beginning to bite”. He calls on the 
accountancy profession to increase efforts to promote corporate sustainability reporting, arguing that the 
measurement of a host of environmental metrics should become the norm for organisations around the world. 
For more details www.princeofwales.gov.uk/media/speeches. 
11 Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) find that these GHG guidelines have a significant positive effect on the 
level of GHG disclosures of FTSE350 firms. 
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requirements for quoted companies concerning disclosure of GHG emissions. The directors’ 
report of such companies needs to disclose annual carbon dioxide emissions and the 
methodologies used to calculate them. Second, we build on the RBV theory (e.g. Hart, 1995; 
Russo and Fouts, 1997) to understand how proactive integration of climate change mitigations 
into a firm’s business strategy could affect the bottom line performance through carbon 
disclosure to stakeholders. Thirdly, we test our RBV-based conceptual model against 
empirical reality by constructing a comprehensive index that captures FP. To our knowledge, 
this study is the first to use a financial index to quantify financial impacts of carbon 
disclosure. We take a step ahead to highlight how firms’ engagement in high (low) carbon 
disclosure can lead to high (low) FP. Finally, findings in this study add to the broad set of 
environmental accounting literature identifying the impact of disclosing for carbon emissions 
on separate indicators, e.g. accounting vs market-based measures of firm performance. Our 
results also draw up insights provided by prior research related to carbon-intensive industries 
(e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Hamilton, 1995) and introduce strong evidence related to 
carbon disclosure and implications on firm performance. 
Findings in this paper provide updated insights and policy implications for managers, 
investors, and regulators. Managers should work towards improving the quality of carbon-
related information by ensuring the relevance, credibility, and reliability of such information. 
In this regard, the CDP report, as a disclosure mechanism, fits the mission of both 
stakeholders and managers since it offers comparable and standardised information which 
make it difficult for poor performers to mimic high achievers (Luo and Tang, 2014). Our 
findings also guide regulators on how to promote and focus their efforts towards the 
implementation of sustainable carbon management practices in businesses. Although the 
DEFRA guidance on GHG disclosure and the new UK annual strategic report and 
requirements to disclose GHG emissions are essential steps in the right direction, regulators 
should consider framing climate change mitigation efforts and identify strategically relevant 
resources to which carbon disclosure quality contributes.  
The next section reviews the literature and develops a hypothesis to answer the research 
question. The Section 2.3 presents sample data and model. Section 2.4 reviews the empirical 
results and additional analyses. The Section 2.5 concludes.  
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Background 
Many literature reviews exist on the determinants of corporate social/environmental/carbon 
responsibility or sustainability reporting (e.g. Berthelot et al., 2003; Lee and Hutchison, 2005; 
Fifka, 2013; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Khlif et al., 2015; Haque, 2017). The association 
between social/environmental responsibility and FP has also long been the centre of 
considerable research in many scholar disciplines (e.g Pava and Krausz, 1996; Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Qiu et al., 2016). 
Stechemesser and Guenther (2012), Hartmann et al. (2013), Ascui (2014) and Haslam et al. 
(2014) provide extensive reviews of the literature on carbon accounting. Hahn et al. (2015) 
review the research addressing output and outcome of carbon disclosure and conclude that a 
considerable number of studies emphasise the empirical determinants and, to a lesser extent, 
the effects (outcome) of carbon disclosure, which has become a strategic decision-making 
issue for organisations within the current competitive scenarios (Kuo and Yi-Ju Chen, 2013). 
Accordingly, “the effects of carbon disclosure represent a major gap that should be filled by 
future research” (Hahn et al., 2015, p. 97). 
This view appears especially valid considering that the ongoing debate in the limited literature 
on the economic impact of reported GHG emissions or disclosed responses to climate change 
also shows no consensus and related empirical research provides inconclusive findings. Some 
studies find general support for a positive relationship (e.g. Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Ziegler et 
al., 2011; Fujii et al., 2013; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2015). Busch and Hoffmann (2011) find 
that carbon emissions as an outcome-based measurement have a positive relationship with FP, 
but they observe a negative link when using carbon management as a process-based 
measurement. Kim and Lyon (2011) analyse the conditions under which share prices are 
increased for the Financial Times Global 500 due to participation in the CDP and find no 
systematic evidence that CDP participation directly increased share prices.12 However, they 
find that companies’ CDP participation increased shareholder value when exogenous events 
caused the likelihood of climate change regulation to rise. Gallego‐Álvarez et al. (2014) find 
that GHG emissions ratio does not have either a positive or negative influence on a 
company’s FP. They conclude that “future research should consider the possibility of 
                                                 
12 The Financial Times Global 500 provides an annual ranking of the world’s largest firms according to their 
market capitalisation. It shows the changing performance of both individual companies and the sectors and 
countries they operate in.  
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including a broader time period, and thus the behaviour of firms before, during and after the 
period of economic crisis could be analyzed” (p. 371). Matsumura et al. (2014) find that the 
capital markets penalise all firms for their carbon emissions but impose a further penalty for 
non-disclosure. Misani and Pogutz (2015) study carbon-intensive industries, for which 
reduction of GHG emissions is a highly material issue, and find that firms achieve the highest 
FP when their disclosed GHG emissions are neither low nor high, but intermediate. These 
authors suggest that future research should also examine industries with lower average levels 
of emissions. Lewandowski (2017) find that carbon emission mitigation has a linear and 
significantly positive relationship to return on sales but is negatively related to Tobin’s q. 
Empirical investigations of this relationship have used global or US-based samples and 
employed different measures of carbon disclosure (e.g. carbon intensity ratios, variation in the 
carbon dioxide emissions) while covering many time periods and not precisely a broader 
period after the GFC. Although accounting and market measures of performance have been 
widely used in previous literature, no consensus exists on the measurement of FP. 
Methodological and measurement issues thus seem to explain the inconsistent results (Hahn et 
al., 2015). Moreover, Hahn et al. (2015) conclude that extant literature does not “explicitly 
refer to an underlying theoretical framework and, rather, rely on prior empirical evidence to 
develop their hypotheses” (p. 94). As such, it is not clear whether the understanding of this 
issue is much greater now than when it was first considered. With the growing interest and 
opaqueness of implications of carbon disclosure, it is necessary to develop a firm theoretical 
foundation highlighting the underlying cause-effect relationship between carbon disclosure 
and FP. 
 
2.2.2 Carbon Management and Financial Performance: An RBV Conceptualisation 
In a competitive business environment, the primary focus of a firm is to overcome intense 
competition and outperform other firms by creating competitive advantage (Kamasak, 2013), 
defined as superior FP (Winter, 1995). A firm has a competitive advantage “if it [can] create 
more economic value than the marginal (breakeven) competitor in its product market” 
(Peteraf and Barney, 2003, p. 314). Indeed, any firm is a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), defined as “the subset of its productive assets which are economically 
inalienable” (Wernerfelt, 2016, p. 102). Each firm has a unique (heterogeneous) resource 
endowment (Lockett et al., 2008). These resources can only be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage when they are valuable (Barney and Clark, 2007). More precisely, 
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“bundles of strategically relevant resources” (Peteraf and Barney, 2003, p. 317) enable a firm 
to create viable business strategies and to develop a sustainable competitive advantage over its 
rivals (Collis, 1994; Kamasak, 2013).  
The RBV of a firm, “an efficiency-based explanation of sustained superior firm performance” 
(Barney and Clark, 2007, p. V), is one of the leading theoretical paradigms to explain 
performance variation among competing firms (Newbert, 2007; Galbreath and Galvin, 2008) 
in relation to internal, idiosyncratic resources or firm-specific factors (Barney, 1991). 
According to this paradigm, if a firm is to earn superior profits and achieve sustained 
competitive advantage in the current economic climate (Hitt et al., 2001), it must acquire and 
control valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) intangible resources (Barney, 
1991) along with the dynamic capabilities that “integrate, build and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al.,1997, p. 516).  
The RBV theoretical lens appears to have become the dominant theory in the debate on how 
environmental practices affects FP (e.g. Hart 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 
1997; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Menguc and Ozanne, 2005; Sarkis et al., 2010; 
Ramanathan, 2018). It offers a supportive framework for our study setting to analyse such 
relationship for two reasons (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Surroca et al., 2010). First, it focuses on 
FP as the key outcome variable. Second, prior work adopting this view explicitly recognises 
the importance of the creation of intangible assets or resources, such as legitimacy and the 
broader reputational benefits of taking a proactive approach to the environment (Spicer, 1978; 
McGuire et al., 1988; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Hamilton, 1995; Cohen et al., 1995; 
Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 
2005; Cho et al., 2012; Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012; Kuo and Yi-Ju Chen, 2013). Such 
advantage-creating resources can be generated, maintained or enhanced through disclosure 
practices (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
Legitimacy, “a view closely tied to the RBV of the firm” (Tilling and Tilt, 2010; p. 58), 
serves as a resource (Hearit, 1995) that organisations use through various disclosure-related 
strategies (Deegan, 2014; Higgins and larrinaga, 2014) to construct their social conversations 
with stakeholders, and enhance reputation (Auger et al., 2013; Beyer et al., 2010; Busch and 
Hoffmann, 2011; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Ullmann, 1985). 
Miles and Covin (2000) point out, “reputational advantage, as a function of credibility, 
reliability, responsibility and trustworthiness, is enhanced by superior environmental 
performance” (p. 300). After implementing more mitigating actions related to their ecological 
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impact and GHG effect, organisations will have greater motivations to voluntarily disclose 
high-quality information to stakeholders (Kuo and Yi-Ju Chen, 2013). 
Accordingly, in the underlying proposition of the RBV is managing carbon effectively. This 
implies an organisational capability that should be communicated to corporate audiences in an 
appropriate, consistent, open, and accessible format to make a positive impact on competitive 
advantage. A proactive carbon strategy applied to processes, products, and services will often 
necessitate meeting the objectives of protecting human health and the quality of the 
environment as well as using natural resources prudently and rationally (Deegan and Gordon, 
1996). Such strategy constitutes a part of the corporate environmental orientation and reflects 
a firm’s contribution to climate change. When carbon management is poor, a firm’s reputation 
for environmental responsibility and the legitimacy of its passive commitment to climate 
change issues are at risk (Misani and Pogutz, 2015). By contrast, a proactive carbon strategy 
tends to achieve maximum possible operational efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the 
environment (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Fujii et al., 2013). Improved environmental risk 
management practices in turn alleviate the societal pressure, mitigate the threat of government 
regulation, lower the market risk (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Salama et al., 2011) and 
reduce cost of capital to the firm (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011). Environmentally active firms are also expected to 
“enjoy several potential revenue-generating benefits: (a) reducing their exposure to potential 
carbon costs, (b) opening up new markets, (c) developing competencies that provide a 
competitive advantage, and (d) creating new revenue streams from excess credits” (Peloza, 
2009, p. 1526). 
Companies with such proactive carbon strategies attempt to improve their market and 
economic position (Grant, 1991; Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Bansal and Roth, 2000; 
Miles and Covin, 2000; Galbreath, 2010; McLaughlin, 2011; Matisoff, 2013; Hahn et al., 
2015) by (1) investing in physical assets and corporate green R&D strategy of low-emission 
technologies; (2) attracting the skills required to use these assets and technologies to reduce 
the corporate impact on the natural environment; (3) minimising exposure to physical and 
regulatory risks associated with climate change and maximising opportunities from changing 
market forces and emerging controls; (4) improving organisational culture and inter-
functional coordination as a means of promoting climate change mitigation action to prevent 
further accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere; (5) accomplishing a cost-based competitive 
advantage through reduced energy consumption; and (6) maximising value to stakeholders by 
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creating reputational capital. Therefore, the RBV plays a key role in understanding the 
proactive integration of climate change mitigation efforts into the business strategy. These 
efforts, if implemented and sustained, are unique and will be a source of both competitive and 
financial advantages to environmentally active firms (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Ramanathan, 
2018).  
 
2.2.3 The Decision to Disclose Carbon Information Voluntarily 
For some time now, scholars have tried to answer the question of whether it pays to be green 
(e.g. Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Clarkson et al., 2011; Barnett and Salomon, 2012). However, 
before answering this question, it is worth exploring another: How can we tell how green a 
firm is, or how green it is perceived to be? In other words, how can we identify a proactive 
carbon strategy, with boards of directors and executive committees having incorporated 
climate change policy considerations in their strategic planning and decision making 
(Galbreath, 2010)? This issue is important for managers and various other stakeholders 
because having a green strategy, if appropriately developed, implemented, and sustained, a 
firm’s business operations can be distinguished from those of other competitors and hence, 
this strategy will be a source of both competitive and financial advantages.  
In an area of financial reporting dominated by voluntarism, broad options are available to 
managers about how to report the impact of organisational activities on the environment 
(Hasseldine et al., 2005; Delmas and Burbano, 2011; de Villiers and Van Staden, 2011). As 
Cairncross (1995) puts it: “Companies are free to publish whatever they wish (or whatever 
they think they can get away with” (p. 203). There is also a possibility that environmental 
responsibility can be used as an attempt to greenwash to deliberately manage stakeholders’ 
perceptions by reporting biased/misleading positive information not matched by improved 
environmental impacts (see, for example, Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Bowen, 2014), rather 
than as an authentic means to limit global climate change by measuring, managing, and 
reducing the GHG emissions (Haney et al., 2009). Greenwashing can adversely affect 
investor confidence, eroding the environmentally responsible investing capital market 
(Delmas and Burbano, 2011), and could negatively affect firm performance (Lyon and 
Montgomery, 2015).  
If these concerns are valid, managers need to improve the transparency and accountability of 
their corporate carbon profile and find innovative ways to cut emissions and associated waste 
 
 
 
22 
 
(Haslam et al., 2014). Failure to communicate information on carbon profile to the market 
would result in the inability of investors to accurately estimate the risk associated with the 
investment. Carbon disclosure can then be regarded as a commitment to transparency, as 
efforts to address climate change risks and opportunities, and as a criterion for measuring an 
organisation’s reliability and legitimacy. Once proactive carbon management strategies are 
adopted, firms will voluntarily report information about their mitigation actions (Connelly et 
al., 2011), that is, their ‘discharge of accountability’ (Gray et al., 1996, p. 39), through 
communication to stakeholders (Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990). High-quality voluntary carbon 
disclosure will then enable the organisation to develop a carbon competitive strategy 
(Schaltegger and Csutora, 2012), publicise stronger environmental records to stakeholders 
(Mahoney et al., 2013), distinguish themselves from poor performers to avoid the problem of 
adverse selection (Luo and Tang, 2014), and eventually increase their market values (Hummel 
and Schlick, 2016). Therefore, within the context of the RBV, accountability through carbon 
disclosure, reconciled with sustainability, can be viewed as a resource that provides sustained 
competitive advantage (Haslam et al., 2014).  
Luo and Tang (2014) suggest carbon information is “a complex and multidimensional 
concept” (p. 196).13 Managers must, therefore, come to appreciate the key elements in making 
disclosures on GHG pollution emissions and their detailed plans to deal with the global 
warming problem. These plans should include low-carbon initiatives, emissions reduction 
targets, energy/power consumption, and the determination of climate change risk and 
opportunities, resulting in a change in business operations, expenditures, and revenues. 
Ultimately, to be considered as valuable, unique resource, a credible carbon reporting system, 
by which to improve the perceived legitimacy and to gain reputational advantages, should 
cover questions of what sorts of carbon information is needed to be reported and relevant to 
use and what items reflect a proactive carbon management strategy.  
Carbon disclosures conveying relevant information to stakeholders regarding advantage-
creating resources would, therefore, imply integration of (a) climate change into business 
strategy, (b) an effective system of corporate governance, based on the values of transparency 
and accountability, that addresses climate change, and (c) external assurance/verification to 
enhance the credibility of firms’ disclosures (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008). If carbon disclosures 
                                                 
13 The main difference between this paper and the Luo and Tang (2014) study, is that we concentrate on financial 
consequences rather than non-financial ones. Luo and Tang (2014) examine the correlation between carbon 
performance measured by GHG intensity and carbon disclosure, and whether a good carbon performance could 
lead firms to distinguish themselves by focusing more on disclosing their carbon profile. 
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provide accurate information about actual performance and are successfully transmitted to a 
broader range of stakeholders, who increasingly require meaningful and transparent 
disclosures on GHG emissions and the management of related risks and opportunities 
regarding global warming, the carbon disclosure–FP relationship, in which strategic 
organisational resources required for competitiveness are combined, and environmental 
technologies are implemented, should exist (Klassen and Whybark, 1999). The relationships 
described above are summarised in Figure 3.1, which leads directly to the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H1 Carbon disclosure has a significant and positive association with the FP. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The Impact of Voluntary Carbon Disclosure on Financial Performance 
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2.3 Research Design and Data 
2.3.1 Sample 
Since it is the largest index in the UK that is annually assessed by the CDP, our sample 
includes all firms continuously listed on the FTSE350 index between the years 2007-2015. 
This period was characterised by high public awareness and extensive policy debate on GHG 
emissions, including national legal requirements (i.e. Regulation of 2013) and international 
climate provisions and agreements (i.e. Paris agreement). It is worth mentioning the FTSE350 
companies were first invited to engage in and voluntarily report their carbon disclosure 
through the CDP online questionnaire in 2006. We exclude the year 2006 from the analysis 
for two reasons: (1) the modest participation level in CDS questionnaire in that year, and (2) 
to ensure the consistency of the companies’ responses to the questionnaire items and analyses 
of the CDP data across time. The responses in 2006 were analysed and classified into four 
categories (qualitative): answered questionnaire (AQ), provided information (IN), declined to 
participate (DP), and no response (NR). In contrast, in the following years, the responses were 
classified based on the digital analysis (quantitative) and ranged from 0 to 100. The final 
sample consists of 977 firm-year observations, after dropping the financial institutions, as is 
common in this type of research, because of their unique accounting practices and the 
different set of environmental and social regulations such as the ‘Equator Principles’ they 
follow (Macve et al., 2010; Hussainey and Salama, 2010; Qiu et al., 2016; Haque, 2017).14 
Table 2.1 summarises the distribution of the final sample by the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) classification, the same classification applied by the CDP.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The Equator Principles is a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects. See http://www.equator-principles.com. 
15 For the treatment of the outliers, our data are winsorised at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. 
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Industry/Year       2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Per cent 
Basic Materials 4 9 8 10 12 10 8 8 7 76 7.78 
Consumer Goods 8 13 8 12 15 19 17 21 20 133 13.61 
Consumer Services 24 29 24 28 33 32 35 35 40 280 28.66 
Health Care 4 7 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 60 6.14 
Industrials 26 32 28 31 37 39 37 39 37 306 31.32 
Oil and Gas 5 6 5 4 5 6 8 6 1 46 4.71 
Technology 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 17 1.74 
Telecommunications 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 13 1.33 
Utilities 5 7 6 5 4 5 4 6 4 46 4.71 
N 78 106 90 100 117 121 120 125 120 977 100 
Table 2.1 Sample Distributions based on Industry and Year 
 
2.3.2 Measures 
2.3.2.1 Financial Performance 
The dependent variable in this study is firm financial performance (FP). Measurement of FP 
is a fundamental problem in the context of the prior literature hypothesising that corporate 
social and environmental responsibility is a predictor of FP (Margolis and Walsh, 2001). 
Accordingly, we take a step forward to overcome this concern by developing a composite 
financial performance index (FPI) incorporating the most common measures employed by 
previous studies examining the associations between corporate social/environmental 
responsibility and FP (e.g. Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Jo and Na, 2012; Jayachandran et al., 
2013; Chang et al., 2014; Koh et al., 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Qiu et al., 2016). 
The FPI comprises ten financial variables which reflect accounting and market measures. 
These variables are classified according to their measure source, either accounting, market, or 
combined accounting and market-based measures. Accounting-based measures include return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), asset turnover (AT), the debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) 
and interest coverage ratio (IC). Market-based measures include stock return volatility (RV), 
cost of equity (COE) and the price-earnings ratio (P/E). Altman Z-score (Z) and the market-
to-book ratio (P/B), are categorised as combined measures. In constructing the FPI, we take 
the average industry value for each of these proxies at each time t and compare it with the 
firm i value of each proxy. We then create dummy variables for each of the ten variables. 
Each dummy variable gets a value of 1 if a firm’s proxy has a score better than the industry 
average; 0 otherwise. Finally, we give a scale value for the FPI ranging from zero to ten, 
where a higher value reflects a better FP position. We use the scale value derived from the 
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dummy variables to get the overall financial health level. We require the availability of all 
FPI’s proxies to have a value. We, therefore, remove any missing values along the FPI 
components. The data source is the Bloomberg database, and the definitions of variables are 
presented in Appendix 2.1 
Although the idea of constructing an index to capture variables in regression equations has 
recently been emphasised by finance scholars on financial flexibility (e.g. Doidge et al., 2009; 
Ferrando et al., 2017) and corporate governance (Mollah et al., 2017), to our knowledge, none 
of the previous studies in the context of environmental accounting has implemented an FPI to 
assess the relationship between corporate social/environmental/carbon practices and FP.  
Developing this index, to stipulate a firm’s FP, can be justified from three perspectives. First, 
it offers simultaneous assessments of a firm’s performance using multiple indicators. Given a 
rich variety of available proxies of financial measures that can be used independently in 
analysis, existing studies measure firms’ FP by employing individual measures of the same 
category, such as accounting-based measures (see, for example, Harcourt, 1965; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Wright, 1978; Gonedes and Dopuch, 1979; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 
1979; Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Fisher, 1984; Benston, 1985; 
Salamon, 1985; Griner and Stark, 1991; Hay and Morris, 1991; Rees, 1995; Brealey et al., 
2012). However, despite their similarities, each of the measures captures different aspects of 
firm’s FP. For example, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and asset turnover 
(AT) reflect firms’ profitability as well as their operational efficiency. Adding to these three 
measures, debt to equity (D/E) and interest cover (IC) provide the relative profitability of 
firms given their financial obligations. Furthermore, as important as accounting measurements 
which reflect the historical FP, market-based measures provide the perceptions and reactions 
of the market on the firms’ future financial prospects. Moreover, it might be argued that 
accounting proxies are likely to be subject to managerial opportunism (i.e. earnings 
management) and influenced by differences in accounting practices. Hence, additional 
consideration of market-based measures can provide a more robust examination of a firm’s 
financial health. Overall, it can be seen that different financial measures do not stand on their 
own but complement each other for a more comprehensive analysis of a firm’s financial 
achievements. Therefore, those measures should be integratedly used by developing a 
composite measure that offers an overall assessment of the financial position/health of a firm 
that can be compared across several years. 
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Second, the FPI captures the relative FP of firms across industries rather than their absolute 
performance. It has been suggested that studying firm performance should be extended to 
reflect on other industry-specific characteristics (McGuire et al., 1988). As for all previous 
studies, the comparison of absolute FP across firms can be misleading and biased. This 
property of the index is critical because it is more rational to compare firms with similar 
characteristics. Therefore, the index compares the individual financial aspects of each firm 
with the industry average benchmark. 
Lastly, regarding the selection of the index’s components, the study thoroughly evaluates the 
ten most well-acknowledged and important financial measures that have been used both in the 
literature and in practice. Furthermore, there were criteria that these measuring elements 
should provide unique value added to the firm’s FP from different perspectives and that 
duplication should be avoided. For example, as there is significant duplication between EPS 
and P/EPS ratios, and Tobin’s Q and P/EPS, EPS and Tobin’s Q are excluded.  
By computing the index, the correlations between measures are seen to be significant for 
around 90% of the measure pairs (the correlations results are not reported in this thesis). The 
associations between these ten measures justify the use of the FPI devised in this thesis. 
Particularly, many different aspects of firms’ FP, good performance and bad performance can 
be inherent simultaneously through all measures. Consequently, it is useful to incorporate all 
aspects into one single measure for a complete picture of firms’ financial health. 
 
2.3.2.2 Carbon disclosure 
Koh et al. (2014) suggest that future research may endeavour to measure corporate social and 
environmental practices using a survey methodology. We use the Carbon Disclosure Score 
(CDS), collected from the CDP database, as a proxy for a firm’s carbon disclosure. The CDS 
is obtained via a survey and is based on a company’s responses to questions in the CDS 
Online Response System. The score ranges from 0 to 100, representing the quality level of a 
firm’s responses to an annual questionnaire issued by the CDP, an independent, not-for-profit 
organisation. The CDP works with institutional shareholders and corporations to run the 
global environmental disclosure system for business and disclose GHG emissions of 
thousands of major companies worldwide (e.g. S&P500 and FTSE350). The CDP “is working 
to reduce the risks associated with transparency by facilitating dialogue and information-
sharing between companies” (Wilhelm, 2013, p. 159). It, therefore, demonstrates a strategic 
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competence that appeals to multiple stakeholders and builds broad legitimacy for carbon 
disclosure standards (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011).  
The questionnaire assesses the information that companies disclose on CDS in terms of three 
broad topics: (1) climate change management: governance, strategy, targets and initiatives, 
and communications; (2) climate change-related risks and opportunities; and (3) climate 
change emissions methodology, emissions data, energy, emissions performance, and 
emissions trading.  
It is worth mentioning, within the third category, which presents 48% of the CDS, the 
emissions performance (changes in carbon emissions volume) is one out of five topics in this 
category. Furthermore, the inclusion of emissions volume is critical. Similar to financial 
disclosure, firms should be aware of the likelihood of revealing negative as well as positive 
information on their emissions volume. Nevertheless, it is worthnoting, this component in the 
third category reflects the quality of the responses in terms of emissions volume reliability, 
honesty and fairness, regardless of carbon emissions volume emitted by firms. Specifically, 
increasing or decreasing of carbon emissions volume is not the standard but the quality of the 
information provided regarding this factor. Particularly, a disclosure of a high volume of 
carbon emissions does not necessarily reduce the CDS score. Therefore, there is no issue of 
compounding effects of carbon disclosure and emissions performance in this disclosure index. 
Company responses to the CDP questionnaire, made publicly available on the CDP website, 
could have implications on investors’ investment decisions (Kim and Lyon, 2011). According 
to Tang and Luo (2011), “a firm’s reputation could be adversely affected if the firm refuses to 
participate in CDP, or participated but, disclosed poor carbon information” (p. 26). 
The choice of the CDS measure of carbon disclosure is justified by the high number of 
organisations that voluntarily respond to the information request and by its popularity in 
previous studies of the determinants of disseminating relevant information on GHG (e.g. 
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Luo et al., 2012) and whether voluntary carbon 
disclosure reflects firms’ true carbon performance (Luo and Tang, 2014).16 In a global 
economy, improving transparency and comparability of carbon information is regarded as 
imperative for information usefulness (Andrew and Cortese, 2011), which is perceived as 
integral to carbon markets and corporate carbon management (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011). 
Many companies provide their full CDP responses as a surrogate for disclosing climate 
                                                 
16 The average number and percentage of FTSE350 companies participated in the CDS index over the sample 
period was 243.56 companies (69.59%). 
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change information in the annual or sustainability reports (Cotter and Najah, 2012) or in a 
form intended to complement annual reports and provide information relevant to investors 
relating to the financial risks that companies might experience due to their GHG emissions 
and opportunities from climate change (Kolk et al., 2008; Kim and Lyon, 2011). Appendix 
2.2 presents a summary of the questionnaire questions about the construct and their 
measurement items. 
 
2.3.2.3 Controls 
To control for the firm characteristics that may drive the examined relationship, we follow 
prior studies (see, for example, Toms, 2002; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2012) and include in our analysis firm size (SIZE), measured 
by the natural log of total assets, financial leverage (LEV), measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
capital and systematic risk measured by beta (BET) as control variables. Board size (BRS), 
measured by the natural log of total number of directors, and the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board (NED) are included to control for the role, effectiveness, and 
independence of the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Brickley et al., 1994; Yermack, 
1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Chen and Jaggi, 2001; Balatbat et al., 2004; Cornett et al., 2007; 
Payne et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2011). In line with prior studies, we also include the 
percentage of shares held by executive directors to the total number of shares (MAN) and the 
total percentage of shares owned by substantial shareholders (5 per cent or more) (SUB) to 
control for ownership structure effects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Also, working in foreign 
markets requires firms to consider cross-national variances and comply with rules and 
regulations controlling trade between different countries. Given exposure to such hurdles, 
businesses are expected to be more socially responsible (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). 
According to Stanny and Ely (2008), European companies with higher proportions of 
international trading are more strongly expected to disclose their carbon emissions. Therefore, 
consistent with Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), we control for the effects of foreign market 
activities (FMA) based on the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. This measure proxies for 
the degree of internationalisation of a firm that might influence the examined relationship. 
Further, the competitive business environment motivates firms to outperform the competitors 
by creating competitive advantage (Kamasak, 2013). We therefore control for the effects of 
product market competition (COM), measured by the number of competitors in the same 
industry in a given year (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003; Fernández-Kranz and Santaló, 2010). As 
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our sample firms are required to comply with the GHG reporting regulation (which came into 
force on 1 October 2013) and report on their GHG emissions as part of their annual Directors’ 
Report based on the Companies Act 2006 ‘Amendment of Part 7’ Regulations 2013 
(Secretary of State, 2013), we include a dummy variable (REG) equal to one for years 2014-
2015 and zero otherwise. Certain industries have high carbon emissions profiles and are 
therefore more heavily scrutinised by the public, media, and governmental regulations and 
legislation. Consequently, we include a dummy variable (IND) equal to one if a firm is part of 
a carbon-intensive industry and zero otherwise. In doing so, we divide the sample into ten 
subsamples by the industry’s structure and definitions employed by the GICS. The standards 
of the FTSE All-Share Index are then applied to identify carbon-intensive industries within 
the sample, these being basic materials, utilities, industrials, oil and gas, and consumer 
services. Finally, we include yearly dummy variables to control for the possible influence of 
fluctuations in market trends that may affect firms’ FP (Hui, 2005; Deng et al., 2013; Al-
Awadhi and Dempsey, 2017). 
 
2.3.2.4 Model Tested 
To test H1, our main empirical model is set out below: 
 
   FPIit = β0 + β1 CDSit +  β2 SIZEit +  β3 LEVit + β4 BETit + β5 BRSit + β6 NEDit  +
                         β7 MANit +  β8 SUBit + β9 FMAit + β10 COMit + β11 REGit +  β12 INDit +
                         β13 YEARit +  ℇit                                 (1)                                                                                  
 
where FPI is the financial performance index; CDS, Carbon Disclosure Score; SIZE, the 
natural log of total assets; LEV, the total debt to total capital ratio; BET, the systematic risk 
estimated by regressing the daily stock return on the daily market return over 12 months; 
BRS, the natural log of the number of board members; NED, the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board; MAN, the percentage of shares held by executive directors to total 
number of shares; SUB, the total percentage of shares held by substantial shareholders (5 per 
cent or more); FMA, the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; COM, the number of 
competitors in the same industry; REG, a dummy variable takes the value of 1 for years 2014-
2015 and 0 otherwise; IND, a dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a carbon-intensive 
industry and 0 otherwise; and YEAR, dummy variables. 
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2.4 Results and Analysis  
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 2.2-2.4. In Table 2.2, the mean and distributional 
characteristics are reported for each variable. The response rate for our sample to the CDS 
information request is approximately 77% (752 out of 977). The mean value for CDS is 
71.16, which is relatively high compared with prior studies that employed CDS as a 
dependent variable. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), who examine the role of the 
board of directors in disseminating information related to GHG emissions, report 60% as the 
mean value for CDS based on CDS 2007 annual survey. Also, Luo and Tang (2014), who 
investigate whether the voluntary carbon disclosure reveals the actual carbon performance, 
report 65% as the mean value for CDS based on CDS 2010 annual survey. The differences in 
CDS mean values between our study and prior studies can be explained by the short period 
examined in those studies (only one year) and the time variation of the public pressure to 
disclose information related to climate change. The mean value for FPI is 4.9, with a 
minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 10. The unreported average firm SIZE is £10.9 
billion, which suggests that our sample comprises large firms. The mean and median values of 
SIZE, measured by the logarithm of total assets, are approximately 22, similar to the Clarkson 
et al. (2008) sample. The maximum value of SUB exceeds 100%. According to Asquith et al. 
(2005), this could happen when shares are owned by more than one party at the same time 
(the original lender plus the purchaser on the other side of the short sale). 
 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
FPI 977 4.9 5 2.1 0 10 
CDS 752 71.16 73 20.41 4 100 
SIZE 977 21.76 21.61 1.49 17.69 26.13 
LEV 977 24.29 22.91 13.55 1.55 55.34 
BET 977 0.87 0.82 0.34 0.05 2.69 
BRS 966 9.31 9 2.42 4 20 
NED 965 58.77 60 12.95 0 92.86 
MAN 975 2.27 0.24 7.65 0 45.1 
SUB 977 97.13 98.2 22.52 24.11 161.6 
FMA 975 36.90 35.68 28.16 0 95.01 
COM 977 23.90 28 12.67 1 40 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Chapter Variables 
This descriptive statistics is based on our sample from 2007 to 2015. 
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Table 2.3 reports mean values of study variables by industry. Regarding the CDS mean, we 
find that utilities and basic materials outperform telecommunications, technology, and health 
care in terms of engaging in innovation to reduce their carbon footprint. Although voluntary 
environmental disclosures tend to be high for companies working in environmentally 
sensitive industries (Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hasseldine et 
al., 2005), the oil and gas industry was the sixth best sector behind health care and consumer 
services. According to KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting in Oil and Gas 
sector (2015), “The Oil and Gas sector has one of the highest rates of carbon reporting at 90 
per cent. However, the quality of reporting is the lowest of all sectors at just 35 out of 100. 
The global average quality score is 51 out of 100. Less than one-third of large oil and gas 
companies (29 per cent) set targets to reduce carbon emissions” (p. 4). In general, and based 
on FTSE All-Share Index classification, this study indicates that the CDS mean for firms in 
carbon-intensive industries surmounts that for firms within low carbon industries (75.8 > 
65.8). 
 
Variable N FPI CDS SIZE LEV BET BRS NED MAN SUB FMA COM 
Basic Materials 76 5.45 73.24 22.35 22.07 1.38 9.51 62.25 3.68 91.32 61.24 8.97 
Consumer Goods 133 4.81 76.38 21.86 19.81 0.8 8.86 58.39 3.33 93.12 24.16 16.22 
Consumer Services 280 4.60 72.52 21.66 28.71 0.79 9.6 57.48 3.1 96.82 26.59 31.93 
Health Care 60 5.18 73.05 21.8 23.07 0.62 9.72 65.84 1.65 82.86 58.23 6.83 
Industrials 306 4.82 66.22 21.2 21.81 0.91 8.65 57.11 1.4 101.66 41.50 34.62 
Oil and Gas 46 5.54 70.95 23.5 13.91 1.05 12 61.96 1.37 98.89 64.65 5.74 
Technology 17 4.24 58.53 20.92 19.7 0.84 8.18 64.78 0.25 102.75 52.94 2.06 
Telecommunications 13 4.62 55.25 22.73 42.01 0.78 10.31 69.66 2.72 90.62 25.68 1.77 
Utilities 46 5.04 81.13 23.1 39.11 0.61 9.98 54.99 0.1 106.8 7.41 5.30 
Table 2.3 Mean Values of Chapter Variables 
This table reports the variable mean values by industry from 2007 to 2015 for our sample.  
 
Table 2.4 reports the Spearman (Pearson) correlations reported in the upper (lower) 
diagonal.17 The correlation between CDS and other right-hand variables (e.g. SIZE and REG) 
is consistent with prior literature. As Cormier and Magnan (1999) conclude, “irrespective of 
their information costs and financial condition attributes, large firms disclose more 
environmental information than small firms” (p. 444). The significant positive correlation 
between CDS and REG indicates that the UK environmental reporting guidelines, including 
                                                 
17 Unreported variance inflation factors (VIFs) are within levels of tolerance for multicollinearity. 
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mandatory GHG emissions reports requirements, motivate firms to be more accountable and 
transparent about their carbon profile. Consistent with RBV expectations, the significant 
positive correlation between FPI and CDS provides some primary findings suggesting that 
carbon disclosure tends to positively affect FP. 
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Variables FPI CDS SIZE LEV BET BRS NED MAN SUB FMA COM REG IND 
FPI 1 0.071* -0.088** -0.184*** -0.218*** 0.113*** 0.007 -0.124*** -0.058 0.055 -0.151*** -0.037 -0.022 
CDS 0.076** 1 0.326*** 0.011 -0.087** 0.202*** 0.298*** -0.209*** -0.248*** -0.132*** 0.032 0.462*** -0.053 
SIZE -0.090*** 0.311** 1 0.141*** 0.043 0.606*** 0.323*** -0.567*** -0.256*** 0.098*** -0.252*** -0.042 -0.014 
LEV -0.209*** -0.001 0.136*** 1 -0.216*** 0.076** -0.058 -0.056 -0.036 -0.010 -0.041 -0.096*** 0.129*** 
BET -0.213*** -0.084** 0.171*** -0.157*** 1 -0.023 0.111*** -0.007 0.027 0.199*** 0.081** -0.004 0.167*** 
BRS 0.081** 0.188*** 0.643*** 0.092*** 0.060* 1 0.124*** -0.346*** -0.283*** 0.173*** -0.105*** .001 0.067* 
NED -0.045 0.298*** 0.403*** -0.044 0.151*** 0.164*** 1 -0.212*** -0.222*** 0.127*** -0.011 0.198 -0.116*** 
MAN -0.084*** 0.052 -0.189*** -0.028 0.052 -0.174*** -0.103*** 1 0.118*** -0.112*** 0.194*** 0.092** -0.061* 
SUB -0.013 -0.236*** -0.235*** 0.049 -0.005 -0.243*** -0.169*** -0.303*** 1 0.007 0.065* -0.082** 0.126*** 
FMA 0.009 -0.136*** 0.125*** -0.091*** 0.246*** 0.164*** 0.116*** -0.100*** -0.018 1 -0.037 -0.073** 0.086** 
COM -0.135*** -0.006 -0.294*** -0.029 -0.042 -0.145*** -0.094*** 0.012 0.087*** -0.155*** 1 0.215*** 0.483*** 
REG -0.072** 0.397*** -0.030 -0.048 -0.097*** -0.010 0.185*** 0.027 -0.064** -0.104*** 0.191*** 1 -0.035 
IND 0.001 -0.046*** -0.022 0.093*** 0.189*** -0.043 -0.118*** -0.024 0.150*** 0.025 0.521*** -0.034 1 
Table 2.4 Spearman (Pearson) Correlation Analysis of Chapter Variables 
This table reports the pairwise coefficients for our sample from 2007 to 2015 of 977 firm-year observations. The upper (lower) triangle reports the Spearman (Pearson) 
correlations. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
 
 
35 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Tests 
2.4.2.1 Carbon Disclosure and Firm Performance  
We employ alternative empirical assessments using several estimations to examine the impact of 
carbon disclosure on FP. Beside using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression procedures 
(Column 1) as reported in Table 2.5, we employ a TOBIT formulation for our second regression 
(Column 2) to account for the censored nature of the dependent variable (FPI) (e.g. Clarkson et 
al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014). We also re-estimate our model using the Random-Effects 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) (Column 3), based on Hausman test results, to control for 
heteroscedasticity (Kennedy, 2003).18 Finally, we use the instrumental variable two‐ stage least 
squares (IV‐ 2SLS) estimator in Column four (applying firm age and CDS Lag: 1 year) to 
examine the endogenous relation of carbon disclosure and FPI (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010, Jo 
and Harjoto, 2011, 2012). Endogeneity, arising from omitted variables, measurement error, 
interdependence between variables or correlated unobserved effects, is an issue we cannot ignore 
(e.g. Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, it is often challenging to ascertain the 
existence of reverse causality between dependent and independent variables, i.e. CDS drives FPI 
or otherwise (Wintoki et al., 2012). To address these endogeneity concerns, the study employed 
the IV-2SLS model, which requires the use of instrumental variables which are both exogenous 
and relevant. This requires the selection of an instrument for correlating with the endogenous 
variable (i.e. CDS) but not with the dependent variable (i.e. FPI) (Schreck, 2011). In line with 
Harjoto and Jo (2011; 2012), we select the Firm Age as a first instrumental variable. This 
selection is based on the assumption that mature firms are likely to be in a stronger position to 
participate in carbon disclosure projects but also that improved firm performance from such 
participation is not automatic (Harjoto and Jo 2011; 2012). In line with Schreck (2011) and 
Surroca et al. (2010), we use a one-year time lag of CDS as the second instrumental variable. 
Both instrumental relevance and exogeneity criteria are satisfied by using the lagged term of 
CDS. Prior period CDS can be viewed as one of a firm’s criteria for judging its current carbon 
disclosure and its current developing (declining) level.19  
                                                 
18 The Hausman test reports 0.460 and confirms the presence of no systematic differences between the fixed and 
random effects (Prob > 0.05). 
19 In order to confirm the absence of residual endogeneity, we run the Durbin Wu-Hausman test which reports a P-
value of 0.483. The IV-2SLS estimation uses a reduced sample because instruments (lagged values) are only 
available for 651 observations. 
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Results reported in Table 2.5 provide strong evidence for the positive impact of carbon disclosure 
on FP. CDS has a highly significant and positive association with FPI, consistently across all 
estimation methods. This result implies that firms continuously engaged with voluntary carbon 
disclosure on their carbon practices can attain the high FP and achieve a long-term competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. This finding confirms our main hypothesis (H1) and indicates that 
“it pays to be green” (e.g. Hart and Ahuja, 1996) which is generally supported by the RBV (Hart, 
1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Indeed, investing in a proactive carbon strategy, and voluntarily 
disclosing information that supports successful carbon management, leads to developing 
company-specific competencies aligned with enhanced transparency and accountability and the 
creation of further market opportunities.  
With regards to the control variables, SIZE reports a significant and negative association with 
FPI, contrary to our expectations. However, this finding is in line with prior research on RBV 
(e.g. Surroca et al., 2010; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2015), highlighting the importance of 
recognising the mediating effect of intangible assets in determining FP (e.g. Penrose, 1959; 
Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). We reflect on this argument within the theoretical framework 
proposed in Section 2.2 (Figure 2.1), suggesting the possible creation of a new intangible 
resource, acquired through improved carbon management and subsequent voluntary disclosures. 
This resource takes the form of a reputational asset that offers a competitive advantage and 
hence, improves FP. Because intangible assets are assumed to have a mediating effect on the 
association between environmental responsibility and FP, and the FP is negatively related to 
tangible assets (e.g. Surroca et al., 2010), the negative association between SIZE and FP seems to 
be driven by the tangible rather than intangible assets. We also find that the coefficient on LEV is 
highly significant and negative, in line with previous studies (e.g. Simerly and Li, 2000; Elsayed 
and Paton, 2005). This finding can be attributable to the high cost of loans determined by debtors 
who interpreted the firms’ need for debt as an indication of a liquidity issue, in a manner which 
affects the FP negatively. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Busch and Hoffmann, 2011), the 
coefficient on BET is highly significant and negative, suggesting that high-risk firms could 
encounter financial difficulties. Moreover, BRS reports a significant and positive association with 
FPI (Dalton et al., 1998), which is consistent with the resource dependence theory (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Payne et al., 2009). The coefficient on NED is positive and significant (except in 
GLS where the coefficient is positive and insignificant). A high percentage of non-executive 
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directors on the board is regarded as possibly having positive effects on firm FP (Brickley et al., 
1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cornett et al., 2007). MAN has a negative and significant 
association with FP. This result is supported by Short and Keasey (1999) who suggest that at 
certain ownership levels, managers consider it beneficial to enjoy perquisites (e.g. bonuses), 
particularly at times of falling share prices, and they do so with little fear of sanction from other 
shareholders. The association between SUB and FPI is negative and significant in OLS and IV-
2SLS analyses, similar to the finding of Faccio and Lasfer (2000). This result implies that 
institutional holders tend to be short-term investors who act as “brokers”, holding or selling the 
shares according to their portfolio and reallocating requirements in a way that affects FP 
negatively, as opposed to institutional investors that own shares with a long-term policy 
(Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). COM is negatively and significantly associated with FP, which is in 
line with Giroud and Mueller (2011) stating that a rise in product substitutability leads to reduced 
revenues for any assumed number of firms. REG coefficient is also negative and significant 
(except in GLS where the coefficient is negative and insignificant). This can be explained by the 
costs arising from compliance with environmental regulations which may be significantly 
detrimental to maximising shareholder wealth (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). Moreover, IND 
reports a positive and significant association. Hart and Ahuja (1996) suggest that firms with 
intensive emissions can enhance their productivity and competence by reducing their industrial 
waste. This might lead to better employment of inputs, causing a reduction in raw materials 
and/or waste disposal expenses. FMA shows an insignificant relationship. 
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                OLS 
                   (1) 
          TOBIT            
(2) 
GLS (RE) 
                 (3) 
        IV-2SLS 
                     (4) 
CDS 0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
SIZE -0.546*** 
(0.074) 
-0.549*** 
(0.071) 
-0.408*** 
(0.107) 
-0.596*** 
(0.089) 
LEV -0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.041*** 
(0.005) 
-0.044*** 
(0.007) 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
BET -1.671*** 
(0.219) 
-1.682*** 
(0.223) 
-1.086*** 
(0.234) 
-1.683*** 
(0.242) 
BRS 1.727*** 
(0.339) 
1.732*** 
(0.359) 
0.766** 
(0.383) 
1.508*** 
(0.366) 
NED 0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
MAN -0.039*** 
(0.008) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037** 
(0.018) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
SUB -0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.007** 
(0.004) 
FMA 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
COM -0.051*** 
(0.007) 
-0.052*** 
(0.007) 
-0.54*** 
(0.011) 
-0.051*** 
(0.007) 
REG -0.844** 
(0.327) 
-0.844** 
(0.394) 
-0.386 
(0.325) 
-1.045*** 
(0.399) 
IND 0.983*** 
(0.209) 
0.997*** 
(0.192) 
1.239*** 
(0.347) 
0919*** 
(0.216) 
YEAR Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.524*** 
(1.325) 
14.600*** 
(1.380) 
13.821*** 
(2.313) 
15.717*** 
(1.439) 
Log- Likelihood  -1484.997   
Hausman test                      0.460  
Durbin Wu-Hausman    0. 483 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.25  0.07 0.22 0.24 
N 747 747 747 651 
Table 2.5 The Impact of Carbon Disclosure on Financial Performance 
This table reports the results of four estimation methods: (1) OLS (2) TOBIT (3) Random-GLS (4) IV‐2SLS. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. (two-tailed test). 
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Overall findings support our expectations and hypothesis, which suggest that implementing 
proactive carbon management strategies is likely to enhance FP. This path establishes the 
discharging of accountability through voluntary quality disclosure. The proactive strategies 
involve a set of plans, actions, and verifications all aimed at improving carbon disclosure. 
Significant changes in business operations are likely during this process which also involves 
target-setting elements and the alignment of carbon strategy with overall business strategy. Thus, 
prepared for voluntary disclosure (through CDP), the firm will subsequently be able to avail itself 
of the benefits driven by improved carbon disclosure. Therefore, in line with the RBV conceptual 
framework, carbon disclosure, which complements the capability resource to manage carbon 
effectively, and transmits accurate information about actual performance to a wide range of 
stakeholders, is an essential competitive resource that addresses climate change risks and 
opportunities and helps improve organisational reliability and legitimacy, which will eventually 
enhance the FP. 
 
2.4.2.2 Additional Analyses 
Considering the sample period of this study that includes the period of the GFC (2007-2008), we 
perform an additional analysis to capture the potential effect of the GFC on the examined 
relationship.20 We split our sample into two sub-periods: 2007-2008 (financial crisis period) and 
2009-2015 (recovery period). Table 2.6 shows that the relationship of CDS-FPI is insignificant 
during the GFC period, while it is highly significant during the recovery period. This finding 
emphasises that firms ought to adapt to times of GFC and reduce investment in carbon mitigation 
projects (e.g. Cheney and McMillan, 1990; Njoroge, 2009). However, after the crisis, corporate 
social and environmental responsibility tend to become more important in the public interest. As 
KPMG states: “Before the financial crisis, investors typically saw environmental due diligence as 
a risk management tick-box exercise to secure financial institution funding. However, post-this 
exogenous shock, there appears to be a greater focus on responsible investment. We are seeing an 
increased appetite for the potential upsides (e.g. cost savings, additional revenue streams) of the 
sustainability agenda, in a transactional context. Strategies to manage energy (buy better, use less 
                                                 
20 Consistent with Erkens et al., 2012, we specify the years of 2007-2008 as the GFC period. 
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and self-generate) and waste (convert waste to an asset) are transforming the environmental due 
diligence process” (KPMG, 2017).  
Accordingly, findings suggest that the value of a firm was less dependent on intangible assets 
within the GFC period and that today’s businesses are looking for confidence in the financial 
market to improve their reputations in competitive markets (Raithel et al., 2010). Our finding, 
however, contradicts that of Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2014), who examine the impact of the crisis 
on the environmental performance of large international companies for the period 2006 to 2009. 
They find that in times of GFC, companies continue to invest in sustainable projects to enhance 
relations with their stakeholders that might result in higher economic profits. However, as they 
conclude, a limitation of their study is the period employed; future studies should examine longer 
time periods to enable analysis of the behaviour of firms during and after the period of GFC. Our 
study accounts for this possibility by comparing the GFC period and recovery period in 
examining the relationship between carbon disclsoure and FP. 
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                                                                        Financial Crisis Period                                                Recovery Period 
                                                                                 (2007-2008)                                                            ( 2009-2015) 
                                                                     OLS                             TOBIT                              OLS                         TOBIT 
CDS 0.013 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
SIZE -0.450* 
(0.233) 
-0.450* 
(0.233) 
-0.552*** 
(0.078) 
-0.556*** 
(0.075) 
LEV -0.060*** 
(0.011) 
-0.060*** 
(0.012) 
-0.037*** 
(0.005) 
-0.037*** 
(0.006) 
BET -2.383*** 
(0.717) 
-2.383 *** 
(0.790) 
-1.603*** 
(0.230) 
-1.615*** 
(0.236) 
BRS 1.759* 
(0.981) 
1.760* 
(1.058) 
1.762*** 
(0.365) 
1.766*** 
(0.383) 
NED 0.032* 
(0.019) 
0.032* 
(0.0187) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
MAN -0.029 
(0.021) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040*** 
(0.011) 
SUB -0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
FMA -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
COM -0.028 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
-0.053*** 
(0.007) 
-0.054*** 
(0.007) 
REG   -1.029** 
(0.329) 
-1.030*** 
(0.324) 
IND 1.145* 
(0.591) 
1.145** 
(0.532) 
0.942*** 
(0.226) 
0.958*** 
(0.206) 
Constant 12.766*** 
(3.862)                            
12.766*** 
                    (4.132) 
14.685*** 
(1.459) 
14.765*** 
(1.487) 
Log- Likelihood  -193.557  -1286.931 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.30  0.09 0.25 0.07 
N 101 101 646 646 
Table 2.6 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Relationship Examined 
OLS and TOBIT were applied. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test).
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We perform an additional test to further examine the effect of carbon disclosure across the 
different set of continuous measures (i.e. accounting, market, combined accounting and 
market-based measures) and to check the robustness of our main findings. We re-assess the 
associations between carbon disclosure and each of the individual proxies for our FPI, as 
shown in Table 2.7 Across four out of five accounting measures, results report significant 
associations with carbon disclosure (i.e. ROA, ROE and AT in the expected direction and D/E 
in the inverse direction).21 Among the three market measures, we only find a significant 
association between carbon disclosure and RV in the expected direction (i.e. negative). For 
the two combined measures, Z-score and P/B have a significant relationship in the expected 
direction (i.e. positive). Overall, the results indicate that the carbon disclosure quality is less 
related to market-based measures than other indicators.  
Taken together, this finding suggests that accounting measures are more likely to be 
correlated with CDS than market measures. This finding is in line with Orlitzky et al. (2003), 
who state that the relationship of CSR-FP is robust when employing the accounting measures. 
Accounting measures reflect a firm’s profitability, as a determinant of operating efficiency, 
and hence place more emphasis on the internal resource utilisation strategies than the market-
based measures of performance. This interpretation is consistent with the RBV theory which 
explains performance variations among competing firms (Galbreath and Galvin, 2008) based 
on each firm’s ability to exploit its internal resources (Barney, 1991). Beliveau et al. (1994) 
show that the different financial responses to CSR are based on the measures employed, with 
the accounting measures capturing the historical aspect and the market measures capturing the 
future aspect. This argument confirms the need to use a constructed index that captures 
several financial dimensions, particularly when considering the debate about the proper 
measure of a firm’s FP (e.g., Cochran and Wood, 1984). The use of market measures along 
with accounting measures compensates for any potential measurement deficiency (Balabanis 
et al., 1998). 
 
                                                 
21 The expected direction for ROA, ROE and AT is positive, and the expected directions for D/E is negative. 
43 
 
DV                                  ROA                 ROE                  AT                   D/E                 IC                   RV                 COE                 P/E                   Z                     P/B                  
Model                             OLS                  OLS                 OLS                  OLS              OLS                OLS                OLS                 OLS                OLS                 OLS               
CDS  0.026*** 
(0.009) 
 0.180*** 
(0.038) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.505*** 
(0.143) 
 0.006 
(0.073) 
-0.039** 
(0.015) 
 0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
SIZE                   -1.453*** 
(0.178) 
-6.300*** 
(0.756) 
-0.050*** 
(0.017) 
-13.674*** 
(2.452) 
-5.435*** 
(1.270) 
-1.889*** 
(0.213) 
-0.151*** 
(0.057) 
1.215** 
(0.577) 
-0.704*** 
(0.052) 
-1.121*** 
(0.136) 
LEV -0.067*** 
(0.011) 
0.271*** 
(0.058) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
6.176*** 
(0.234) 
-0.604*** 
(0.077) 
 0.018 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.049 
(0.038) 
-0.052*** 
(0.003) 
0.067*** 
(0.010) 
BET -1.787*** 
(0.533) 
-8.300*** 
(2.001) 
-0.190*** 
(0.048) 
-20.241*** 
(6.946) 
7.291* 
(3.822) 
18.909*** 
(0.890) 
4.671*** 
(0.226) 
4.738** 
(2.177) 
-0.371** 
(0.160) 
-0.583** 
(0.281) 
BRS 5.003*** 
(0.812) 
23.892*** 
(3.913) 
-0.193** 
(0.081) 
39.540*** 
(13.822) 
10.785* 
(6.257) 
-0.983 
(1.161) 
0.017 
(0.297) 
3.714 
(3.369) 
1.348*** 
(0.260) 
2.616*** 
(0.687) 
NED 0.053*** 
(0.015) 
0.200*** 
(0.056) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
 0.165 
(0.211) 
-0.008 
(0.101) 
-0.051*** 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.050 
(0.044) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
MAN -0.038 
(0.023) 
-0.110 
(0.112) 
 0.000 
(0.002) 
 0.061 
(0.505) 
-0.181 
(0.175) 
0.146*** 
(0.034) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.093 
(0.087) 
-0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
SUBO -0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.018 
(0.031) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.107 
(0.108) 
0.003 
(0.056) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.082*** 
(0.031) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
FAR -0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.063** 
(0.026) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.370*** 
(0.111) 
 0.041 
(0.044) 
 0.007 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.038* 
(0.023) 
 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
COM -0.013 
(0.010) 
 0.005 
(0.035) 
 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.193 
(0.125) 
0.058 
(0.060) 
-0.035*** 
(0.013) 
 0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.075** 
(0.037) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
REG -3.063*** 
(0.939) 
-16.843*** 
(4.367) 
-0.277*** 
(0.094) 
-17.675 
(14.283) 
12.879*** 
(4.615) 
3.181*** 
(1.024) 
0.102 
(0.231) 
7.038*** 
(2.289) 
0.137 
(0.257) 
-0.609 
(0.844) 
IND -0.008 
(0.466) 
0.763 
(1.829) 
0.092** 
(0.042) 
14.831** 
(6.480) 
-7.760** 
(3.924) 
 0.216* 
(0.605) 
-0.107 
(0.154) 
-0.476** 
(1.677) 
-0.554*** 
(0.136) 
-0.619** 
(0.290) 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 28.271*** 
(3.677) 
95.771*** 
(13.292) 
2.364*** 
(0.281) 
159.660*** 
(47.308) 
127.070** 
(22.840) 
61.743*** 
(4.387) 
9.412*** 
(1.116) 
25.647** 
(10.184) 
17.294** 
(0.936) 
19.939*** 
(2.670) 
R2 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.57 0.13 0.72 0.59 0.06 0.40 0.16 
N 1,196 1,141 1,195 1,162 1,197 1,197 1,064 1,107 1,184 1,058 
Table 2.7 The Impact of Carbon Disclosure on Variables of FPI  
This table reports the results of regressions for each variable of FPI as a continuous variable. where ROA is return on assets, ROE is return on equity, AT is asset turnover, D/E 
is debt to equity ratio, IC is interest coverage ratio, RV is stock return volatility, COE is cost of equity, P/E is price earnings ratio, Z is Altman z-score, and P/B is market to 
book ratio. The measurements of these variables as presented in Appendix 2.1. OLS was applied. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (two-tailed test). 
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We further extend our analyses to cluster the full sample into two groups based on the mean 
value of FPI to examine whether there are structural differences for CDS across firms 
reporting high FPI and low FPI. Firms which grouped as having a low FPI report no 
significant evidence for this association. In Table 2.8 (Panel A), results confirm our main 
findings and show that firms with proactive carbon strategies promote better firm FP. This 
suggests additional benefits to stakeholders and might enhance investors’ confidence that 
these firms tend to achieve maximum possible operational efficiency and are more likely to 
have superior FP (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).  
Furthermore, consistent with our main findings, firms within carbon-intensive industries tend 
to have better FP. Extending our further interest on this classification of firms operating in 
carbon-intensive industries, we perform an additional test which aims to provide the 
moderating effect of firms in carbon-intensive industries on the positive association between 
disclosure and FP. In this analysis, an interactive term between industry and carbon 
disclosure (IND*CDS) is constructed and is controlled for in Equation (1) using OLS 
estimation method.  
Results in Table 2.8 (Panel B) show that the coefficient on CDS is consistently positive and 
highly significant, indicating that carbon disclosure promotes high firm performance. 
Conditional on the industry type (i.e. carbon-intensive vs non-carbon-intensive industries), 
we find the interaction term IND*CDS shows a negative and highly significant coefficient. 
This suggests that firms operating within the carbon-intensive industries and reporting on the 
carbon practices show significantly lower firm performance. The sum of the CDS and 
IND*CDS coefficients is positive and significant, which confirms that the positive 
association between CDS and FP is significantly lowered for this particular category of firms. 
In other words, firms operating in carbon-intensive industries are not benefiting from 
disclosing on their carbon profile when compared to other firms that work in non-carbon-
intensive industries. This finding can be explained by the negative financial consequences 
resulting from the environment-related cost, which are more pronounced for firms in carbon-
intensive industries (Ramiah et al., 2013). 
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Panel A Panel B 
                                                                  High FPI                                         Low FPI Interaction 
                                                       OLS                  TOBIT                  OLS                TOBIT OLS 
CDS 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.007) 
SIZE -0.455*** 
(0.068) 
-0.460*** 
(0.067) 
0.120* 
(0.065) 
0.121* 
(0.063) 
-0.571*** 
(0.0723) 
LEV -0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.041*** 
(0.005) 
BET             -0.518** 
(0.210) 
-0.527** 
(0.234) 
-0.786*** 
(0.166) 
-0.788*** 
(0.167) 
-1.764*** 
(0.214) 
BRS 0.964*** 
(0.334) 
0.971*** 
(0.352) 
0.403 
(0.279) 
0.402 
(0.276) 
1.746*** 
(0.338) 
NED 0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
MAN -0.033*** 
(0.008) 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.040*** 
(0.008) 
SUBO  0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
FMA -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
COM -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.056*** 
(0.007) 
REG -0.021 
(0.318) 
-0.025 
(0.368) 
-0.917*** 
(0.231) 
-0.917*** 
(0.294) 
-0.853*** 
(0.321) 
IND 0.368** 
(0.186) 
0.380** 
(0.172) 
0.266 
(0.187) 
0.267 
(0.1177) 
3.578*** 
(0.614) 
IND*CDS     -0.035*** 
(0.008) 
YEAR Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.508*** 
(1.291) 
13.603*** 
(1.222) 
1.158 
(1.215) 
1.136 
(1.216) 
13.139 
(1.326) 
Log- Likelihood  -656.681  -433.8144  
CDS+IND*CDS 0.010** 
(0.004) 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.27 
N 411 411 336 336 747 
Table 2.8 The Impact of Carbon Disclosure on Sub-sample of FPI and the Industry Effect 
Panel A reports the results for clustering our sample into higher (lower) than the mean value (4.9) of FPI. Panel B 
reports the moderating effect of industry on the impact of carbon disclosure on FP. OLS and TOBIT were applied. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. (two-tailed test).
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2.5 Conclusion 
Motivated by the growing public concern about climate change and green finance, this study 
empirically assesses the economic consequences of carbon disclosure. We use the RBV as a 
conceptual foundation for analysis within carbon accountability research to understand 
companies’ responsibility practices towards their constituents in the UK, one of the leading 
countries in Europe, that is rigorously developing regulations in carbon emissions. The current 
literature seems to be lacking such investigation, particularly within this specific setting.  
The RBV is arguably one of the dominant strategic paradigms that can significantly advance our 
understanding of carbon management practices. It explicitly looks for the intangible assets or 
internal resources and dynamic capabilities of competitive advantage and aims to explain why 
competing firms might differ in performance (Barney,1991; Teece et al., 1997; Peteraf and 
Barney 2003). In this paper, we hypothesised that it is not only resources that generate 
competitive advantage but also the managerial capabilities to put these resources into 
communication with stakeholders after implementing carbon mitigation actions to make a 
positive impact on market participants' expectations. If carbon disclosure provides accurate 
information about actual performance and is transmitted to a broader range of stakeholders, the 
carbon disclosure-FP relationship should exist. As such, carbon disclosure does not replace the 
capability resource to manage carbon effectively in the RBV stream; rather it complements it. 
The RBV represents legitimacy and reputation as intangible resources (Miles and Covin, 2000; 
Tilling and Tilt, 2010; Kuo and Yi-Ju Chen, 2013) that are derived from combinations of internal 
investments required for carbon mitigation projects and external market assessment of carbon‐
related risks and opportunities. In such context, a firm may choose to voluntarily report high-
quality information regarding their proactive carbon strategies applied to processes, products, and 
services to create, maintain or enhance its competitive advantage. Failure to communicate 
information on carbon profile to the market would result in the inability of investors to accurately 
estimate the risk associated with the investment. Carbon disclosure can then be regarded as a 
commitment to transparency, as efforts to address climate change risks and opportunities, and as 
a criterion for measuring an organisation’s reliability and legitimacy. 
The RBV’s theoretical framework suggested in this study is expected to form a basis for 
understanding how incorporating climate change mitigation efforts into business strategies can 
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affect the bottom line of firms’ performance through disclosure to the public. We tested this 
theoretical prediction through employing several empirical assessments. We utilised firms’ 
voluntary carbon disclosure in the CDP, and developed a composite measure of FP for FTSE350 
firms over the 2007–2015 period.  
Our results show that enhanced carbon disclosure in the period examined positively influences 
FP. Findings suggest that if businesses are to put the RBV framework into practice to maximise 
cost savings and accelerate business benefits, they need both the proactive integration of climate 
change mitigation efforts into their business strategy and the high-quality carbon disclosure 
communications to signal their superior performance to the public realm. Furthermore, the results 
show no significant evidence for the impact of carbon disclosure on FP during the GFC years. 
This association is more pronounced after the crisis period (i.e. carbon disclosure became an 
important determinant of firm performance). 
The study also shows evidence that market-based measures of firm performance are less related 
to carbon disclosure than other measures of performance. Moreover, results indicate that firms 
which achieved high FP reported highly positive carbon disclosure compared to a modest 
disclosure for firms with low FP. We also find that firms operating in carbon-intensive industries 
are not benefiting from disclosing on their carbon profile as other firms that work in non-carbon-
intensive industries. 
As an implication in an increasingly competitive world, and as the level of carbon disclosure and 
stakeholder demands for carbon-related information increase, it is becoming evident that 
managers should consider a company’s carbon management and its subsequent quality reporting 
activities as strategic issues. Carbon-related decisions should be integrated into corporate 
transparency and disclosure requirements as well as broader organisational decision-making 
processes to support firms seeking to develop a competitive advantage.  
A limitation of the study is that the sample firms are the largest 350 companies by capitalisation 
which have their primary listing on the London Stock Exchange. Therefore, caution should be 
taken in generalising the present study outcomes to other businesses.  
Additionally, for two variables, advertising expenses and R&D expenditure, there are gaps in the 
data which could have impacted the analysis of the relationship of interest. Furthermore, this 
study did not examine whether developing an RBV competitive advantage from proactive carbon 
management strategy leads to better risk management. Therefore, future research could explore 
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the question of whether promoting sound carbon mitigation policies decreases a firm’s market 
risk or is a cost burden and increases such risks. Furthermore, Brexit may open new research 
directions to investigate the carbon disclosure profile in the UK and its impact on firms’ FP as 
well. This possibility is especially relevant given the current political climate in the UK as Brexit-
related uncertainty implies that the UK may withdraw from the EU Emissions Trading System 
and establish its policy to combat climate change and mitigate GHG emissions cost-effectively. 
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Chapter 3.Does Improving Corporate Carbon Disclosure Reduce Firm Risk? 
Empirical Evidence from the UK 
3.1 Introdution 
Awareness of the environmental downsides of economic development is increasing worldwide. 
Climate change and energy transitions have become major social and financial issues, which is 
reflected in the prevailing regulatory reforms driven by the concerns of different stakeholder 
groups (Haque, 2017). In response, more responsibility is falling on firms to improve their 
environmental strategies. Firms have recognised their responsibility in this area and the 
opportunities that these new realities present, including tangible cost savings from waste 
management and energy efficiency to the intangible benefits of an enhanced reputation. That is, 
firms are increasingly prioritising their climate change strategy in their overall business strategy 
(Lewandowski, 2017). 22 Interest in firm risk arising from climate change, including that from 
regulatory and market influences, has exponentially increased among institutional investors and 
other stakeholders, exerting growing pressure on corporate managers to prioritise the evaluation 
and reporting of such risks and related opportunities (Matsumura et al., 2014). Carbon reporting 
as a tool to tackle the climate risk is only one element of corporate reporting, but it is recognised 
as a vital and challenging undertaking (Graafland et al., 2016). 
There is growing evidence that managers share a common interest with increasingly demanding 
stakeholders and could potentially gain from carbon disclosure. There is evidence that voluntary 
carbon disclosure enables a firm to avoid the valuation penalty that capital markets impose based 
on the magnitude of carbon emissions and the failure to disclose carbon emission information 
(Matsumura et al., 2014). As part of a superior overall corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
practices, carbon disclosure and engagement with stakeholders can lead to improved access to 
financing (Cheng et al., 2014).  
As an effort to report the carbon profile was establishing the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
which is a registered charity that aims to help organisations understand, report and, ultimately, 
reduce their carbon impacts. By promoting greater transparency, they could nudge investors away 
                                                 
22 “The trend is clear; the world is moving towards a green economy. Governments and business increasingly 
understand that there is no trade-off between a healthy environment and a healthy economy” (António Guterres, 
United Nations, 2017). 
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from investment decisions that carry a risk from climate change impacts. In addition, the CDP 
could encourage investments that move the economy towards a more low-carbon sustainable 
future. The objective of this work is to investigate the relationship between voluntary carbon 
disclosure and firm risk (FR). Recognising the effects of climate change on the FR allows 
stakeholders to proactively respond in a manner that benefits the firm and the environment. 
The motivation for the present study is derived from an interest in understanding corporate 
engagement in climate change beyond regulatory compliance by considering voluntary carbon 
disclosure through the CDP. We contribute to the debate on the economic outcomes of carbon 
disclosure through the conceptualisation of the impact of the adoption of proactive carbon 
management strategies on FR and investigation of any effects. Besides the potential positive 
association between information asymmetry and FR, the resource-based view (RBV) theory is 
considered appropriate to build our study’s theoretical framework. RBV focuses on how internal 
decision making, determined by the availability of productive resources, generates a competitive 
advantage and results in financial benefits through a reduction in FR, which may include valuable 
and hard-to-duplicate resources that could offer strategic gains over competitors (Ramanathan, 
2018).  
Our study sample represents listed firms on the FTSE350 index and comprises 2089 year-
observations from 2007 to 2015, a period of raised public awareness and intense policy debate on 
issues of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate change. The companies listed on the 
FTSE350 are the largest in the London Stock Exchange by market capitalisation, so they 
constitute a central projection for carbon and economic performance in the UK. We use climate 
change-related disclosure – the Carbon Disclosure Score (CDS) published by the CDP – and 
apply three FR measures: total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. In the first empirical study 
(Chapter 2), the measure of total risk used in the current study (i.e. stock return volatility) is an 
element of the financial performance index. Technically, the standard deviation of stock returns 
can be viewed as an indicator of both financial performance and risk. For the former, the links 
between profitability and stock prices were established based on the measure of asset prices (i.e. 
present value of future cash flow). Therefore, the fluctuations in stock price can indicate the 
stability of firms’ financial performance, which is an important aspect of financial health. As a 
result, it is included as a measuring component of the financial performance index. On the other 
hand, the measure also indicates the total risk of firms and is analysed in isolation in this study. 
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This risk measure is examined in more detailed by studying its components. According to finance 
theory, the total risk is composed of systematic risk (market risk) - the portion of risk explained 
by changes in the average market portfolio returns - and idiosyncratic risk (firm-specific unique 
risk) - the residual risk that cannot be explained by changes in the average market portfolio 
returns (e.g. Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Jo and Na, 2012). This study finds that proactive 
responses to climate change involving voluntary carbon disclosure significantly improve the three 
aspects of FR. The findings are in line with the notion of ‘win-win’ outcomes from being both 
green and competitive (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). The present study also captures the 
effect of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the carbon disclosure-FR relationship. The results 
indicate that carbon disclosure had no effect on risk during this GFC period. However, during the 
recovery period, reporting on carbon disclosure resulted in a lower FR. By distinguishing 
between intensive and non-intensive carbon industries, this study reveals that the relationship 
between carbon disclosure and FR is more marked in carbon-intensive industries. 
This study contributes to the emergent field of climate-related activism and carbon disclosure by 
providing broader considerations of corporate transparency in three ways. First, our study builds 
on RBV theory (Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997) by investigating how proactive carbon 
strategy may influence the FR. We test the conceptual model based on RBV theory and consider 
the positive association between the information asymmetry and FR by applying three variables 
that capture FR. Second, previous studies emphasised the broad measures of environmental 
responsibility, but our analysis focuses on carbon issues, allowing for an examination of one 
delimited aspect. To our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the impact of carbon 
disclosure on FR. Therefore, our study extends the emerging literature on carbon responsibility 
(e.g. Luo and Tang, 2014; Haque, 2017). Third, the debate in the literature on the economic 
effects of CSR verges on suggesting a negative direction for this relationship, but there is no 
evidence within the European or UK contexts on the direction and extent of the relationship 
between carbon disclosure and FR. As the UK, a member of the G7 (Group of Seven), is a major 
emitter of GHG in global terms (Haque, 2017), it is appropriate and interesting as a setting for 
this study. Moreover, the UK is presently taking a leadership role in the development of proactive 
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mechanisms aimed at the mitigation of climate change dangers.23 In late 2008, the UK’s 
Committee on Climate Change recommended that the government target a reduction in GHG 
emissions to a minimum of 80% below the 1990 levels by 2050. The Companies Act 2006 
(Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1970) (Secretary of State, 
2013) created new obligations for listed companies with regard to GHG emissions disclosure. In 
their directors’ report, such firms must publish their annual carbon dioxide emissions and the 
methodology used for their calculation. The present study fills an important gap in the literature 
by presenting evidence from the UK. 
The findings presented in this paper provide updated insights and policy implications that are of 
interest to regulators, managers and investors. Management must work toward the improvement 
of carbon disclosure including its reliability, credibility and relevance. CDP reports appear to be a 
particularly appropriate mechanism, as they meet the needs of managers and stakeholders by 
offering standardised and readily comparable information that makes mimicking higher achievers 
problematic for lower-performing firms (Luo and Tang, 2014). The results of this study offer 
guidance to regulators seeking to encourage businesses to implement sustainable carbon 
management practices. The 2009 guidelines for GHG disclosure and the disclosure requirements 
issued by Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the new annual strategic 
report are crucial steps in the right direction, but regulators should frame efforts to mitigate 
climate change in terms of strategically important resources that are enhanced by quality carbon 
disclosure. 
The rest of this paper is presented as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the existing literature on the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and FR, which facilitated the creation of the hypothesis 
for this paper. Section 3.3 presents the research design, sample, study period and measurement of 
variables, followed by Section 3.4, which shows the research results and an analysis of the 
findings. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
23 In electricity generation terms, 2017 was the UK’s greenest year ever. Data from the National Grid shows that the UK 
reduced its electricity sector carbon emissions by half since 2012 and is the seventh-cleanest power system worldwide 
(BBC News, 2017). 
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3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Background 
Many literature examined sustainability reporting or corporate social/environmental/carbon 
responsibility (e.g. Bansal and Roth, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2010; Qiu et al., 
2016). The association between social/environmental responsibility and FR has been the focus of 
substantial research across a range of academic disciplines (e.g. Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; 
Lee and Faff, 2009; Salama et al., 2011; Jo and Na, 2012; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Albuquerque 
et al., 2013; Benlemlih et al., 2018). Comprehensive literature reviews on carbon accounting 
have been performed (Stechemesser and Guenther, 2012; Hartmann et al., 2013; Ascui, 2014; 
Haslam et al., 2014;). Hahn et al. (2015) reviewed studies examining the output and outcome of 
carbon disclosure and concluded that studies primarily give prominence to the empirical 
determinants of carbon disclosure and secondarily, and to a much lesser degree, examine the 
outcomes (effects) of the disclosure. As a result, “the effects of carbon disclosure represent a 
major gap that should be filled by future research” (Hahn et al., 2015, pp. 97). 
This assertion appears particularly well-founded considering the ongoing debate on the economic 
impacts of carbon disclosure in the literature. In previous related empirical studies, CSR was 
measured by indices/scores that focus broadly on environmental/social aspects rather than on 
impacts of carbon profile on FR, as in our paper. Furthermore, related empirical research on the 
impact of CSR on FR provides virtually consensual and conclusive findings that report a negative 
association. Those who measured FR using the systematic risk by beta found a negative 
relationship between FR and CSR. Salama et al. (2011) provide evidence in the UK regarding the 
association between CSR measured by social and environmental responsibility rankings and 
systematic FR. Panel data from 1994 to 2006 across sectors for the UK’s most admired firms 
(including the FTSE100) revealed a statistically significant negative relationship between CSR 
and FR. The same findings were repeated by Oikonomou et al. (2012) and Albuquerque et al. 
(2013) by observing US firms of the S&P500 index from 1991-2008 and US firms from MSCI’s 
(former KLD’s) database from 2003-2011, respectively.24 A different set of studies employed the 
idiosyncratic risk as an FR proxy and the results showed a negative association between 
                                                 
24 MSCI Research delivers detailed research, scoring, and scrutiny concerning the environmental, social, and 
governance-related corporate practices of thousands of global firms, providing primary and timely information 
(https://www.msci.com/esg-integration). 
 
 
 
54 
 
company-unique idiosyncratic risk and CSR, including Lee and Faff (2009) using the Dow Jones 
Global index from 1998–2002 as a research sample and Luo and Bhattacharya (2009), who relied 
on the America’s Most Admired Companies list for a research sample from 2002-2003. Total risk 
was employed to measure the FR in a study by Jo and Na (2012), who analysed the relationship 
by observing American firms from the MSCI database. They found that the risk reduction effect 
from CSR engagement is economically and statistically significant in firms operating in 
controversial sectors compared to those in non-controversial industries. Orlitzky and Benjamin 
(2001) summarise this research area quantitatively through a meta-analysis of 18 studies 
examining the relationship between CSR and FR, representing 6,186 observations from 1978 to 
1997. They found that CSR is negatively correlated with risk and that the negative correlation is 
highest with total risk. Benlemlih et al. (2018) applied three variables to measure FR, total risk, 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk and found significant and negative relationships between 
social and environmental disclosures and total and idiosyncratic risk for 2005-2013 for FTSE350 
listed firms. According to the authors, future research should re-examine this relationship by 
applying different measures.25 
Although environmental and social measures have been widely used in previous literature, no 
measure precisely reflects the carbon profile (e.g. CDS issued by CDP, changes in carbon dioxide 
emissions and carbon intensity ratios). Although it covers many time periods, the literature does 
not extensively cover an extended post-financial crisis period. Furthermore, as Hahn et al. (2015, 
pp. 94) note, previous studies do not “explicitly refer to an underlying theoretical framework and, 
rather, rely on prior empirical evidence to develop their hypotheses”. It is unclear whether our 
understanding of the issue has advanced since it first received scholarly attention. As the field has 
matured, there is a need for a sound theoretical foundation and further empirical work on the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and FR. 
 
3.2.2 Carbon Disclosure and FR: Rethinking the Relationship with an RBV Conceptualisation 
The priority of all firms in a competitive business environment is to secure a sustainable 
competitive advantage to outperform and overcome other firms (Kamasak, 2013). This 
                                                 
25 Benlemlih et al. (2018) employed an environmental disclosure score extracted from Bloomberg’s database as a 
proxy for environmental disclosure. We cannot use this proxy as a measure for carbon disclosure in the relationship 
examined in this paper as the components of this measure are not all fully related to carbon (e.g. water consumption, 
wastewater, electricity consumption, paper consumption and phone recycling). 
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competitive advantage is achieved “if it is able to create more economic value than the marginal 
(breakeven) competitor in its product market” (Peteraf and Barney, 2003, pp. 314). A firm can be 
viewed as a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), defined as “the subset of its 
productive assets which are economically inalienable” (Wernerfelt, 2016, pp. 102), and every 
firm possesses a unique (heterogeneous) resource endowment (Lockett et al., 2008). However, 
such resources may only be the basis of sustained competitive advantage if they are valuable 
(Barney and Clark, 2007), as “bundles of strategically relevant resources” (Peteraf and Barney, 
2003, pp. 317) allow for a firm to generate accomplishable business strategies and build a 
sustainable competitive advantage over competitor firms (Collis, 1994; Kamasak, 2013). 
The RBV of the firm, “an efficiency-based explanation of sustained superior firm performance” 
(Barney and Clark, 2007, pp. V), offers a theoretical approach to explain differences in 
performance among firms in the same market (Newbert, 2007; Galbreath and Galvin, 2008) 
related to internal, firm-specific factors and idiosyncratic resources (Barney, 1991). In the RBV 
approach, for a firm to generate superior profits and/or decrease costs and establish a sustainable 
competitive advantage in today’s business climate (Hitt et al., 2001), it has to acquire and control 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) intangible resources (Barney, 1991) and 
possess dynamic capabilities that “integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, pp. 516). There is a 
strong case for RBV theory as the predominant theory in the discourse on how firm performance 
is affected by environmental practices (e.g. Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 
1997; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Menguc and Ozanne, 2005; Ramanathan, 2018). 
Carbon disclosure is a reflection of a firm’s contribution to climate change and thus constitutes an 
important part of the corporate environmental strategy. Adopting a proactive environmental 
strategy often leads to achievement of an optimal operational efficiency and a reduction of risks 
to humans and the environment (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Fujii et al., 2013). Enhanced 
environmental risk management practices relieve societal pressures, lower the threat of 
government regulation, and reduce market risk (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Salama et al., 
2011) and the firm’s cost of capital (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Firms that are environmentally proactive “enjoy several potential revenue-
generating benefits: (a) reducing their exposure to potential carbon costs, (b) opening up new 
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markets, (c) developing competencies that provide a competitive advantage, and (d) creating new 
revenue streams from excess credits” (Peloza, 2009, pp. 1526). 
Achieving competitive advantage through voluntary carbon disclosure as a vital aspect of overall 
CSR reporting will lead to an enhanced level of transparency (e.g. Wood, 1991; Clarkson et al.,  
2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Superior openness regarding CSR can lead to improved access to 
finance and reduced idiosyncratic capital constraints (Cheng et al., 2014). Considering these 
benefits, there is a strong case for presenting carbon information as part of overall CSR reporting 
in the same manner that financial information is presented in traditional annual reports (Cho et 
al., 2013). As stated earlier, carbon disclosure as a competitive advantage and transparency are 
closely linked; we can use a firms’ voluntary disclosures to evaluate their level of transparency. 
Existing literature indicates that the more transparent a firm is, the less the information 
asymmetry between that firm and its investors is (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert et 
al., 2007). Dhaliwal et al. (2011, pp. 62) recognise, ‘‘… some CSR projects have direct 
implications for positive cash flow even in the near future’’. As an element of overall CSR, 
carbon disclosure projects can potentially influence equity valuation (Cho et al., 2013) because 
carbon disclosure reduces uncertainties about the value consequences of CSR projects. Therefore, 
the promotion of carbon transparency allows for the firm and stakeholders to improve the quality 
of their economic decision making. The resulting transparency and reduction in information 
asymmetry are expected to affect the relationship examined in this paper. 
 
3.2.3 Discharging Accountability: The Quality Role 
Managers should seek creative ways to reduce their firm’s carbon footprint in an accountable and 
transparent manner (Haslam et al., 2014). Having adopted such strategies, firms with better 
carbon disclosure will voluntarily indicate information on their actions (Connelly et al., 2011), 
that is, their “discharge of accountability” (Gray et al., 1996, pp. 39), by communicating (Zeghal 
and Ahmed, 1990) intent to devise a carbon competitive strategy (Schaltegger and Csutora, 
2012), publicising stronger environmental records to stakeholders (Mahoney et al., 2013), and 
distinguishing their firm from poor performers, avoiding the problem of adverse selection (Luo 
and Tang, 2014) and leading to more informed economic decisions that reduce the probability of 
FR. 
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Managers need to appreciate the main components of disclosures on GHG pollution emissions 
and their detailed plans for addressing the issue of global warming. Such plans typically cover 
emissions reduction targets, low-carbon initiatives, and energy/power consumption and identify 
climate change risk and opportunities, which may result in changes in business operations, 
expenditures, and revenues. Consequently, an enhanced carbon disclosures imply the integration 
of three elements (1) climate change into business strategy, (2) an effective corporate governance 
system rooted in the values of accountability and transparency, which considers climate change, 
and (3) third-party verification/assurance to enhance the credibility of firms’ disclosures (e.g. 
Clarkson et al., 2008). Managers should appear of such a proactive carbon strategy to the full 
range of stakeholder groups, who increasingly insist on meaningful and transparent disclosure 
concerning GHG emissions and the management of associated risks. 
Enhanced environmental disclosure promotes firm transparency, reduces information asymmetry 
and facilitates improved economic decision making in conditions of greater trust and confidence 
for both firms and investors (Benlemlih et al., 2018). Cui et al., (2016) found a positive 
association between information asymmetry and FR that was also supported by Stoll (2000), 
Chung et al., (2010), and Cho et al. (2013). The carbon disclosure–FR relationship should be 
established, in which the strategic organisational resources required for competitiveness are 
combined and environmental technologies are implemented (Klassen and Whybark, 1999). These 
expectations lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1 Carbon disclosure and FR are negatively associated. 
 
3.3 Research Design and Data 
3.3.1 Sample 
Since it is the largest index in the UK that is annually assessed by the CDP, our sample includes 
all firms continuously listed on the FTSE350 index between the years 2007-2015. This period 
was characterised by high public awareness and extensive policy debate on GHG emissions, 
including national legal requirements (i.e. Regulation of 2013) and international climate 
provisions and agreements (i.e. Paris agreement). Noteably, the FTSE350 were initially invited to 
engage in and voluntarily report their carbon disclosure through the CDP online survey in 2006. 
However, 2006 was excluded from our analysis for two reasons: (1) there was only modest 
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participation in the CDP survey that year; (2) the 2006 responses were qualitatively analysed 
using 4 categories: Answered Questionnaire (AQ), Provided Information (IN), Declined to 
Participate (DP), and No Response (NR). In contrast, the quantitative analysis classified the 
responses of all subsequent years with scores from 0 to 100. The final sample consists of 2089 
firm-year observations, after an exclusion was made for financial institutions as is standard 
practice for this type of research, due to the different set of environmental and social regulations 
such as the ‘Equator Principles’ they adhere to and their unique accounting practices (Hussainey 
and Salama, 2010; Macve, et al., 2010; Qiu et al., 2016; Haque, 2017).26 Table 3.1 gives a 
summary of the distribution of the final sample by the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) classification, the same classification applied by the CDP.27 
 
Industry/Year       2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Per cent 
Basic Materials 18 21 21 26 32 31 25 22 18 214 10.24 
Consumer Goods 25 25 28 25 24 25 29 29 29 239 11.44 
Consumer Services 63 66 66 60 57 57 61 67 67 564 27.00 
Health Care 5 9 9 8 8 10 12 14 13 88 4.21 
Industrials 65 65 66 59 62 60 64 64 58 563 26.95 
Oil and Gas 18 21 20 21 21 19 17 15 11 163 7.80 
Technology 13 13 17 17 15 14 13 10 8 120 5.74 
Telecommunications 5 6 5 7 9 8 8 7 6 61 2.92 
Utilities 11 11 10 9 8 7 7 7 7 77 3.69 
N 223 237 242 232 236 231 236 235 217 2089 100 
Table 3.1 Sample Distributions based on Industry and Year 
 
3.3.2 Measures 
3.3.2.1 Firm Risk 
 In line with previous literature, we apply the firm’s total risk as measured by the standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock return (e.g. Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Jo and Na, 2012), as 
in the following equation: 
 
                                                 
26 The Equator Principles is a risk management framework used by financial institutions to determine, assess and 
manage environmental and social risk in projects. See: [http://www.equator-principles.com]. 
27 To handle outliers, the data are winsorised at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. 
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𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜n 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 = √
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛)
𝑛
𝑡
2                              (1) 
where Rit is the return on security i for day t and 𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 is the mean of the daily market return 
over 12 months. We use the CAPM beta to measure a firm’s systematic risk (Jo and Na, 2012; 
Benlemlih et al., 2018) and estimate it using a regression of the daily stock return on the daily market 
return of the FTSE350 over 12 months: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖             (2) 
where Rit is the return on security i for day t, ai is the intercept term, Bi is the systematic risk of 
security i (BETA), Rmt is the return on market m for day t, and ei is an error term. Finally, we 
employ the idiosyncratic risk, i.e. the unique business risk, as measured by the standard deviation 
of residuals from the CAPM on the basis of daily stock returns (e.g. Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990; 
Lee and Faff, 2009; Bouslah et al., 2013). 
 
3.3.2.2 Carbon Disclosure 
 Koh et al. (2014) posit that future studies may attempt to measure corporate social and 
environmental responsibility by applying survey methodology. As a proxy for a firm’s carbon 
disclosure, the carbon disclosure score – CDS from the CDP database is used. The CDP uses a 
survey to calculate the CDS based on a firm’s responses to questions in the CDP’s Online 
Response System. The score ranges from 0 to 100 and represents the quality of a firm’s responses 
to the annual CDP questionnaire. The CDP “is working to reduce the risks associated with 
transparency by facilitating dialogue and information-sharing between companies” (Wilhelm and 
Willard, 2013, pp.159). In doing so, it has demonstrated a strategic competency that appeals to 
different stakeholders and created a broadly based legitimacy for carbon disclosure standards 
(Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011). 
The survey evaluates the information that firms disclose in the CDS under three broad headings: 
(1) climate change management: governance, strategy, targets and initiatives and 
communications; (2) climate change-related risks and opportunities; and (3) climate change 
emissions methodology, emissions data, energy, emissions performance and emissions trading. 
Appendix 3.1 presents a summary of the questionnaire questions about the construct and their 
measurement items.  
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It is worth mentioning, within the third category, which presents 48% of the CDS, the emissions 
performance (changes in carbon emissions volume) is one out of five topics in this category. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of emissions volume is critical. Similar to financial disclosure, firms 
should be aware of the likelihood of revealing negative as well as positive information on their 
emissions volume. Nevertheless, it is worthnoting, this component in the third category reflects 
the quality of the responses in terms of emissions volume reliability, honesty and fairness, 
regardless of carbon emissions volume emitted by firms. Specifically, increasing or decreasing of 
carbon emissions volume is not the standard but the quality of the information provided regarding 
this factor. Particularly, a disclosure of a high volume of carbon emissions does not necessarily 
reduce the CDS score. Therefore, there is no issue of compounding effects of carbon disclosure 
and emissions performance in this disclosure index. 
Firms’ responses to the CDP survey, available publicly on the CDP website, could have 
implications on investors’ investment decisions (Kim and Lyon, 2011). Tang and Luo (2011, pp. 
26) note that “a firm’s reputation could be adversely affected if the firm refuses to participate in 
CDP, or participated but, disclosed poor carbon information”. 
Selection of the CDS as a measure of carbon disclosure is justified by the large number of 
organisations that voluntarily respond to CDP’s information request and its use in previous 
studies on whether voluntary carbon disclosure is a true reflection of a firms’ actual carbon 
performance (Luo and Tang, 2014) and on the determinants of disseminating relevant 
information on GHG (e.g. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Luo et al., 2012).28 
Information usefulness is dependent on the transparency and comparability of carbon information 
(Andrew and Cortese, 2011), and useful information is required for carbon markets and corporate 
carbon management (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011). For some firms, provision of full CDP 
responses substitutes for the disclosure of such information in their annual or sustainability 
reports (Cotter and Najah, 2012). For others, it is intended to complement the annual reports by 
providing investors with information that is relevant to the financial risks the firm may be 
                                                 
28 Over the sample period, the average number of participating firms in the CDS was 243.56, which represents an 
average 69.59% rate of participation of FTSE350 companies. 
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exposed to due to their GHG emissions and opportunities from climate change (Kolk et al., 2008; 
Kim and Lyon, 2011).  
 
3.3.2.3 Controls 
In controlling for firm characteristics that may affect the examined relationship, we follow the 
approach of earlier studies (e.g. Toms, 2002; Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2012) and include 
firm size (SIZE) measured by the natural log of total assets and financial leverage (LEV) 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total capital. It is frequently asserted that firms with lower 
payout ratios carry greater risk. Therefore, the dividend payout (POUT), calculated by the ratio of 
the dividend per share to the stock price per share, can have a signalling effect concerning 
management’s perception of future earnings uncertainties (Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 
2012). Earlier studies found that more profitable firms carried less risk (e.g. Jo and Na, 2012; 
Benlemlih et al., 2018). Therefore, profitability (PROF) measured by return on assets (ROA) is 
included as a control. Corporate liquidity is an additional variable that is frequently applied to test 
the association and prediction of FR (e.g. Ferris et al., 1989; Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et 
al., 2012). The lower the liquidity, the higher the firm’s liquidity risk, which may be reflected in 
increased stock price fluctuations. The current ratio is widely viewed as the classic measure of 
liquidity. We control for liquidity (LIQ) using the current ratio, measured by the total current 
assets/total current liabilities. Most empirical studies examining this relationship controlled for 
the firm's growth (e.g. Oikonomou et al., 2012). To control for growth (GROW) effects, we use 
the market-to-book (MTB) ratio because analysts regard companies with weak growth prospects 
(low MTB ratio) as more exposed to market volatility (e.g. Lewellen, 1999). Following 
Galbreath’s (2010) suggestion that the structure of the board of directors and the deployment of 
organisational resources to manage the risk and opportunity arising from climate change 
influence climate change governance practices, we control for the influence of corporate board 
composition by calculating a composite index with the components of board composition as 
dummy industry-adjusted variables. Similar to Zaman, Hudaib, and Haniffa (2011) and Bui et al., 
(2017), we incorporate six variables, as shown in Appendix 3.2, to construct an index for the 
board composition (BC). The competition in the business environment motivates firms to 
outperform their competitors by creating competitive advantage (Kamasak, 2013). Therefore, the 
effects of product market competition (COM) are controlled for, measured by the number of 
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competitors in the same industry in a given year (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003; Fernández-Kranz and 
Santaló, 2010). Working in foreign markets necessitates companies to consider cross-border 
differences and comply with policies and regulations governing commerce between different 
countries. Given exposure to such barriers, businesses are likely to be more socially responsible 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). According to Stanny and Ely (2008), European firms with higher 
percentages of international commerce disclose their carbon emissions more. Consistent with 
Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), we control for the effects of foreign market activities (FMA) 
based on the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. As the firms in our sample must comply with 
the GHG reporting regulation (which came into effect on 1 October 2013), including reporting on 
their GHG emissions as part of their annual Directors’ Report based on the Companies Act 2006 
‘Amendment of Part 7’ Regulations 2013 (Secretary of State, 2013), a dummy variable (REG) set 
to one for 2014-2015 and zero otherwise is included. Lastly, to control for the potential influence 
of fluctuations in market trends that may affect the FR, we include yearly dummy variables (e.g. 
Deng et al., 2013; Al-Awadhi and Dempsey, 2017). 
 
3.3.2.4 Model Tested 
To test the main hypothesis, our main empirical model is as follows: 
 
FRit = β0 + β1 CDSit +  β2 SIZEit +  β3 LEVit + β4 POUTit +  β5 PROFit + β6 LIQit  +  β7 GROWit +
              β8 BCit + β9 COMit +  β10 FMAit +  β11 REGit + β12 YEARit + ℇit                                    (3) 
 
where FR is one of the risk proxies, such as the total risk (i.e. stock volatility), systematic risk 
(i.e. beta), or idiosyncratic risk (i.e. unsystematic risk); CDS is the Carbon Disclosure Score; 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets; LEV is the total debt to total capital ratio; POUT is the 
dividend payout; PROF is the return on assets (i.e. ROA); LIQ is the current ratio; GROW is the 
MTB ratio; BC is the board composition index; COM is the number of competitors in the same 
industry in a given year; FMA is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REG is a dummy 
variable set to “1” for 2014-2015 and “0” otherwise; and YEAR are dummy variables.  
A pair of empirical assessments is employed to investigate the impact of carbon disclosure on 
FR. First, we use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Second, we apply a specific 
estimator model, the instrumental variable-two-Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) model (using 
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Firm Age and CDS “lag-1 year”), to address the endogeneity problem between CDS and FR 
proxies (Jo and Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Schreck, 2011).29 
 
3.4 Results and Analysis 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The mean and distributional 
characteristics for each variable are reported in Table 3.2. The response rate to the CDP 
questionnaire for our sample was approximately 64% (1330 of 2089). The mean of the CDS is 
69.12, which is somewhat higher than in previous studies employing CDS as a dependent 
variable. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), examined the role of the Board of Directors 
in disseminating information related to GHG emissions and reported a mean CDS of 60% based 
on the CDP’s 2007 annual survey. Luo and Tang (2014) investigated whether voluntary carbon 
disclosure reveals the actual carbon performance and reported a mean CDS of 65% based on the 
CDP’s 2010 annual survey. The variance in the mean CDS between these earlier studies and our 
study may be justified by the shortened period applied by these studies (just one year) and the 
timing of public pressure on the disclosure of information relating to climate change. The mean 
total risk is 35.66, within the range established in prior studies, (e.g. Benlemlih et al., 2018). The 
mean of the systematic risk is almost 1, (the same as the market beta), in line with prior literature 
employing BETA as the left-side variable (e.g. Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012), and 
the average firm-specific risk (idiosyncratic) is 0.017, similar to previous studies (e.g. Amit and 
Wernerfelt, 1990). The unreported average firm SIZE is £8.12 billion, suggesting the sample 
comprises large firms. The logarithm of total assets was used to measure SIZE, and the mean and 
median result were 21, in line with that of the Clarkson et al. (2008) sample. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29See Section 2.4.2.1 (p.36) in Chapter 2 for more details about the instrumental variables.To confirm the absence of 
residual endogeneity, a Durbin Wu-Hausman test was performed, which reported P-values of 0.729, 0.246 and 0.956 
for total, systematic and unsystematic risks, respectively. The IV-2SLS estimate utilises a reduced sample as 
instruments (lagged values) were only available for 817, 810 and 786 observations of the abovementioned FR 
proxies, respectively. 
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Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
TR 2040 35.664 31.517 14.493 17.535 76.930 
SR 2056 1.008 0.957 0.481 -0.042 2.479 
IDR 1521 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.071 
CDS 1330 69.12 72.000 21.022 4.000 100.000 
SIZE 2076 21.365 21.214 1.534 16.909 26.147 
LEV 2037 25.492 19.809 20.234 4.625 83.081 
POUT 1777 0.032 0.030 0.017 0.001 0.180 
PROF 2067 7.655 6.522 7.128 -6.828 28.573 
LIQ 2077 1.558 1.285 1.131 0.306 7.015 
GROW 1982 3.904 2.754 4.021 0.608 21.943 
BC 1797 2.874 3.000 1.337 0.000 6.000 
COM 2089 42.698 57.000 22.500 5.000 67.000 
FMA 2089 37.504 34.990 27.684 0.000 95.010 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Chapter Variables 
This descriptive statistics is based on our sample from 2007 to 2015. 
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Table 3.3 Spearman (Pearson) Correlation Analysis of Chapter Variables 
This table reports the pairwise coefficients for our sample from 2007 to 2015 of 2089 firm-year observations. The upper (lower) triangle reports the Spearman (Pearson) 
correlations*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
Variables TR SR IDR CDS SIZE LEV POUT PROF LIQ GROW BC COM FMA REG 
TR 1 0.45*** 0.92*** -0.34*** -0.20*** 0.10*** -0.01 -0.03 0.20*** -0.12*** -0.24*** -0.04* 0.17*** -0.27*** 
SR 0.44*** 1 0.29*** -0.21*** -0.04 0.09*** -0.17*** -0.09*** 0.15*** -0.23*** -0.03 0.14*** 0.33** -0.06* 
IDR 0.93*** 0.32*** 1 -0.33*** -0.28*** 0.11*** 0.01 -0.01 0.22*** -0.11*** -0.25*** 0.01 0.04 -0.20*** 
CDS -0.41*** -0.17*** -0.40*** 1 0.38*** -0.01 0.14*** -0.03 -0.03 0.09** 0.30*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.46*** 
SIZE -0.23*** 0.08*** -0.36 0.37*** 1 0.21*** 0.26*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.26*** 0.35*** -0.26*** 0.12*** 0.01 
LEV 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.15*** 1 0.33*** -0.39*** -0.30*** -0.41*** 0.14*** 0.09*** -0.03 -0.15*** 
POUT -0.14 -0.10*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.17*** 0.30*** 1 -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.23*** 0.09*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.16*** 
PROF -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07** -0.06 -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.16*** 1 0.17*** 0.54*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
LIQ 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** -0.04 -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.20*** 0.15*** 1 -0.05 -0.12*** -0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
GROW -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.18*** 0.06 -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.10*** 0.42*** -0.09*** 1 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.10*** 
BC -0.20*** -0.08*** -0.28*** 0.30*** 0.41*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.05* -0.17*** 0.02 1 -0.03 0.01 0.12*** 
COM 0.12*** -0.01 0.14*** -0.07** -0.17*** 0.16*** 0.04* -0.01 -0.25*** 0.12*** 0.01 1 -0.04 0.05 
FMA 0.17*** 0.31*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.13*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.05** 0.04* -0.13*** -0.05* -0.15*** 1 -0.07** 
REG -0.21*** -0.13*** -0.20*** 0.43*** 0.07*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.03 -0.01 0.06** 0.12*** -0.04 -0.12*** 1 
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Table 3.3 shows the Spearman (Pearson) correlations in the upper (lower) diagonal.30 In line with 
RBV expectations, the significant negative correlation between all FR measures and CDS 
indicates that the carbon disclosure act to increase the carbon transparency that decreases the 
impact of FR. Moreover, the correlations between CDS and other right-hand variables (e.g. SIZE, 
REG and BC) are aligned with those in existing studies. Cormier and Magnan (1999, pp. 444) 
note that “irrespective of their information costs and financial condition attributes, large firms 
disclose more environmental information than small firms”. The significant positive correlation 
between CDS and REG suggests that environmental reporting under UK guidelines, which 
includes mandatory GHG emissions reporting, motivates firms to act more accountably and 
transparently regarding their voluntary carbon disclosure. Furthermore, the significantly positive 
correlation between CDS and BC suggests corporate boards prioritise climate change on their 
agenda, consistent with Ben‐Amar and McIlkenny’s (2014) results indicating a positive 
association between board effectiveness and the firm's decision to respond to the CDP 
questionnaire and its carbon disclosure quality. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Tests 
3.4.2.1 Carbon Disclosure and Firm Risk 
Table 3.4 reports the results obtained using Equation (3) to investigate our hypothesis, primarily 
evaluating the impact of carbon disclosure on FR. Model 1 presents results from regressing total 
risk on the carbon disclosure and control variables. The coefficient of the CDS is negative and 
statistically significant across the two estimations, OLS and IV-2SLS. This indicates that 
improvement of carbon disclosure increases firm transparency, reducing information asymmetry. 
This builds trust and confidence between the company and stakeholders concerned about the 
environment. This results in demand control on the firm’s stock that decreases price fluctuation 
and reduces its volatility risk (e.g. Jo and Na, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Unreported variance inflation factors (VIFs) are within the levels of tolerance for multicollinearity. 
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Dependent Variable                           Total Risk                            Systematic Risk                         Idiosyncratic Risk 
Model                                          OLS(1)         IV-2SLS(1)      OLS(2)            IV-2SLS(2)         OLS(3)          IV-2SLS(3)                                             
CDS -0.058*** 
(0.018) 
-0.046* 
(0.026) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
SIZE -1.154*** 
(0.238) 
-1.007*** 
(0.270) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
-0.120*** 
90.014) 
-0.109*** 
(0.015) 
LEV 0.085*** 
(0.016) 
0.082*** 
(0.018) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
POUT 3.077 
(25.47) 
-6.476 
(19.36) 
-2.976*** 
(0.947) 
-2.860*** 
(0.882) 
2.131 
(1.551) 
1.681 
(1.073) 
PROF -0.205*** 
(0.062) 
-0.199*** 
(0.058) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
LIQ 2.485*** 
(0.318) 
2.130*** 
(0.324) 
0.083*** 
(0.017) 
0.073*** 
(0.015) 
0.120*** 
(0.020) 
0.109*** 
(0.018) 
GROW -0.079 
(0.058) 
-0.065 
(0.074) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
BC -0.27 
(0.242) 
0.118 
(0.237) 
-0.022** 
(0.011) 
-0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
COM -0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
FMA 0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
REG -2.129* 
(1.284) 
-2.516 
(1.893) 
0.015 
(0.072) 
0.033 
(0.087) 
-0.008 
(0.071) 
-0.022 
(0.104) 
YEAR Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 56.380*** 
(5.169) 
52.130*** 
(5.819) 
0.277 
(0.233) 
0.319 
(0.265) 
4.133*** 
(0.313) 
3.885*** 
(0.320) 
Durbin Wu-Hausman  0.729  0.246  0.956 
R2 0.55 0.49 0.21 0.22 0.53 0.49 
N 1104 817 1091 810 931 786 
Table 3.4 The Impact of Carbon Disclosure on Firm Risk 
This table reports the results of two estimation methods OLS and IV‐ 2SLS. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. (two-tailed test). 
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The same estimation methods are used substituting total risk with systematic risk (Model 2) and 
idiosyncratic risk measures (Model 3). Regarding the systematic risk, OLS and IV-2SLS 
estimation models confirm that there is a significantly negative effect from CDS on BETA at 
99% confidence level (p < 1%). Environmentally engaged organisations, including those who 
continually aim to improve their carbon disclosure, will have lower anticipated variability of cash 
flows from implicit and explicit environmental-based stakeholder claims and experience a 
decrease in their market risk. This result is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Salama et al., 
2011; Jo and Na, 2012; Oikonomou et al., 2012). 
Additionally, when FR is measured by the idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient of the CDS is 
negative and statistically significant using both OLS and IV-2SLS. It appears that the reduced 
total risk among high-disclosure firms is predominantly a result of a reduction in the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. (e.g. Benlemlih et al., 2018). 
Regarding the control variables, SIZE is significantly negatively associated with total and 
idiosyncratic risk, consistent with our expectation, whereas it is significantly positively associated 
with systematic risk, counter to expectation. Notably, this finding aligns with previous RBV 
research (e.g. Benlemlih et al., 2018). One explanation could be that SIZE is controlling for 
leveraging effects that arise from the larger firms are better able to the debt market exposing them 
to increased market risk (Gyourko and Nelling, 1996). Lee and Jang (2007) reported the same 
finding, stating that the positive association of firm SIZE to market risk is paradoxical as it 
opposed the relevant finance theory and earlier studies. Furthermore, LEV is positively 
significant at the 1% level regarding each of the risk measures, in alignment with earlier research 
(e.g. Salama et al., 2011; Jo and Na, 2012). This may result from the high cost of loans and the 
high percentage of debt determined by the market risk. In line with previous research (e.g. Beaver 
et al., 1970; Oikonomou et al., 2012), POUT is significantly negatively associated with 
systematic risk at the 1% level. It is commonly suggested that firms with low payout ratios have 
more risk, although it’s statistically insignificant compared to other risk measures (i.e. total and 
idiosyncratic risk). Moreover, PROF is highly negatively associated with total and idiosyncratic 
risk, confirming that more profitable firms are associated with lower risk (e.g. Salama et al., 
2011; Jo and Na, 2012). The statistical relationship between PROF and the systematic risk is 
insignificant. 
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The results demonstrate that LIQ is significantly positively associated with all risk variables. This 
may be because high levels of liquidity could reflect an unwise investment of available resources; 
thus, higher levels of liquidity may indicate an increase in agency costs related to "free cash 
flow," which could also increase risk (Jensen, 1986). GROW is as negatively significantly 
associated with systematic risk at the 10% level in the OLS model, as firms with lower growth 
opportunities may have lower share prices, lower market-to-book ratios, and be vulnerable to 
market volatility (e.g. Lewellen, 1999). GROW is insignificant in the IV-2SLS model; this 
inconsistency may result from the decrease in observations when applied to the instrumental 
variables. Moreover, the growth effects are insignificant for the total and idiosyncratic risk. BC is 
significantly negatively associated with systematic risk at the 5% level in the OLS model whereas 
BC is insignificant in the IV-2SLS model, which could be caused by the decrease in observations 
when applied to the instrumental variables. The impact of BC is not noticeable for the total and 
idiosyncratic risk. This finding is in line with Rhoades et al. (2000), who concluded that there 
was a weak relationship between board composition and firm performance, part of a general lack 
of convincing evidence for a significant relationship (Barnhart et al.,1994; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999). In relation to systematic risk, COM is positively 
significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2011), who found 
that increased product substitutability is followed by a reduction in revenues, which persuades 
affected firms to exit. Conversely, the impact of COM is not evident for the total and 
idiosyncratic risk. The FMA, the measure of the degree of internationalisation of a firm that 
might impact the examined relationship, is significantly positively associated with all risk 
variables. Reeb et al. (1998) explained this association, suggesting that FMA may result in 
increased risk related to exposure to several risk factors such as political risk, exchange rate risk, 
asymmetric information, and agency issues. Moreover, when a business invests in a less-
developed market, FR is may increase (Kwok and Reeb, 2000). The REG results indicate no 
meaningful relationship. 
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3.4.3.2 Additional Analyses 
As the sample period in this study includes the GFC period (2007-2008), we perform an 
additional test to isolate the potential effect of the GFC on the relationship being examined.31 Our 
sample was divided into two sub-periods: 2007-2008 (GFC period) and 2009-2015 (recovery 
period). Table 3.5 indicates that the relationship of CDS-all risk measures is not significant for 
the GFC period but is highly significant during the recovery period. This finding shows that firms 
should adapt during times of crises by reducing investment in carbon mitigation projects (e.g. 
Cheney and McMillan, 1990; Njoroge, 2009). After the crisis, corporate social and environmental 
responsibility tends to increase the public agenda. As KPMG states: “Before the financial crisis, 
investors typically saw environmental due diligence as a risk management tick-box exercise to 
secure financial institution funding. However, post-this exogenous shock, there appears to be a 
greater focus on responsible investment. We are seeing an increased appetite for the potential 
upsides (e.g. cost savings, additional revenue streams) of the sustainability agenda, in a 
transactional context. Strategies to manage energy (buy better, use less and self-generate) and 
waste (convert waste to an asset) are transforming the environmental due diligence process” 
(KPMG, 2017). 
This indicates that a firm’s value depended less on intangible assets during the GFC period and 
that, today, firms seek investor confidence in the financial market to improve their reputations in 
competitive markets (Raithel, et al., 2010). There is a contradiction between our findings and 
those of Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2014). They found that, in crisis periods, firms continue 
investing in sustainability projects to enhance stakeholder confidence, which may lead to higher 
profitability.32 They note that future research should extend the sample period to encompass firm 
behaviour both before and after the GFC to allow for a complete analysis. The present study 
accounts for this possibility with a comparison of the GFC and recovery periods in the 
examination of the relationship between carbon disclosure and FR. 
 
                                                 
31 Consistent with Erkens et al., 2012, we specify the years of 2007-2008 as the GFC period. 
32 Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2014) investigated the impact of the global financial crisis on the environmental performance 
of large multinationals from 2006 to 2009. They state that the relatively short sample period is an important limitation 
of their study. 
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Variable                 Total Risk                           Systematic Risk                       Idiosyncratic Risk                                                           
Period               Crisis          Recovery           Crisis                Recovery            Crisis          Recovery           
CDS -0.063 
(0.056) 
-0.055*** 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
SIZE -0.530 
(0.908) 
-1.242*** 
(0.241) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
0.028*** 
(0.011) 
-0.127** 
(0.061) 
-0.115*** 
(0.014) 
LEV 0.057 
(0.069) 
0.089*** 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
POUT -37.532 
(79.261) 
9.037 
(26.720) 
-4.509* 
(2.554) 
-2.713*** 
(1.003) 
2.363 
(6.222) 
2.111 
(1.606) 
PROF 0.164 
(0.192) 
-0.254*** 
(0.062) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
LIQ 2.267* 
(1.236) 
2.535*** 
(0.338) 
0.016 
(0.043) 
0.091*** 
(0.018) 
0.166 
(0.115) 
0.115*** 
(0.019) 
GROW -0.362* 
(0.190) 
-0.015 
(0.055) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
BC 0.068 
(0.923) 
-0.298 
(0.243) 
0.006 
(0.034) 
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.058) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
COM 0.101** 
(0.041) 
-0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
FMA 0.053 
(0.039) 
0.067*** 
(0.010) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
(0.001) 
(0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
REG 
 
-8.949*** 
-1.652 
 
-0.024 
(0.057) 
 
-0.486*** 
-0.093 
Constant 37.276* 
(20.244) 
65.228*** 
(5.435) 
1.349* 
(0.731) 
0.209 
(0.238) 
3.957*** 
(1.308) 
4.550*** 
(0.328) 
N 156 948 151 940 129 802 
R2 0.54 0.37 0.16 0.23 0.49 0.40 
Table 3.5 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Relationship Examined 
OLS was applied. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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We further extend our analysis to investigate the potential effect of industry in the examined 
relationship. Industries with higher carbon emissions profiles are subject to more public and 
media scrutiny and governmental regulations and legislation. The sample in the present study is 
diverse and includes both intensive and non-intensive industries. The sample contains ten 
industries (nine after excluding the financial industry) according to the industry’s structure and 
definitions applied by the industry GICS. FTSE All-Share Index standards are applied to identify 
carbon-intensive industries based on the level and nature of GHG emissions. These were 
industrials, basic materials, utilities, consumer services and oil and gas. The sample was divided 
into two sub-samples: intensive and non-intensive. An OLS regression test was performed to 
identify the possible impact of the industry on the examined relationship. Table 3.6 indicates that 
the relationship of CDS-all risk measures is significant for firms in intensive industries but not 
significant for those operating in non-intensive industries. This result confirms the notion that 
voluntary environmental disclosures predominate among firms in environmentally sensitive 
sectors (Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hasseldine et al., 2005). This is 
consistent with the argument proposed by Hart and Ahuja (1996) that companies with intensive 
carbon emissions can improve productivity and competence through a reduction in their 
industrial waste. One likely outcome is enhanced employment of inputs, leading to a reduction in 
the costs of raw material and waste disposal in a manner that also reduces the default risk and 
cost of capital. 
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Variable                       Total Risk                       Systematic Risk                         Idiosyncratic Risk                                                           
Industry               Intensive   Non-Intensive        Intensive     Non-Intensive       Intensive    Non-Intensive 
CDS -0.060*** 
(0.020) 
-0.036 
(0.033) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
SIZE -0.847*** 
(0.300) 
-2.136*** 
(0.352) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.104*** 
(0.018) 
-0.197*** 
(0.022) 
LEV 0.077*** 
(0.018) 
0.116*** 
(0.042) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
POUT 3.514 
(30.300) 
17.513 
(36.341) 
-2.241** 
(1.073) 
-6.187*** 
(1.491) 
1.042 
(1.824) 
7.324** 
(3.395) 
PROF -0.241*** 
(0.073) 
-0.011 
(0.111) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
LIQ 2.578*** 
(0.371) 
1.800*** 
(0.632) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
0.140*** 
(0.022) 
0.107** 
(0.047) 
GROW -0.066 
(0.072) 
0.062 
(0.100) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
BC -0.330 
(0.271) 
-0.279 
(0.504) 
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
COM -0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.088 
(0.055) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
FMA 0.081*** 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
REG -3.408** 
(1.488) 
1.011 
(1.824) 
0.038 
(0.080) 
-0.165 
(0.142) 
-0.041 
(0.082) 
0.038 
(0.110) 
YEAR Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 51.783*** 
(6.733) 
73.260*** 
(7.391) 
0.595** 
(0.292) 
0.774** 
(0.324) 
3.903*** 
(0.397) 
5.349*** 
(0.485) 
N 839 265 826 265 713 218 
R2 0.57 0.59 0.25 0.23 0.53 0.63 
Table 3.6 The Impact of the Industry Type on the Relationship Examined  
OLS was applied. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study was motivated by the increasing public concern about climate change and provides an 
empirical assessment of the economic consequences of carbon disclosure, with a focus on FR. 
The RBV was our conceptual framework for analyses of carbon accountability and firms’ 
responsibility practices toward stakeholders in the UK context, in which regulators are actively 
pursuing the regulation of carbon emissions. There appears to be a lack in the literature of this 
type of investigation, especially in this specific setting. Considering the possible positive 
association between information asymmetry and FR, the RBV theoretical framework proposed in 
this study facilitates understanding the effects of integrating climate change mitigation 
endeavours into an overall business strategy in terms of the bottom-line performance and risk. To 
test this hypothesis, we conducted econometric analyses involving the measurement of carbon 
disclosure using voluntary carbon disclosure score and three FR measures, the total, systematic, 
and idiosyncratic risks for FTSE350 firms for 2007–2015. 
The results show that during this period, there was a negative influence from enhanced carbon 
disclosure on FR. These findings indicate that firms should aim to put the RBV framework into 
practice to maximise cost savings and accelerate business benefits to proactively integrate climate 
change mitigation efforts into their business strategy and deploy a high-quality carbon disclosure 
mechanism. The additional tests show no significant evidence for any effect from carbon 
disclosure during the GFC period. However, carbon disclosure became a more important 
determinant of FR after the GFC. By distinguishing between intensive and non-intensive carbon 
industries, this study finds that the examined relationship strengthens in the more intensive 
carbon industries. 
In a world of ever-increasing competition with increasing stakeholder demand for carbon 
disclosure, management must consider the firm’s carbon disclosure and the reporting of strategic 
issues, which means integrating carbon-related decisions into the overall corporate disclosure 
requirements and transparency efforts as well as the broad sweep of organisational decision 
making to achieve a competitive advantage. 
The study has a limitation as the sample was restricted to the 350 largest UK companies (by 
market capitalisation) of the FTSE350. As a result, caution should be exercised when 
generalising the current study’s findings beyond these companies. The present study did not 
examine whether a proactive carbon management strategy extends to a company’s stock reaction. 
Hence, further research could investigate whether the impact of carbon disclosure announcements 
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on a company’s stock reaction is positive or a cost burden that affects company’s stock response 
negatively. Moreover, the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union may create new research 
opportunities to investigate the country’s carbon profile and its impact on FR. Such an 
opportunity is particularly pertinent given the UK’s current political landscape, which includes 
Brexit-related uncertainties, such as the potential withdrawal from the European Union Emissions 
Trading System and establishment of a new policy to manage climate change and GHG 
emissions in a cost-effective manner. 
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Chapter 4.Market Responses to Firms’ Voluntary Carbon Disclosure: 
Empirical Evidence from the UK                        
4.1 Introduction 
Climate change has emerged as a significant business consideration over the last two decades. 
Firms have increasingly included the consideration of global warming as part of their strategic 
management decision making (e.g. Matsumura et al., 2014; Haque, 2017). In recent years, 
businesses have experienced increasing pressure to disclose more information about their plans to 
lower their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and their overall climate change strategy. Globally, 
stakeholders, and public interest groups have called for greater disclosure, increased 
transparency, and a consistent approach to GHG emissions (e.g. Black, 2013; Flammer, 2013; 
Qian and Schaltegger, 2017). Meanwhile, firms and their insurers have expressed concerns over 
the cost of these disclosures from the viewpoint of liability exposure and competitive 
disadvantage (Allen et al., 2009; Weigand, 2010). Additionally, there are individuals who urge 
balancing the approach by considering both costs and benefits (e.g. Li et al., 1997). Therefore, 
today’s firms face the challenging task of determining the appropriate level of disclosure of the 
risks and costs associated with GHG emissions. It is no surprise that the question of whether 
being green receives consistently close scrutiny by both the media (Hart, 1995; Lam et al., 2016) 
and scholarly journals. The event study methodology is widely adopted to address this question. 
It does so by quantitatively examining stock market reactions to company announcements related 
to environmental initiatives (e.g. Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Jacobs et al., 2010).  
The objective of this study is to demonstrate how investors and the market reacts to firms’ 
environmental initiatives to disclose their carbon profile. This objective will be achieved by 
examining and extending the extant literature on whether investors see voluntary disclosure of 
carbon emissions information as being relevant to stock valuation.  
One initiative to meet the need for consistency and transparency is the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP).33 The CDP is a charitable organisation concerned with environmental impact and pursues 
the goal of spreading environmental risk management and reporting throughout the business 
                                                 
33 Currently the world’s largest register of corporate carbon disclosures, the CDP was established in 2000 in the UK. 
Its central activity is administrating an annual survey on behalf of investor signatories. The CDP survey collects 
information from public companies on climate change-related issues. Its breadth of coverage has also led it to 
become an important data source for academic research. The CDP has highlighted the fact that its data was used in 
70 peer-reviewed studies published between 2005 and 2015. 
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community. Its strategy aims to facilitate investors to move away from shareholdings bearing risk 
arising from climate change impacts. The CDP sends companies listed on major stock indices 
such as the FTSE350 and S&P500 an annual survey. The survey gathers information under the 
following three headings: (a) climate change management: strategy, initiatives, target, 
communications, and governance; (b) climate change-related risks and opportunities; and (c) 
climate change emissions methodology, emissions performance, emissions data, and energy and 
emissions trading. The collected information is made available to the public via the CDP website. 
The present study is motivated by a desire to understand the nature and consequences of 
businesses’ approach to climate change outside of regulatory compliance, viewed from the 
perspective of participation in the CDP to make voluntary carbon disclosures. To meet our 
objective, we apply the event study method and select three days around the event dates as the 
event window (i.e one day before the event, the event day itself and one day after the event). 
Applying this procedure helps us account for potential pre-event information leaks and the 
scenario where announcements are made after the stock market has closed. Any further 
expansion of the window would open up the likelihood in which market movements are not 
attributable to the specific event (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). The sample comprises 
1,564 firm-year observations of firms listed on the FTSE350 index for the period 2009–2015. 
This period witnessed heightened public engagement in climate change issues and the associated 
policy debate. The firms listed on the FTSE350 are the UK’s largest public companies by market 
capitalisation, and hence they offer a core representation of the UK’s economic performance and 
its carbon strategy. The findings of this study show that investors react significantly negatively to 
firms disclosing their carbon profile through participation in the CDP, regardless of disclosure 
level or score. These findings indicate that investors’ perceptions are in line with a win-lose logic 
of being green, but with economically disadvantageous consequences (Freedman, 1970). 
Moreover, concerning robustness checks, the market reaction is significantly negative for 
businesses that make disclosures to the CDP but operate in carbon-intensive industries. With 
CDP participation seen as an indication that environmental costs will rise, the cost implication is 
acute, particularly for companies operating in carbon-intensive industries (Ramiah et al., 2013). 
Moreover, we examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the market reaction for 
those firms responded to the CDP survey as an additional analysis, by creating a sub-sample for 
the period of 2007-2008. The results demonstrate a significantly positive market reaction. 
Investors interpret firms’ participation in CDP during the GFC as a signal of financial strength 
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that allows for the allocation of financial resources to environmental initiatives. Earlier studies of 
market reactions to carbon disclosure have been conducted in the US context (e.g. Jacobs et al., 
2010; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Hsu and Wang, 2013). A 
smaller number of studies have examined carbon disclosures in developing countries, typically 
Asian contexts (e.g. Lee et al., 2015; Lam et al., 2016). European contexts have received very 
limited attention regarding market reaction to carbon disclosures, including the UK. It is worth 
mentioning that we already examined the voluntary carbon disclosure impacts on some of the 
market variables in Chapter 2 by applying regression methodologies, however, that test does not 
clearly consider the immediate market reaction towards the announcements of voluntary carbon 
disclosure. In Chapter 2, the regressions capture the carbon disclosure effects on market variables 
based on long term period (i.e. 9 years), while in this chapter we seek to capture the immediate 
market reaction from such announcements by using very short event window through event study 
methodology. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the market 
responses of the London Stock Exchange to announcements related to carbon disclosure by 
applying the event study approach. 
The UK, as a G7 (Group of Seven) member, is one of the world’s biggest emitters of GHG 
(Haque, 2017) making it a pertinent setting for studies of this kind. Moreover, the UK is currently 
at the forefront of the development of mechanisms to proactively mitigate the negative 
consequences of climate change. Notably, the UK has the greatest proportion of firms making 
Scope 1 and 2 emissions disclosures (>97%) and the greatest proportion of board-level oversight 
of climate change risk (96%) (CDP, 2018b).34 In 2008, The UK’s Committee on Climate Change 
gave the government a recommendation to put in place a GHG reduction target that would see 
emissions fall to a minimum of 80% of the 1990 levels by 2050. The following year, the 
government published voluntary guidelines for measuring and reporting of GHG emissions to 
encourage firms in the UK to reduce their climate change impact. Furthermore, the Companies 
Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1970) brought in 
statutory requirements for listed companies regarding GHG emission disclosure. Since 1st 
October 2013, the firms have been obligated to publish a directors’ report of GHG emissions and 
                                                 
34Scope 1 emissions are those directly emitted by sources owned or controlled by the reporting firm. Scope 2 
emissions are indirect and represent emissions arising from the generation of energy purchased. 
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the methodology applied in calculating them. The UK is, therefore, a highly significant country in 
terms of both emissions and emissions disclosure terms. Hence, it is important to address the gap 
noticed in the case of the country, which is addressed in the present study. 
Furthermore, we contribute to the continuing literature by constructing the cost-benefit approach 
as a conceptual model, to understand market reaction to voluntarily corporate engagement in 
climate change initiatives. One proposes that voluntary moves aimed at improving corporate 
environmental strategy decrease profits and, therefore, runs counter to the maximization of 
shareholder value, a “win-lose” perspective (e.g. Freedman, 1970). On the other hand, there is 
another perspective which emphasises that shareholder value and corporate environmental 
strategy are not mutually exclusive. Instead, under this view it is proposed that tackling emissions 
and achieving profitability can be pursued together, in a “win-win” approach (e.g. Porter and Van 
der Linde, 1995). 
Our study’s findings offer fresh insights and updated policy implications for investors, 
management, and sustainability institutions (e.g. CDP). The London Stock Exchange placed a 
negative value on voluntary carbon disclosures announcements due to the interpretation that any 
costs incurred beyond regulatory compliance is against the interests of shareholders and would 
generate disadvantages economic consequences. We conclude that voluntary carbon disclosures 
should include statements justifying environmental strategy and accompanying initiatives. 
Justifications may include, for example, ensuring readiness for forthcoming legislation, carbon 
trading intentions, or competitive lobbying. Statements should be clear on the anticipated value of 
these efforts.  
In the next section, we review existing literature and explain the hypothesis development. The 
research design and methodology are explained in the Section 4.3. The Section 4.4 presents the 
empirical results. Concluding remarks are made in the Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Background 
Researchers have shown considerable interest in the economic consequences of a firm’s social 
responsibility (e.g. Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; 
Lee and Faff, 2009; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Hussainey and Salama, 2010; Salama et al., 
2011; Jo and Na, 2012; Benlemlih et al., 2018). Some of the early literature followed the 
approach of Freedman’s proposition that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its 
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profits” (Freedman, 1970, p. 122) and firmly positioned corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
the cost column. As a cost of doing business, CSR would inevitably mean low profits and directly 
conflict with management’s obligation to shareholders. For example, a firm contemplating to 
install a new clean energy machine and to train staff would require new capital, both of which 
would come at a significant cost. Conversely, another stream of literature challenges Freedman’s 
approach by arguing that the twin pursuits of pollution control and profitability are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). This approach sees pollution as 
a wasteful use of energy and material resources; furthermore, efforts to control pollution, for 
example, through improved processes or products, can bring the double benefit of reducing the 
firm’s carbon footprint while strengthening its competitiveness. Empirical studies have produced 
mixed results when examining the CSR and firm financial performance. These studies can be put 
into one of the following three groups based on their analytical approach: (a) portfolio analysis, 
(b) regression analysis, and (c) event studies.  
Studies using the portfolio analysis method aim to examine whether returns for a portfolio 
comprising firms with a positive environmental responsibility outperform the market as a whole. 
The results have been negative especially for old studies, finding that mutual funds made up of 
environmentally or socially responsible firms perform less well in terms of risk-adjusted returns 
(White, 1996; Geczy, et al., 2005). Similarly, Ziegler et al. (2009) reported a negative abnormal 
return for investment strategies that involve buying stocks of companies that are proactively 
aiming to reduce GHG emissions and divesting stocks where the firms invest no significant 
environamntal efforts. However, a more recent study finds that investors could gain abnormal 
risk-adjusted revenues of around 13% annually when investing in portfolios entirely comprised of 
firms which disclose their carbon profile (Liesen et al., 2017). 
Studies using regression analysis focus mainly on the relationship between environmental 
responsibility and financial performance over the long term. Several studies have found a positive 
relationship. Others, however, reported either mixed findings or a negative relationship (e.g. 
Jaggi and Freedman, 1992; Molloy et al., 2002; Clarkson, et al., 2004). Generally, it appears that 
a positive relationship is found when the environmental measures involve compliance, regulatory 
risk, and liability (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). Furthermore, Matsumura et al. (2014) 
reported a significantly negative relationship between GHG emissions and the value of equity. 
Their suggestion is attributed to the “uncertainty surrounding physical climate parameters” as 
well as to the costs associated with “measuring, monitoring, and reducing carbon emissions” 
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(Matsumura et al., 2014, p. 701). The implication of the empirical evidence from these regression 
studies is that a negative impact on financial performance should be anticipated from 
environmental investments (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). It should be noted, however, 
that the long-term nature of these studies exposes firm performance to an array of explanatory 
factors that are beyond environmental responsibility. 
The event studies investigate how markets react to environmental 
initiatives/disclosures/activities. Although the event study methodology has been proven to be a 
productive approach, the findings have not been consistent, with some results indicating a 
positive reaction to environment-related announcements, others a negative reaction, and some 
even reporting the absence of any effect. In one of the earlier studies, Shane and Spicer (1983) 
reported that the stock market reaction to announcements of improved pollution performance is 
more positive than it is for announcements of poor performance. Likewise, Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996) found that positive abnormal stock returns are normally triggered by positive 
firm events such as the winning of an environmental award. Additionally, Griffin and Sun (2013) 
found that capital markets give a positive response when firms voluntarily disclose GHG 
emissions. Contrary to this evidence, other studies found a different negative reaction to events. 
For example, when Finnish forestry firms announce environmental investments, the stock 
market’s reaction is found to be negative (Halme and Niskanan, 2001). In the same vein, when 
studying investor perceptions, Molloy et al. (2002) found that the perception of environmental 
investment is that it increases costs, not reduces them. Moreover, Beatty and Shimshack (2010) 
reported that stock markets react to negative environmental disclosures but not to positive ones. 
Basing his study on the toxic release inventory’s data releases, Hamilton (1995) found that the 
public disclosure of these data and the press coverage thereof leads to significantly negative 
abnormal returns in cases where the toxic release was high. Furthermore, Stevens (1984) found 
that companies whose pollution control costs are low are more likely to experience positive 
abnormal stock market returns when compared to firms incurring high costs. The interpretation of 
investors is that the new information increases firm liability or compliance risk, thereby leading 
to higher costs. Another event study on ISO 14001 certification announcements reported that the 
shares of firms that are relatively less polluting drop the post-announcement (Cañón-de-Francia 
and Garcés-Ayerbe, 2009). The interpretation of the authors is that investors see no significant 
benefit with such certification, but associate it with high costs. In recent studies, both Chapple et 
al. (2013) and Griffin et al. (2017) found that there is a negative relationship between GHG 
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emissions disclosures to the CDP and shareholder value. They concluded that shareholders treat 
carbon emissions as a hidden off-balance sheet liability. In a study most closely related to the 
present one, Lee et al. (2015) proposed that the stock market would react negatively to a 
company’s CDP carbon disclosure based on the fact that such announcements are viewed as bad 
news that potentially involves costly mitigation measures. Finally, as mentioned, there are studies 
reporting no effect. An examination of environmental conscientiousness scores covered in the 
press revealed no significant abnormal stock market returns in response (Yamashita et al., 1999). 
Similarly, Gilley et al. (2000) reported that the stock market did not react in any significant way 
to company announcements on environmental initiatives. This aligns with Jacobs et al. (2010) 
who found, among their other findings, that environmental initiative announcements fail to 
provoke significant stock market reactions. Kim and Lyon (2011) also showed a lack of evidence 
for increases in company value arising from carbon disclosure. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual Model Linking Voluntary Carbon Disclosure to Market Reaction 
4.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
The stakeholder theory is a popular approach among CSR researchers (Lee et al., 2015). It 
emphasises the influence of various stakeholder groups, including investors, employees, 
customers, government, and the community, on firm decision making (Freeman, 1984). Since the 
market reaction is a consequence of investor reaction, our hypothesis is formulated based on how 
investors will react to voluntary carbon disclosure announcements initiated by the CDP. Two 
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main mechanisms have been proposed to examine how CSR either increases revenues or costs 
(Freedman, 1970; Porter, and Van der Linde, 1995). A review of these mechanisms reveals the 
way voluntary carbon disclosure may impact market reaction.  
The framework shown in Figure 5.1 was used to develop the hypothesised impact of carbon 
disclosure announcements on markets. Figure 5.1 indicates that it is possible that investors’ 
perception of the voluntary efforts for carbon disclosure will match Freedman’s perception. 
Freedman (1970) proposed that if a firm incurs environmental expenses beyond those required 
for regulatory compliance, then they would be acting against the interests of shareholders and 
would see a negative effect on firm value and performance. In line with this, investors may view 
firms asked to make disclosures to the CDP as having potentially high GHG emissions and with 
them high mitigation costs. Furthermore, where carbon information is disclosed, there may be no 
benefit to investors (Kolk et al., 2008). By agreeing to participate in the CDP, firms are 
committing to disclosing their existing GHG emission levels, reduction targets, initiatives to 
achieve these targets, and associated risks and opportunities arising from global warming (Lee et 
al., 2015). Mitigation initiatives tend to be related to costs. To exemplify, the decision to deploy 
green technologies is associated with an investment that would not be required if the firm decides 
not to act as a green firm (Wegener, 2010). Jacobs et al. (2010) suggested that markets react 
negatively to voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions because the associated costs are evident, 
while the revenue benefits are hard to define. Consistent with this and other studies, Fisher-
Vanden and Thorburn (2011) found that participation in the Environmental Protection Agency 
Climate Leaders programme, as a resource for reducing GHG emissions voluntarily, is linked to a 
negative market reaction.35 Palmer et al. (1995) argued that shareholders’ wealth is reduced by 
efforts to mitigate climate change because such efforts can mean diverting the investment from 
more productive activities, and can hence mean that the full potential earnings of its assets are not 
realised. As a result, the firm finds itself disadvantaged economically. In line with this argument, 
Hsu and Wang (2013) reported that positive wealth effects are associated with firms receiving 
negative news coverage regarding climate change. Lee et al. (2015) suggested that investors have 
concerns that measures to combat global warming may not bring sufficient benefits to justify the 
costs. Indeed, this concern also has a political dimension. According to Hsu and Wang (2013), 
                                                 
35 The Environmental Protection Agency Climate Leaders programme is an American governmental initiative aimed 
at tackling climate change threats and mitigating GHG emissions. 
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the deadlock in the run-up to the Paris climate treaty was partly due to the issue of additional firm 
costs and the threat to the competitiveness of some industries.  
Alternatively, as shown in Figure 5.1, it is also possible for investors to view carbon disclosures 
through Porter’s lens. This sees pollution as wasted resources and, therefore, views mitigation 
measures and the enhancement of carbon profile as strengthening firm competitiveness in a win-
win situation (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Furthermore, a participation in voluntary carbon 
disclosure will enable a firm to attract and retain high quality staff (Turban and Greening, 1997), 
encourage innovation (Surroca et al., 2010), and improve decision making as well as overall 
organisational culture (Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998; Hillman and Keim, 2001). 
In line with the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), it has been argued that companies engaged 
in enhancing their environmental responsibility are acquiring both stakeholder support and 
necessary resources, which mitigates against legislative, regulatory, or fiscal actions (Buysse and 
Verbeke, 2003; Flammer, 2013). In turn, such activities can enhance firm reputation (Hart, 1995), 
may manage firm legitimacy (Porter and Kramer, 2006), and reduce financial risks (Peloza, 
2009). It may also attract investment from the growing number of environmentally conscious 
investors (Heal, 2005; Consolandi et al., 2009; Dowell and Hart, 2011). The increased demand 
from environmentally conscious consumers can lead to a growth in share prices. Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996) and Dowell et al. (2000) suggested that important reputational benefits 
emerging from positive environmental actions can be associated with revenue growth, therefore 
maximising shareholder wealth by creating reputational capital. Turning to costs, participation in 
CDP as an environmental initiative may help companies achieve cost reductions by reducing 
pollution and other forms of waste (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Costs may also be lowered 
by improving energy efficiency and operational and supply chain business processes (Hart and 
Ahuja, 1996; Christmann, 2000; Sroufe, 2003; Rao and Holt, 2005). This might lead to better 
employment of inputs, causing a reduction in raw materials and/or waste disposal expenses. In 
the long term, costs related to future environmental crises, regulatory compliance, and liabilities 
may be avoided (Reinhardt, 1999; Karpoff et al., 2005). 
It is clear from this discussion that the views of Freedman (1970) and Porter and Van der Linde 
(1995) represent two expected outcomes from voluntary carbon disclosure, in terms of stock 
market reaction. The former is a negative reaction, and the latter is a positive one. Therefore, we 
formulate the following reference hypothesis:  
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H1: There is a significant market reaction following the announcement of CDP survey. 
 
4.3 Research Design and Data 
4.3.1 Sample 
Since the FTSE350 is the largest index in the UK that is annually assessed by the CDP, all firms 
continually listed on the FTSE350 between 2009 and 2015 were included in the sample. It is 
noteworthy that the FTSE350 firms were originally asked in 2006 to engage with and report their 
carbon footprint voluntarily via the CDP online survey.36 This first year, however, was not used 
for our analysis because (1) there was only a low level of participation in the CDP, and (2) the 
qualitative analysis only extended to assigning responses to one of the following four categories: 
Answered Questionnaire (AQ), Provided Information (IN), Declined to Participate (DP), and No 
Response (NR). From the following year, a 0 to 100 scoring scale was introduced. 
Notwithstanding this change, we also decided to exclude the period 2007-2008 to isolate our 
analysis from the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC). However, we will consider this 
impact in the additional analysis section. Following standard practice for research of this kind, 
financial institutions were also excluded because of their unique accounting principles and the 
different social and environmental guidelines they apply, such as the ‘Equator Principles’ 
(Hussainey and Salama, 2010; Macve et al., 2010; Haque, 2017; Qiu et al., 2016).37 Ultimately, 
the sample comprised of 1,564 firm-year observations crossing nine industries. The Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) used for the CDP sector categories is also applied to this 
study. A summary of the final sample distribution by industry and year is given in Table 4.1 
Panel A indicates 2014 as the highest year for response rate (79%) and 2009 as the lowest (57%) 
in the sampled period. Despite the surprising drop in 2015, it is clear that the annual increase in 
the response rate is consistent with the public concern related to climate change. Panel B shows 
that the utilities industry has the highest overall response rate (93%), while the technology 
industry has the lowest (52%). Based on the FTSE All-Share Index classification, this study 
                                                 
36 The CDP reporting year is set to match the fiscal year of each participating firm. Subsequently, the summary of 
survey data is generally published in September or October of the reporting year. 
37 The Equator Principles offer financial institutions a risk management framework aimed at providing a minimum 
standard for determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risks in projects. See: 
http://www.equator-principles.com. 
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indicates that the response rate for firms operating in carbon-intensive industries (72%) is almost 
equal to the response rate for the firms in non-intensive industries (71.25%). 38  
 
                              Participated Firms Non-Participated Firms Total Response Rate % 
Panel A: Sample Structure and Response Rates by Year 
2009 130 100 230 57% 
2010 137 87 224 61% 
2011 156 74 230 68% 
2012 163 47 210 78% 
2013 176 53 229 77% 
2014 171 45 216 79% 
2015 167 58 225 74% 
N 1,100 464 1,564  
Panel B: Sample Structure and Response Rates by Industry 
Basic Materials 102 61 163 63% 
Consumer Goods 155 33 188 82% 
Consumer Services 266 145 411 65% 
Health Care 54 20 74 73% 
Industrials 311 107 418 74% 
Oil and Gas 79 43 122 65% 
Technology 45 41 86 52% 
Telecommunications 36 10 46 78% 
Utilities 52 4 56 93% 
N 1,100 464 1,564  
Table 4.1 Sample Distributions of Chapter Observations based on Participating in CDP 
This table reports the distribution of our sample from 2009 to 2015 by industry and year. 
 
4.3.2 Event Study 
The market reaction following announcements in the CDP report is estimated by using event 
study method, thereby testing the hypothesis. This method provide the means (medians) to 
estimate event-related market returns and, at the same time, control for more general market 
influences on stock prices (MacKinlay, 1997; Jacobs et al., 2010). The underlying assumption is 
that, in conditions of market efficiency, an event’s effect is reflected immediately in the stock 
                                                 
38 FTSE All-Share Index standards are applied to identify carbon-intensive industries based on the level and nature 
of GHG emissions. These were industrials, basic materials, utilities, consumer services, and oil and gas. 
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price of the concerned firm. Consequently, by observing the stock price for a short time span, 
event effects on a firm’s value can be recorded (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011).  
The initial task when implementing the event study is to determine the event period, this being 
the period for estimating abnormal returns. To encompass the possibility of pre-announcement 
information leakage, the day prior to the announcement is included in addition to the 
announcement day itself (Lam et al., 2016). For this reason, and to align with previous event 
studies (Ba et al., 2013; Wassmer et al., 2014; Lam et al., 2016), we selected three days around 
the event dates as our main event window (i.e. days -1 to +1). This procedure would help us to 
account for the possibility of pre-event information leakages and the possibility of 
announcements being made after stock market closures. Further extension of the window would 
open up the possibility in which market movements are not attributable to the particular event 
(Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). Calendar days are converted to event days by designating 
the announcement day as Day 0. If the announcement is made on a non-trading day or later than 
4.30 pm London time of a trading day, then Day 0 would become the following day. All other 
trading days are recorded as relative to Day 0; hence, the trading day prior to Day 0 
(announcement day) is recorded as Day -1. Likewise, the trading day immediately after the 
announcement day is designated Day 1. Additionally, aligning with previous studies, the 
estimation of abnormal returns is conducted using the market model (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2010; 
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Wassmer et al., 2014).  
Under this model, a linear relationship is posited between a given stock’s return and the market 
return (the return on the market portfolio) over a specified period of time:  
 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖  +  𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡                                                                  (1) 
 
whereby 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the expected return of stock i on Day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 represents the market return 
on Day t, 𝑎𝑖  is the intercept of the relationship for stock i, and 𝛽𝑖 is the slope of the relationship 
for stock i regarding the market return, with ℇ𝑖𝑡  being the error term for stock i on Day t. The term 
𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 represents the sensitivity of stock i’s returns to market return. This portion of the return 
for which market movements provide no explanation is represented by the error term ℇ𝑖𝑡, which 
captures the effects of the firm-specific information released. The computation of expected return 
for each firm in the sample is estimated in accordance with Equation (1), where 𝑎𝑖 and  𝛽𝑖 are 
estimated by applying the ordinary least squares regression across the 200-trading-day estimation 
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period. The commencement of the estimation period was designated, with Day -200 being the 
first trading day of the year, and terminated on Day -21. The reason for terminating the 
estimation period 21 days before the event day is to protect the estimates from contamination due 
to the impacts of the announcement and to render any stationarity inconsequential. In cases where 
a firm does not have data available for the entire estimation period, a qualifying minimum of 40 
stock returns during the 200-day period was applied to the estimates in Equation (1). 
Next, the computation of the abnormal return for firm i on Day t, which is the difference between 
the actual and the expected return, goes as follows:  
 
   𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡                                                                                      (2) 
 
whereby 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is equal to the abnormal return on security i on date t, 𝑅𝑖𝑡  represents the actual 
return of stock i on Day t, and 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  represents the expected return of stock i on Day t. 
After this, aligning with previous event studies (e.g. Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010; Lam 
et al., 2016), the data is both parametrically and non-parametrically tested. First, for testing the 
data parametrically, we use the t-test to determine the statistical significance of the mean of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Second, for testing the data non-parametrically, we control 
for the effect of outliers using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which determines the statistical 
significance of the median of CARs.39 
Finally, the CARs are computed by cumulating ARs over the announcement period. 
 
  𝐴𝑅 [𝑡1, 𝑡2] = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                                                                                          (3) 
 
whereby 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is the cumulative abnormal return, t is the selected day related to the 
announcement event and 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return on security i on date t. 
 
                                                 
39 Since the study’s observations are not normally distributed on the basis of a Sapiro-Francia normality test, the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank non-parametric statistical test is prioritised for explaining the results (McDonald, 
2009). Therefore, if the results of these two tests (t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test) are inconsistent, we consider 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank results. 
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4.4 Results and Analysis 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the sample use data from the fiscal year immediately prior to the most 
recent announcement, and are shown in Table 4.2. The averages of firms’ market value and total 
assets are £9.7 and £8.8 billion, respectively, which suggests that our sample comprises large 
firms. While there is broad variation in firm characteristics found in the sample, there is an 
overall weighting towards the London Stock Exchange’s largest firms by market capitalisation.  
 
 Market Value (£M) Total Assets (£M) Sales (£M) Net Income (£M) Employees 
Mean 9,776.55 8,835.48 7,875.15 593.31 26,643.69 
Median 1,961.40 1,660.80 1,425.33 108.58 8,354.50 
SD 23,582.01 26,594.06 28,930.35 1,789.27 61,447.96 
Max 143,951.20 226,632.40 298,487.50 17,374.88 648,254 
Min 242.63 38.54 0.29 -274.56 8 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Chapter Observations 
This table is based on our sample for the period 2009 to 2015, comprising 1,564 firm-year observations.  
 
4.4.2 Market Reaction to CDP Announcements 
Table 4.3 (Panel A) shows how markets reacted to announcements from companies participating 
in the CDP report; additionally, the t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test results of ARs and 
CARs are presented. The ARs on Day -1 are not statistically significant for both the t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, indicating an absence of evidence of information leakage prior to 
CDP announcements. Furthermore, the median of ARs on day 0 is significantly negative on the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. A subsequent checking of CARs periods reveals evidence that 
responses from capital markets had a significantly negative relationship with the voluntary 
carbon information disclosure for various lengths of the event window. Notably, the mean 
(median) of CARs over the two-day window (0 to +1) and for the key three-day event window (-
1 to +1) are statistically negatively significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which indicates that investors respond negatively to the CDP 
announcements of FTSE350 firms. This could be ascribed to the fact that investors interpret 
climate-related environmental initiatives as an investment/cost to the company without an 
offsetting benefit, that reduces competitive advantage, which aligns with the conclusions of 
Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009). It would also align with Hsu and Wang’s (2013) 
findings that, generally, investors hold the belief that when firms tackle climate change, it can 
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increase costs and place firms at an economic disadvantage. In other words, voluntary carbon 
disclosure requires additional costs that reduce the attractiveness of investment in the firm, which 
may lead investors to abandon the firm's stock even at low prices. Therefore, H1 is supported, 
and London Stock Exchange investors’ reaction is consistent with Freedman’s (1970) view that 
expenses incurred for environmental purposes, which fall outside of regulatory compliance run, 
counter to the best interests of shareholders and degrade firm value. Conversely, market reactions 
to CDP’s non-participants, shown in Panel B of Table 4.3, were not significant, particularly for 
the key event window (-1 to +1), with the exception of Day 0 that is negatively significant in the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
 
Panel A: Participated Firms 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 1100 -0.018% -0.018% -0.378 -0.755 
0 1100 -0.054% -0.095% -1.030 -2.483** 
+1 1100 -0.045% -0.061% -0.804 -0.948 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 1100 -0.072% -0.115% -1.103 -2.092** 
0, +1 1100 -0.098% -0.144% -1.326* -2.156** 
-1, +1 1100 -0.122% -0.202% -1.351* -1.798* 
Panel B: Non-Participated Firms 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 464  0.120% -0.142%  1.301 -0.636 
0 464 -0.178%  0.109% -1.867 -2.195** 
+1 464  0.096%  0.062%  1.060  1.334 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 464 -0.072% -0.115% -0.453 -0.782 
0, +1 464 -0.058% -0.221% -0.634 -0.583 
-1, +1 464 -0.050%  0.154% -0.295 -0.632 
Table 4.3 Market Reaction for Participated and Non-Participated Firms in CDP Report 
This table is based on our sample for the period 2009 to 2015, comprising 1,564 firm-year observations. * 
p<10% (one-tailed tests), ** p<5% (one-tailed tests), and *** p<1% (one-tailed tests). 
 
The explanation of our findings is that participation in the CDP survey is perceived as leading to 
extra costs from investors’ perspective. The robustness of the main results presented in Table 4.3 
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are inducted on firms participating in CDP and working in carbon-intensive industries. For such 
firms,  there is a greater likelihood of significant costs being incurred in relation to environmental 
protection, including risk management, clean-up costs, and reporting and compliance costs 
(Nguyen, 2018). For this, we divide the firms participating in the CDP survey into ten industries 
(nine after excluding the financial industry) based on GICS classification.  
We then apply FTSE All-Share Index standards to identify carbon-intensive industries within the 
subsample of firms that participated in the CDP survey (1,100 observations). These were found to 
be consumer services, basic materials, industrials, utilities, and oil and gas. Panel A in Table 4.4 
indicates that investors react to CDP announcements for firms working in carbon-intensive 
industries in a significantly negative way at the 5% level. This response occurs in almost all 
window periods, particularly in the key event window (-1 to +1) and on the announcement day 
itself (Day 0). The mean and median results of ARs and CARs for these and other periods 
support the notion that investors' impressions of participation in measure to tackle climate change 
and voluntary carbon disclosure initiatives are a cost on firms. This finding is aligned with 
Chapple et al. (2013) who also found that the market evaluates the most carbon-intensive firms in 
the sample more negatively than other firms. These investors' reactions reflect the expectation 
that environment-related costs will increase, creating negative financial consequences; an 
expectation that is even more pronounced for firms in carbon-intensive industries (Ramiah et al., 
2013). These cost consequences may be carbon-related management and accounting costs, clean-
up costs, litigation and compliance costs or reputational damage costs. For firms working in non-
intensive industries (Panel B), although there are significant positive reactions thru t-test on the 
announcement day (day 0) and for the event window of (-1 to 0), we were unable to confirm 
these results since the test of Wilcoxon signed-rank has insignificant signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
Panel A: Intensive Industries 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 810 -0.023% -0.036% -0.4258 -1.099 
0 810 -0.136% -0.129% -2.313** -3.169*** 
1 810 -0.041% -0.053% -0.581 -0.268 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 810 -0.159% -0.171% -2.116** -2.116** 
0, +1 810 -0.176% -0.161% -2.001** -2.347** 
-1, +1 810 -0.198% -0.266% -1.812** -2.089** 
Panel B: Non-Intensive Industries 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 290 -0.003%  0.022% -0.033 0.384 
0 290  0.175%  0.019%  1.575* 0.431 
1 290 -0.056% -0.118% -0.702 -1.458 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 290  0.171%  0.082% 1.322* 1.065 
0, +1 290  0.119% -0.079% 0.869 -0.239 
-1, +1 290  0.089% -0.038% 0.562 0.009 
Table 4.4 Market Reaction for Participated Firms in Intensive and Non-Intensive Industries 
This table is based on firms participated in CDP from our sample for the period of 2009 to 2015, 
comprising 1,100 firm-year observations. * p<10% (one-tailed tests), ** p<5% (one-tailed tests), and 
*** p<1% (one-tailed tests). 
 
4.4.3 Additional Analyses 
To examine the impact of the GFC period, we apply the same criteria as for the main sample, but 
change the period from 2009-2015 to 2007-2008, and the total observations for the new sample 
becomes 455.40 Table 4.5 (Panel A) shows the market responses for companies participating in 
CDP announcements during the crisis period. The results through the two tests (i.e. t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test) over several event window periods, including the key period (i.e. -1, 
+1), show a significant positive market reaction. This finding can be explained as an investor 
perception of the CDP announcement as a signal of the financial strength of the participating 
firms. This perception is based on the view that firms that participated in CDP during the GFC 
are confident of their financial situation. This is demonstrated by their allocation of financial 
                                                 
40 Consistent with Erkens et al., 2012, we specify the years of 2007-2008 as the GFC period. 
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resources to non-profit social initiatives, such as voluntarily disclosure of their carbon profile 
through the CDP report. This finding is supportive of Mohr et al., (2001) who argue that 
investment in CSR should be maintained during economic crises as it exerts a positive influence 
on stakeholder behaviour. Similarly, Gallego‐Álvarez et al., (2014) stated that CSR is required in 
times of financial crises to induce greater trust in the business. The results of non-CDP 
participants for the 2007-2008 period, as presented in Panel B of Table 4.5, shows that while 
market responses are inconsistent through ARs and CARs periods, for the key period (i.e. -1, +1), 
reactions are insignificant. Having said that, the market would not react positively or negatively 
for firms that do not disclose their carbon profile during the GFC period but will reward firms 
that disclose their carbon profile during the GFC period. 
 
Panel A: Participated Firms 
Day N Mean  Median t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 181 0.128% 0.166% 0.528 0.665 
0 181 0.598% -0.327% 1.569* -0.098 
+1 181 0.465% 0.354% 1.670** 1.674* 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 181 0.725% 0.036% 1.706** 0.849 
0, +1 181 1.063% 0.358% 2.381*** 1.881* 
-1, +1 181 1.191% 0.183% 2.606*** 1.918* 
Panel B: Non-Participated Firms 
Day N  Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 274  -0.305% -0.0503% -1.823** -1.046 
0 274  -0.234% -0.446% -0.972 -2.480** 
+1 274   0.890%  0.535%  5.215***  4.998*** 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 274  -0.540% -0.314% -1.746** -1.849* 
0, +1 274   0.655%  0.201%  2.573***  1.851* 
-1, +1 274   0.350% -0.053%  1.1489  0.915 
Table 4.5 Participated and Non-Participated Firms in CDP for Crisis Period 
This table is based on our sample for the crisis period of 2007-2008, comprising 455 firm-year 
observations. * p<10% (one-tailed tests), ** p<5% (one-tailed tests), and *** p<1% (one-tailed tests). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Climate change has become a major issue in corporate decision making and poses a challenge to 
corporate leadership. There is increasing pressure for businesses to operate in a climate-friendly 
way, but a potential conflict may arise when such a strategy contradicts the pursuit of shareholder 
value. Empirical studies have produced mixed results when examining the issue of CSR and 
firm’s financial consequences. Our study set out to understand the market reaction to carbon 
disclosures for the UK context. To this end, a conceptual model was applied which explains the 
market reactions, negative or positive (i.e. Freedman, 1970; Porter, and Van der Linde, 1995). In 
line with this model, we hypothesise that there would be a significant market reaction, either 
positive or negative, following the announcement of voluntary carbon disclosure via the CDP 
survey. The study uses an event study approach and a data set of 1,564 firm-year observations of 
large firms listed on the FTSE350 index for the period 2009-2015. In addition, two subsamples 
were analysed, one based on industry status (carbon-intensive/non-carbon-intensive) for CDP 
participating firms, and another that included a sample for the GFC period 2007-2008. 
For the main sample, our analysis showed a statistically significant negative market reaction to 
carbon disclosure announcements of FTSE350 firms. This suggests that investors perceive such 
disclosures to be associated with climate-related environmental investments, representing costs 
that are not perceived to be offset by tangible benefits and that weaken competitive advantage. 
This result supports the win-lose view that any costs incurred beyond regulatory compliance is 
against the interests of shareholders and would have a negative effect on firm value (Freedman, 
1970). For the industry status subsample, our results also show that investors in firms operated in 
carbon-intensive industries react to carbon disclosure announcements in a significantly negative 
way. This result also supports the expectation that firms operating in carbon-intensive industries 
experience a more pronounced negative reaction on voluntary carbon disclosure. For the temporal 
subsample (2007-2008), carbon disclosure announcements are associated with a significantly 
positive market reaction. We conjecture that this may be explained as an investor perception of 
the carbon disclosure announcement in the crisis period as a signal of the financial robustness of 
participating firms, though this explanation does not necessarily align with Porter and Van der 
Linde (1995) and their win-win approach. 
Hence, overall, we can conclude that, in the case of the London Stock Exchange’s investors, 
voluntary carbon disclosures are deemed to have a negative value as they signal directly 
assignable associated costs that are not matched by tangible financial benefits. The exception to 
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this was the 2007-2008 crisis period. This finding leads to the implication that more emphasis 
needs to be placed by management on identifying and justifying firms’ environmental strategies 
and the resultant initiatives. Carbon disclosures should be accompanied by these clarifications, 
and expressions of the resultant value should be as tangible as possible. Future research may 
consider the scores of voluntary carbon disclosure for the firms included in the CDP report as a 
possible factor in the market reaction toward climate change initiatives. This could be achieved 
by controlling the disclosure score as a piece of good news for firms with a high disclosure score 
and bad news for firms with a low disclosure score. Moreover, using carbon disclosures data 
from a different source to the CDP would add to the present study and the empirical robustness of 
its findings. Finally, market reaction to mandatory carbon disclosure announcements could be 
considered in future research.  
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Chapter 5.Conclusion 
5.1 Recapitulation 
The motivation for this research was drawn from the mounting interest in examining how 
corporate initiatives aimed at tackling climate change impact a firm’s financial situation. The UK 
was selected for the research sample as it is a high-polluting country with established voluntary 
carbon disclosure practices. Voluntary participation in the UK-based CDP testifies to how these 
issues have emerged in the corporate agenda. The aim of this research is to provide a meaningful 
illumination of the financial consequences resulting from voluntary carbon disclosure for the 
firms listed in the FTSE350 index from 2007 to 2015. To meet this aim, we utilised unique 
environmental and financial data from well-established sources— Bloomberg, Datastream, and 
the CDP databases. 
Non-financial consequences of carbon disclosure were beyond the scope of this research which 
restricted itself to financial aspects. Consequently, the research comprised of three separate 
studies, each presented in its own chapter. The objective of the first study presented in Chapter 2, 
was to investigate the impact of carbon disclosure on firm FP. The RBV of the firm was applied 
as a theoretical framework and is linked to voluntary carbon disclosures. A comprehensive FP 
index was developed, and firm characteristics were controlled. By performing multiple sensitivity 
tests, convincing evidence was found for a positive effect of voluntary carbon disclosures on firm 
FP. Among the measures of FP, market-based measurements were found to have a less 
significant relationship with carbon disclosure when compared to others. The study also included 
tests investigating the effect of the 2007-2008 GFC, revealing that carbon disclosure serves as a 
significant determinant of the FP of UK listed firms after the crisis period. Moreover, results 
indicated that firms that achieved high FP reported highly positive carbon disclosure compared to 
a modest disclosure for firms with low FP. Finally, firms that operate in carbon-intensive 
industries were found not to derive benefits from their carbon disclosures in the same way as 
their non-intensive counterparts. The findings reported in this first study offer new insights and 
policy implications for management, investors and regulators. The findings strongly suggest that 
effective strategic management should include consideration of a firm’s carbon footprint and is 
consequent disclosure activities. Corporate transparency should be extended to cover carbon-
related decision-making and the role of these decisoins in management’s pursuit of a sustainable 
competitive advantage.   
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Different stakeholder groups can see in these findings the benefits of voluntary carbon disclosure. 
Investors inparticular can consider the findings when making investment decisions, presumably 
viewing voluntary discloser firms more favourably. The findings will also enable regulators to 
develop their evaluation of firms’ willingness to disclose their carbon emissions voluntarily and 
use this improved understanding when reviewing the regulatory framework. 
The objective of the second study, presented in Chapter 3, was to investigate the impact of carbon 
disclosure on FR by testing the potentially positive relationship between the FR and information 
asymmetry. Again, the RBV framework is used to develop an understanding of how the inclusion 
of climate change inititiatives in the overall business strategy impacts FR. The adoption of a 
positive carbon strategy, of which carbon disclosure is a part, was found to reduce the firm's 
systematic, idiosyncratic, and total risks. In line with the first study, this relationship is not 
significant until after the GFC period. Additionally, the relationship was found to be more 
noticeable for carbon-intensive industries. Stakeholders, who are greatly concerned with the 
firm’s survivability and sustainability, will find these findings particularly insightful.  
The third study, presented in Chapter 4, examined the market reaction to voluntary carbon 
disclosure announcements via the CDP. The objective was to develop an understanding of the 
cost-benefit consequences of both climate change mitigation activities and the reporting thereof. 
By applying the event study methodology, it was found that markets give a significantly negative 
response to carbon disclosure announcements. Furthermore, this negative reaction was 
significantly stronger for firms in carbon-intensive industries. Conversely, during the GFC 
period, the market reaction was significantly positive to such announcements. The clear inference 
from this finding is that management should place extra emphasis on explaining the advantages 
of climate change mitigation expenditures and justifying their overall environmental strategy.  
Each of the research objectives were addressed in separate empirical chapters. However, these 
were each unified components of the overall research aim which was to examine the financial 
consequences of voluntary carbon disclosure on leading UK companies. In combination, FP, FR 
and market reaction form a triangulated picture of the financial consequences of voluntary carbon 
disclosure with greater validity than taking one aspect alone.  
This thesis has added original contributions to knowledge of how voluntary carbon disclosure 
interacts with three financial consequences: FR, FR and market reaction. Some contributions are 
shared across all three emprical chatpers as well as others unique to a given chapter. The first 
shared contribution was providing evidence from the UK on the financial consequences of 
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voluntary carbon disclosures to help fill the gap that existed in the literature. The second shared 
contribution was the evidence provided on the effect of industry type (carbon-intensive vs non-
carbon-intensive industries) on the financial consequences of volutary carbon disclosure. Thirdly, 
each chapter added to understanding of the effect of the GFC on these consequences. Regarding 
the chapter-specific contributions, the first study presented in Chapter 2 makes two further 
contributions to the literature. First, it develops RBV theory towards understanding how a 
proactive carbon strategy which includes voluntary carbon disclosure can effect FP.  Second, it 
provided an original use of a financial index for quantification of the financial impacts of carbon 
disclosure which  adds to the broad ranging environmental accounting literature by identifying 
the impact of carbon disclosure on separate indicators, e.g. accounting vs market-based measures 
of firm FP. For the second study, presented in Chapter 3, a conceptual model based on RBV 
theory was devised which considers the positive association between information asymmetry and 
FR and which builds understanding of how voluntary carbon disclosure could affect FR. Second, 
as far as is known to the researcher, this is the first study to investigate the impact of voluntary 
carbon disclosure on FR. A third study was presented in Chapter 4. Alongside the 
aforementioned shared contributions this study proposes a theoretical framework using the cost-
benefit approach and aimed at facilitating understanding of market reaction to voluntary carbon 
disclosure announcements. 
Today, climate change poses a major threat to global economic stability and can have important 
effects on a firm’s financial situation. The conclusion of this research is that there is a significant 
relationship between voluntary carbon disclosure and each of FP, FR and market reaction. This 
forms the basis for the implication that improvements should be made to the credibility, 
reliability, and relevance of carbon-related information to improve the overall quality of 
disclosures. Furthermore, greater emphasis needs to be placed on explicitly explaining the 
benefits of climate change mitigation activities to counter the perception among investors that 
costs associated with them negatively affect firm performance.  
 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This research limited its sample to large firms listed on the FTSE350 of the London Stock 
Exchange. Caution should be exercised in generalising the findings of the three studies to firms 
with varying sizes and those in other countries. Furthermore, gaps in the data were encountered 
for certain variables, namely the R&D expenditures advertising expenses which may have 
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affected the analysis of the relationships of interest. Moreover, corporate governance, ownership 
structure, and audit-related issues could also be important as explanatory variables and we have 
not considered all of them in the all examined relationships because of the limited research scope 
and the difficulty to control all related variables in one piece of research. 
Future researchers are urged to examine the relationships again and to investigate the UK’s 
overall carbon profile once it has completed its withdrawal from the European Union. This 
withdrawal may be highly significant as it may include withdrawal from the European Union 
Emissions Trading System. Additionally, this single-country research could be developed into a 
comparative study by comparing firms in two or more countries since there are major differences 
between countries, specifically in their regulation and business environment. Moreover, 
investigations on the largest firms in the UK can be replicated for other smaller firms. Small 
firms have different sets of characteristics particular in their size, therefore they will experience 
less pressure from stakeholders including regulators, to be more responsible towards the 
environment. Recognising that the CDP is not the only source of disclosed carbon data, a 
different or multiple sources can be used in future studies. Forthcoming research may consider 
the level of voluntary carbon disclosure for firms included in the CDP report as a possible factor 
in the market reaction toward the climate change initiatives. Finally, investor reaction to 
mandatory carbon disclosure announcements can be compared with reactions to voluntary 
disclosure announcements.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 2.1: Financial Performance Index (FPI) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
1. Accounting Measures 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
1.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
= Net Income / Average Total Assets 
 Is a firm’s ROA > the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
ROA measures the efficiency of assets in generating income (e.g. Busch and Hoffman, 2011). 
 
1.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
= Net Income / Common Shareholders Equity 
 Is a firm’s ROE > the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
ROE measures the shareholder return (e.g. Busch and Hoffman, 2011). 
 
1.3 Asset Turnover (AT) 
= Net Sales / Average Total Assets 
 Is a firm’s AT > the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
AT measures the company ability to use its assets to generate sales (e.g. Cochran and Wood, 1984). 
 
1.4 Debt-to-Equity Ratio (D/E) 
= Short and Long-Term Debt / Shareholders' Equity 
 Is a firm’s D/E < the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
D/E measures the creditor influence as it captures the significance of creditors as stakeholders relative to 
equity investors (e.g. Roberts, 1992). 
 
1.5 Interest Coverage Ratio (IC) 
= {Net Income / [1 - (Effective Tax Rate / 100)] + (Total Interest Expense - Total Interest Income)} / 
(Total Interest Incurred - Total Interest Income)  
 Is a firm’s IC> the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
IC determines whether the company can pay the interest on its loans in a timely manner (e.g. Harrison 
and McMillan, 2003). 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2. Market Measures 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- 
2.1 Stock Return Volatility (RV) 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 = √
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛)
𝑛
𝑡
2       
i= firm, t= year 
 Is a firm’s RV < the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
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RV measures the level of daily return volatility over the 12 months as a proxy for the unsystematic risk 
(e.g. Jo and Na, 2012). 
 
2.2 Cost of Equity (COE) 
= (Risk-free Rate + [Beta x Country Risk Premium]) 
 Is a firm’s COE < the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
COE measures the expected return, given its total risk (e.g. Lee et al., 2010). 
 
2.3 Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) 
= Market Value per Share / Earnings per Share (EPS) 
 Is a firm’s P/E < the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
P/E measures the market expectations for a company's growth (e.g. Fogler and Nutt, 1975). 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
3. Combined Measures 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------- 
 
 
3.1 Altman Z-score (Z) 
=1.2 * (Working Capital / Tangible Assets) + 1.4 * (Retained Earnings / Tangible Assets) + 3.3 * (EBIT 
/ Tangible Assets) + 0.6 * (Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities) + (Sales / Tangible Assets)} 
 Is a firm’s Z-score > the Industry Average?  
             a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
Z measures the probability of a firm suffering financial distress or bankruptcy (e.g. Miller and Reuer, 
1996). 
 
 
3.2 Market-To-Book Ratio (P/B) 
= Market Capitalisation / Book Value of Common Equity 
 Is a firm’s P/B > the Industry Average?  
  a value of 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
P/B captures the industry’s growth opportunities (e.g. Barnea and Rubin, 2010). 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Data Source: Bloomberg Database. 
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Appendix 2.2: Summary of the Carbon Disclosure and Scoring Weight 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
1. Climate Change Management: Governance, Strategy, Targets and Initiatives and 
Communications – Scoring weighted average = 41.5/188 u 100 = 22% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.1    Governance Questions 
1.1.1 What are the highest level of direct responsibility for climate change within your organisation? 
1.1.2 Please identify the position of the individual or name of the committee with this responsibility. 
1.1.3 Do you provide incentives for the management of climate change issues, including the attainment 
of targets? Please provide further details on the incentives provided for the management of climate 
change issues. 
1.2   Strategy Questions 
1.2.1 Is climate change integrated into your business strategy? 
1.2.2 Does your company use an internal price of carbon? 
1.2.3 Do you engage in activities that could either directly or indirectly influence policy on climate 
change through any of the following? (tick all that apply) 
Direct engagement with policy makers                       ❍ 
Trade associations                                                      ❍ 
    Funding research organisations                                  ❍ 
      No                                                                              ❍ 
       Other…………………….                                         ❍ 
1.2.4 Please select the option that best describes your risk management procedures regarding climate 
change risks and opportunities at both company and asset level. 
         Integrated into multi-disciplinary companywide risk management processes     ❍ 
                                                    A specific climate change risk management process                                                  ❍ 
1.3   Targets and Initiatives Questions 
1.3.1 Did you have emissions reduction/initiatives target that was active (ongoing or reached 
completion) in the reporting year? 
1.3.2 Does the use of your goods and/or services directly enable GHG emissions to be avoided by a 
third party? 
1.4   Communications Questions 
1.4.1 Have you published information about your organisation’s response to climate change and GHG 
emissions performance for this reporting year in places other than in your CDP response? If so, 
please attach the publication(s). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2. Climate Change Risks and Opportunities – Scoring weighted average = 54/188 u 100 = 29% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2.1    Regulatory, Physical and Other Climate Change Risks Questions 
2.1.1 Have you identified any inherent climate change risks that have the potential to generate a 
substantive change in your business operations, revenue or expenditure? 
2.2    Regulatory, Physical and Other Climate Change Opportunities Questions 
2.2.1 Have you identified any inherent climate change opportunities that have the potential to generate 
a substantive change in your business operations, revenue or expenditure? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------- 
3. Climate Change Emissions Methodology, Emissions Data, Energy, Emissions Performance 
and Emissions Trading – Scoring weighted average = 91/188 u 100 = 48% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
3.1  Emissions Methodology Questions 
3.1.1 Please provide your base year and base year emissions. 
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3.1.2 Please give the name of the standard, protocol or methodology you have used to collect activity 
data and calculate emissions, the source for the global warming potentials the company used and 
the emissions factors you have applied and their origin; alternatively, please attach an Excel 
spreadsheet with this data at the bottom of this page. 
3.2  Emissions Data Questions 
3.2.1 Please select the boundary you are using for your greenhouse gas inventory. 
     Financial control                                                   ❍ 
     Operational control                                             ❍ 
     Equity share                                                        ❍ 
     Other …………………….                                 ❍ 
3.2.2 Please provide your gross global emissions figures in metric tonnes CO2e. 
3.2.3 Are there any sources (e.g. facilities, specific GHGs, activities, geographies etc.) emissions that 
are within your selected reporting boundary which are not included in your disclosure? If yes 
please provide further details about the sources of emissions. 
3.2.4 Please estimate the level of uncertainty of the total gross global emissions figures that you have 
supplied and specify the sources of uncertainty in your data gathering, handling and calculations. 
3.2.5 Please indicate the external verification or assurance status that applies to your reported 
emissions.  
3.2.6 Please provide further details of the verification or assurance undertaken for your emissions, and 
attach the relevant statements. 
3.3  Energy Questions 
3.3.1 What percentage of your total operational spend in the reporting year was on energy? 
3.3.2 Please state how much fuel, electricity, heat, steam, and cooling in MWh your organisation has 
purchased and consumed during the reporting year. 
3.4  Emissions Performance Questions 
3.4.1 How do your absolute gross global emissions for the reporting year compare to the previous year? 
3.4.2 Please identify the reasons for any change in your gross global emissions and for each of them 
specify how your emissions compare to the previous year. 
3.5  Emissions Trading Questions 
3.5.1 Do you participate in any emission trading schemes? If yes, please provide further details. 
3.5.2 What is your strategy for complying with the schemes in which you participate or anticipate 
participating? 
3.5.3 Has your organisation originated any project-based carbon credits or purchased any within the 
reporting period? If yes, please provide further details. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Sign Off – Scoring weighted average = 1.5/188 u 100 = 1% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
x Please provide the following information for the person that has signed off (approved) the CDP climate 
change response: 
i) Name 
ii) Job title 
iii) Corresponding job category 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Source: https://www.cdp.net/Documents/Guidance/2015/CDP-climate-change-scoring-
methodology.pdf 
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Appendix 3.1: Summary of the Carbon Disclosure and Scoring Weight 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
1. Climate Change Management: Governance, Strategy, Targets and Initiatives and 
Communications – Scoring weighted average = 41.5/188 u 100 = 22% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.1    Governance Questions 
3.1.1 What are the highest level of direct responsibility for climate change within your organisation? 
3.1.2 Please identify the position of the individual or name of the committee with this responsibility. 
3.1.3 Do you provide incentives for the management of climate change issues, including the attainment 
of targets? Please provide further details on the incentives provided for the management of climate 
change issues. 
1.2   Strategy Questions 
1.2.1 Is climate change integrated into your business strategy? 
1.2.2 Does your company use an internal price of carbon? 
1.2.3 Do you engage in activities that could either directly or indirectly influence policy on climate 
change through any of the following? (tick all that apply) 
Direct engagement with policy makers                       ❍ 
Trade associations                                                      ❍ 
    Funding research organisations                                  ❍ 
      No                                                                              ❍ 
       Other…………………….                                         ❍ 
1.2.4 Please select the option that best describes your risk management procedures regarding climate 
change risks and opportunities at both company and asset level. 
         Integrated into multi-disciplinary companywide risk management processes     ❍ 
                                                    A specific climate change risk management process                                                  ❍ 
1.3   Targets and Initiatives Questions 
1.3.1 Did you have emissions reduction/initiatives target that was active (ongoing or reached 
completion) in the reporting year? 
1.3.2 Does the use of your goods and/or services directly enable GHG emissions to be avoided by a 
third party? 
1.4   Communications Questions 
1.4.1 Have you published information about your organisation’s response to climate change and GHG 
emissions performance for this reporting year in places other than in your CDP response? If so, 
please attach the publication(s). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2. Climate Change Risks and Opportunities – Scoring weighted average = 54/188 u 100 = 29% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2.1    Regulatory, Physical and Other Climate Change Risks Questions 
2.1.1 Have you identified any inherent climate change risks that have the potential to generate a 
substantive change in your business operations, revenue or expenditure? 
2.2    Regulatory, Physical and Other Climate Change Opportunities Questions 
2.2.1 Have you identified any inherent climate change opportunities that have the potential to generate 
a substantive change in your business operations, revenue or expenditure? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
3. Climate Change Emissions Methodology, Emissions Data, Energy, Emissions Performance 
and Emissions Trading – Scoring weighted average = 91/188 u 100 = 48% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
3.1  Emissions Methodology Questions 
3.1.1 Please provide your base year and base year emissions. 
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3.1.2 Please give the name of the standard, protocol or methodology you have used to collect activity 
data and calculate emissions, the source for the global warming potentials the company used and 
the emissions factors you have applied and their origin; alternatively, please attach an Excel 
spreadsheet with this data at the bottom of this page. 
3.2  Emissions Data Questions 
3.2.1 Please select the boundary you are using for your greenhouse gas inventory. 
     Financial control                                                   ❍ 
     Operational control                                             ❍ 
     Equity share                                                        ❍ 
     Other …………………….                                 ❍ 
3.2.2 Please provide your gross global emissions figures in metric tonnes CO2e. 
3.2.3 Are there any sources (e.g. facilities, specific GHGs, activities, geographies etc.) emissions that 
are within your selected reporting boundary which are not included in your disclosure? If yes 
please provide further details about the sources of emissions. 
3.2.4 Please estimate the level of uncertainty of the total gross global emissions figures that you have 
supplied and specify the sources of uncertainty in your data gathering, handling and calculations. 
3.2.5 Please indicate the external verification or assurance status that applies to your reported 
emissions.  
3.2.6 Please provide further details of the verification or assurance undertaken for your emissions, and 
attach the relevant statements. 
3.3  Energy Questions 
3.3.1 What percentage of your total operational spend in the reporting year was on energy? 
3.3.2 Please state how much fuel, electricity, heat, steam, and cooling in MWh your organisation has 
purchased and consumed during the reporting year. 
3.4  Emissions Performance Questions 
3.4.1 How do your absolute gross global emissions for the reporting year compare to the previous year? 
3.4.2 Please identify the reasons for any change in your gross global emissions and for each of them 
specify how your emissions compare to the previous year. 
3.5  Emissions Trading Questions 
3.5.1 Do you participate in any emission trading schemes? If yes, please provide further details. 
3.5.2 What is your strategy for complying with the schemes in which you participate or anticipate 
participating? 
3.5.3 Has your organisation originated any project-based carbon credits or purchased any within the 
reporting period? If yes, please provide further details. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sign Off – Scoring weighted average = 1.5/188 u 100 = 1% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
x Please provide the following information for the person that has signed off (approved) the CDP climate 
change response: 
iv) Name 
v) Job title 
vi) Corresponding job category 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Source: https://www.cdp.net/Documents/Guidance/2015/CDP-climate-change-scoring-
methodology.pdf 
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Appendix 3.2: Board Composition Index  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
1. Chairman Independence Are the chair positions separated from the CEO? 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise. 
 
2. Board Size Is a firm’s Board Size > the Industry Average? 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
 
3. Board Independence Is a firm’s independent directors percentage > the Industry 
Average? 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Female on Board Is a firm’s female board director percentage > the Industry Average? 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
 
5. Board Meeting Number Are a firm’s board meetings per year > the Industry Average? 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
 
6. Board Meeting Attendance Is a firm’s board attendance percentage > the Industry 
Average? 1 if yes; 0 otherwise. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Data Source: Bloomberg Database. 
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